An Efficient Mechanism for Differentiated Quality of Internet Service

The Internet industry has realized the importance of provisioning different quality of service to different applications. This paper proposes the integrated differentiated services that achieves the efficient throughput allocation without significant queue management or real-time pricing costs. Competing differentiated services integrates networks into a single network in an economy and allows endusers to submit packets to many networks. In equilibrium, each network posts any price for a submitted packet over time by virtue of the revenue equivalence property.

The effect of competition among brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services

Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.This work has been partly supported by National Science Foundation awards: CNS-0963974, CNS-1346688, CNS-1536090 and CNS-1647084

Pricing differentiated brokered internet services

Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players at each level, compete in a Bertrand game, while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical examples demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.http://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/matta/Papers/sdp2016.pdfAccepted manuscrip

The effect of (non-)competing brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services

Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers’ level. We also study cooperation among a subset of brokers. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.Accepted manuscrip

Demand Management Opportunities in E-fulfillment: What Internet Retailers Can Learn from Revenue Management

In this paper, we explain how Internet retailers can learn from proven revenue management concepts and use them to reduce costs and enhance service. We focus on attended deliveries as these provide the greatest opportunities and challenges. The key driver is service differentiation. Revenue management has shown that companies can do much better than a one-size-fits-all first-come-first-serve strategy when selling scarce capacity to a heterogeneous market. Internet retailers have strong levers at their disposal for actively steering demand, notably the offered delivery time windows and their associated prices. Unlike traditional revenue management, these demand management decisions affect both revenues and costs. This calls for a closer coordination of marketing and operations than current common practice.ketenbeheer;revenue management;home delivery;E-fulfillment;demand management;marketing-operations interface

Rational Regulatory Policy for the Digital Economy: Theory and EU Policy Options

Telecommunications is a key element of the ICT sector which has been shaped by strong innovation dynamics since the 1990s. Market dynamics in selected OECD telecommunications markets are analyzed. We present new ideas about efficient regulation, emphasizing the need to adopt a broader international perspective. Analytical innovations also include the discussion of an adequately-modified Hitch-Sweezy oligopoly model. Moreover, we suggest differentiated two-part tariffs as an ideal welfare-maximizing approach in both wholesale and end-product markets. From a theoretical point-of-view, the need to avoid regulatory uncertainty is also emphasized. Theoretical progress is contrasted with regulations in the EU and the US. The EU offers a broad range of different regulatory approaches where the link between framework regulation and national regulation is rather complex. The internationalization of telecommunications requires a broader cooperation among regulators in the OECD.Digital Economy, Regulatory Policy, European Union

Road User Charging – Pricing Structures.

This project considers the extent to which the public could cope with complex price or tariff structures such as those that might be considered in the context of a national congestion pricing scheme. The key elements of the brief were: • to review existing studies of road pricing schemes to assess what information and evidence already exists on the key issues; • to identify what can be learned about pricing structures from other transport modes and other industries and in particular what issues and conclusions might be transferable; • to improve the general understanding of the relationship between information and people’s ability to respond; and • to recommend what further research would be most valuable to fill evidence gaps and enable conclusions to be drawn about an effective structure