Increasing Dominance - the Role of Advertising, Pricing and Product Design

Despite the empirical relevance of advertising strategies in concentrated markets, the economics literature is largely silent on the effect of persuasive advertising strategies on pricing, market structure and increasing (or decreasing) dominance. In a simple model of persuasive advertising and pricing with differentiated goods, we analyze the interdependencies between ex-ante asymmetries in consumer appeal, advertising and prices. Products with larger initial appeal to consumers will be advertised more heavily but priced at a higher level - that is, advertising and price discounts are strategic substitutes for products with asymmetric initial appeal. We find that the escalating effect of advertising dominates the moderating effect of pricing so that post-competition market shares are more asymmetric than pre-competition differences in consumer appeal. We further find that collusive advertising (but competitive pricing) generates the same market outcomes, and that network effects lead to even more extreme market outcomes, both directly and via the effect on advertising.Increasing dominance; persuasive advertising; duopoly; network effects

Increasing Dominance - the Role of Advertising, Pricing and Product Design

Despite the empirical relevance of advertising strategies in concentrated markets, the economics literature is largely silent on the effect of persuasive advertising strategies on pricing, market structure and increasing (or decreasing) dominance. In a simple model of persuasive advertising and pricing with differentiated goods, we analyze the interdependencies between ex-ante asymmetries in consumer appeal, advertising and prices. Products with larger initial appeal to consumers will be advertised more heavily but priced at a higher level - that is, advertising and price discounts are strategic substitutes for products with asymmetric initial appeal. We find that the escalating effect of advertising dominates the moderating effect of pricing so that post-competition market shares are more asymmetric than pre-competition differences in consumer appeal. We further find that collusive advertising (but competitive pricing) generates the same market outcomes, and that network effects lead to even more extreme market outcomes, both directly and via the effect on advertising

Two-Sided Market with Spillover - Modeling a City

The paper explores the analogy between city and two-sided market. It generalizes the results on the pricing strategies of the platform in the two-sided markets for the case when concentration spillover plays an important role. The two-sided market framework is applied to model a city. The paper highlights the importance of the network effect and labor market structure for city size, governance and agglomeration formation. The cases of an isolated city and competing cities are considered.Two-sided markets; Industrial organization; Urban economics; Concentration spillover; City; Labor matching market

Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac

A Brief History of Mobile Telecommunication in Europe

Since the introduction of mobile telephony in the early fifties in Europe, US and Japan the demand for this service exploded. It seems that the latent demand for mobile telecommunication services for decade's continued to be very strong. Since the introduction of cellular technology the capacity of the services increasingly became able to meet the massive demand. Next and future generations of mobile telecommunication technologies bring increased transmission speed and more versatile services. This forces network operators to organise multi- sourced information flows supplied by service providers to increase the network effect of the system instead of providing the network infrastructure and leave the content to the users as in pure voice telephony. The drivers and inhibitors behind the emergence and recent developments of mobile telecommunications systems in Europe are highlighted in this paper. Liberalisation of the telecom markets in Europe drove new entrants to the market and curbed excessive pricing. However, in recent years the lack of challenging service is the main cause for the wavering development of newer generations of mobile telecommunication services.Telecommunications, Market Structure, Production, Pricing, Technological Change, Economic History, Europe

Improving the MVA-km Method for Transmission Cost Allocation Using Counter-Flow Approaches

Today with restructuring in power systems and the emergence of competitive electricity markets, operation of the power system have been many changes one of the challenges facing the electricity markets, is transmission pricing. transmission pricing has great impact on the network return on investment, competition and attracting new investors. In this paper, transfer pricing is performed by combination of Zbus and MVA-km methods. The Zbus method is used to determine the contribution of participant of lines transmission power and MVA-km method is used to determine the cost of participant transmission. Lines average apparent power flow is used in MVA-km method. three approaches to using MVA-km is defined in order to investigate the effect of reverse power of lines and how to calculate costs is presented by each approach. Simulation of the proposed method on the test network of 12 Bass is done. and the results of MW-km is compared with MVA-km. also, the results of these three approaches of MVA-km method were compared together and analysis their advantages and disadvantages

Price Discrimination between Retailers with and without Market Power

Some retail markets are more competitive than others. A manufacturer with market power in the wholesale market who sells his product to competing retailers in cities and monopolistic ones in each of various towns must set the wholesale price difference between towns and cities to be smaller than the transportation cost to prevent “grey market” arbitrage. If he uses linear pricing, the town retail price will be even higher than under single-retailer double marginalization. Two-part tariffs do not solve the problem as they would if there were a single retailer, because the wholesale unit price must be higher than marginal cost to prevent arbitrage to the cities. If transportation costs are low, price discrimination is difficult and two- part tariffs come to resemble inefficient linear monopoly pricing. High transportation costs allow greater efficiency in contracting, and this can outweigh the negative direct effect on welfare.price discrimination, double marginalization, retail network, transportation costs, two-part tariffs, vertical restraints

The effects of interbank networks on efficiency and stability in a macroeconomic agent-based model

We develop a macroeconomic agent-based model that consists of firms, banks, unions and households who interact on labour, goods, credit and interbank markets. The model endogenises pricing decisions by firms, wage setting by unions and interest rate setting by banks on both firm and interbank lending. Banks also set leverage targets and precautionary liquidity buffers on the basis of internal risk models. Our model produces endogenous fluctuations driven by the pricing behaviour of firms and the wage setting behaviour of unions. Fluctuations lead to loan defaults which are exacerbated as lenders reduce lending and charge higher interest rates, inducing a credit crunch. We also study how making the inter-banking network more connected affects the key outcomes of the economy and find that while the flow of funds from surplus banks to firms can be increased, the latter effect is soon dominated by increasing instability in the real sector as firms default at higher rates. While the banking sector experiences fewer defaults as a whole, losses on the interbank market increase as a source of bank defaults

Pricing information goods with piracy and heterogeneous consumers

We present an information good pricing model with persistently heterogeneous consumers and a rising marginal propensity for them to pirate. Three offsetting pricing mechanisms occur: skimming, compressing price changes, and delaying product launch. We identify a novel trade off in piracy's effect on welfare. We find that piracy quickens sales times and raises welfare in fixed capacity markets, and does the opposite in growing markets. In our model, consumers benefit from piracy except at very high rates in rapidly expanding markets, legal sellers always dislike it, and pirate providers like high but not very high rates. Purchase delay, transient heterogeneity, inelastic demand, and network externalities reduce piracy's effect, but demand uncertainty doesn't

The impact of hub hierarchy and market competition on airfare pricing in US hub-to-hub markets

Over the past years, full-service carriers in Europe have deployed multi-hub-and-spoke systems by joining alliances to exploit network economies. The concentration of flights on a small group of airports leads to the emergence of ‘fortress hubs’ and subsequently creates hub-to-hub markets in Europe reminiscent of the US aviation market. This paper explores the factors influencing the pricing behaviour of full-service carriers in European hub-to-hub markets. Drawing on a 2009 dataset containing route and airfare information, we establish an econometric model to estimate the impact of route structure, alliances, and market concentration on the pricing of European full-service carriers in these markets. Three types of hubs (i.e., primary, secondary and tertiary hubs) are hereby identified to investigate the route structure within the hub-to-hub network. The stepwise regression results suggest that alliances on routes connecting two primary hubs, market share inequality and competition from low-cost carriers influence average airfares of full-service carriers in the European hub-to-hub markets