8,103 research outputs found
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks
This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio
networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to
delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two
paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we
examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary
markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic
shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium
behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents
the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF
channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing
delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU
traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players
employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition
and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators,
two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization
and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator
exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated
separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the
equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal
pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market,
we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and
exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a
backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for
this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac
Spectrum sharing models in cognitive radio networks
Spectrum scarcity demands thinking new ways to
manage the distribution of radio frequency bands so that its use is more effective. The emerging technology that can enable this paradigm shift is the cognitive radio. Different models for
organizing and managing cognitive radios have emerged, all with specific strategic purposes. In this article we review the allocation spectrum patterns of cognitive radio networks and
analyse which are the common basis of each model.We expose the vulnerabilities and open challenges that still threaten the adoption
and exploitation of cognitive radios for open civil networks.L'escassetat de demandes d'espectre fan pensar en noves formes de gestionar la distribució de les bandes de freqüència de ràdio perquè el seu ús sigui més efectiu. La tecnologia emergent que pot permetre aquest canvi de paradigma és la ràdio cognitiva. Han sorgit diferents models d'organització i gestió de les ràdios cognitives, tots amb determinats fins estratègics. En aquest article es revisen els patrons d'assignació de l'espectre de les xarxes de ràdio cognitiva i s'analitzen quals són la base comuna de cada model. S'exposen les vulnerabilitats i els desafiaments oberts que segueixen amenaçant l'adopció i l'explotació de les ràdios cognitives per obrir les xarxes civils.La escasez de demandas de espectro hacen pensar en nuevas formas de gestionar la distribución de las bandas de frecuencia de radio para que su uso sea más efectivo. La tecnología emergente que puede permitir este cambio de paradigma es la radio cognitiva. Han surgido diferentes modelos de organización y gestión de las radios cognitivas, todos con determinados fines estratégicos. En este artículo se revisan los patrones de asignación del espectro de las redes de radio cognitiva y se analizan cuales son la base común de cada modelo. Se exponen las vulnerabilidades y los desafíos abiertos que siguen amenazando la adopción y la explotación de las radios cognitivas para abrir las redes civiles
Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly where primary users allow secondary
access in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission qualities of the
licensed bands fluctuate randomly. Each primary needs to select the price of
its channel with the knowledge of its own channel state but not that of its
competitors. Secondaries choose among the channels available on sale based on
their states and prices. We formulate the price selection as a non-cooperative
game and prove that a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy profile exists
uniquely. We explicitly compute this strategy profile and analytically and
numerically evaluate its efficiency. Our structural results provide certain key
insights about the unique symmetric NE.Comment: Presented in ISIT' 2013, Istanbul Version 2 contains some modified
versions of proofs of version 1. In IEEE Proceedings of International
Symposium on Information Theory, 201
The Economics of Electronics Industry: Competitive Dynamics and Industrial Organization
This entry highlights fundamental changes in the electronics industry that have transformed its competitive dynamics and industrial organization: a high and growing knowledge intensity; the rapid pace of change in technologies and markets; and extensive globalization. That explosive mixture of forces has created two inter-related puzzles. The first puzzle is that a high degree of globalization may well go hand in hand with high and increasing concentration. This runs counter to the dominant view, based on the assumption of neo-classical trade theory, that globalization will increase competition and hence will act as a powerful equalizer both among nations and among firms. Multinational corporations, after all, may not be such effective "spoilers of concentration", as claimed by Richard Caves (1982). The second related puzzle is that this industry fails to act like a stable global oligopoly, even when concentration is extremely high: a market positions are highly volatile, new entry is possible, and not even market leaders can count on a guaranteed survival.
Mobile Communications Industry Scenarios and Strategic Implications for Network Equipment Vendors
Mobile infrastructure markets have changed dramatically during the past years. The industry is experiencing a shift from traditional large-scale, hardware-driven system roll-outs to software and services -driven business models. Also, the telecommunications and internet worlds are colliding in both mobile infrastructure and services domains requiring established network equipment vendors and mobile operators to transform and adapt to the new business environment. This paper utilizes Schoemaker's scenario planning process to reveal critical uncertain elements shaping the future of the industry. Four possible scenarios representing different value systems between industry's key stakeholders are created. After this, five strategic options with differing risk and cost factors for established network equipment vendors are discussed in order to aid firm's strategic planning process. --
Machine Learning and AI in Business Intelligence: Trends and Opportunities
The integration of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) in business intelligence has brought forth a plethora of trends and opportunities. These cutting-edge technologies have revolutionized how businesses analyze data, gain insights, and make informed decisions. One prominent trend is the rise of predictive analytics. Machine learning algorithms can sift through vast amounts of historical data to identify patterns and trends, enabling businesses to make accurate predictions about future outcomes. This empowers organizations to optimize operations, anticipate customer needs, and mitigate risks. By leveraging business intelligence, companies can uncover hidden patterns, identify opportunities for growth and improvement, optimize business processes, and ultimately make informed decisions that drive their success. Another trend is the adoption of AI-powered chatbots and virtual assistants. The opportunities presented by machine learning and AI in business intelligence are extensive. From automated data analysis and anomaly detection to demand forecasting and dynamic pricing, these technologies empower businesses to optimize processes, reduce costs, and identify new revenue streams. In conclusion, the integration of machine learning and AI in business intelligence offers promising trends and abundant opportunities. By leveraging these technologies, businesses can gain a competitive edge, drive innovation, and unlock new levels of success in the digital era
Investment and Pricing with Spectrum Uncertainty: A Cognitive Operator's Perspective
This paper studies the optimal investment and pricing decisions of a
cognitive mobile virtual network operator (C-MVNO) under spectrum supply
uncertainty. Compared with a traditional MVNO who often leases spectrum via
long-term contracts, a C-MVNO can acquire spectrum dynamically in short-term by
both sensing the empty "spectrum holes" of licensed bands and dynamically
leasing from the spectrum owner. As a result, a C-MVNO can make flexible
investment and pricing decisions to match the current demands of the secondary
unlicensed users. Compared to dynamic spectrum leasing, spectrum sensing is
typically cheaper, but the obtained useful spectrum amount is random due to
primary licensed users' stochastic traffic. The C-MVNO needs to determine the
optimal amounts of spectrum sensing and leasing by evaluating the trade off
between cost and uncertainty. The C-MVNO also needs to determine the optimal
price to sell the spectrum to the secondary unlicensed users, taking into
account wireless heterogeneity of users such as different maximum transmission
power levels and channel gains. We model and analyze the interactions between
the C-MVNO and secondary unlicensed users as a Stackelberg game. We show
several interesting properties of the network equilibrium, including threshold
structures of the optimal investment and pricing decisions, the independence of
the optimal price on users' wireless characteristics, and guaranteed fair and
predictable QoS among users. We prove that these properties hold for general
SNR regime and general continuous distributions of sensing uncertainty. We show
that spectrum sensing can significantly improve the C-MVNO's expected profit
and users' payoffs.Comment: A shorter version appears in IEEE INFOCOM 2010. This version has been
submitted to IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computin
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