Role of Cross-Brain Connectivity in Emotion Regulation Within the Parent-Adolescent Dyad

Emotion regulation is influential in adolescent mental health outcomes. Specifically, poor emotion regulation skills and strategies have been shown to be related to increased rates of depression and anxiety. Parenting plays a large role in children's development of effective emotion regulation skills and strategies. Daily interactions between parents and adolescents influence the development of emotion regulation; however, little is known regarding the neural mechanisms that underlie these interactions. Using fMRI hyperscanning, the current study examined the role of cross-brain connectivity in emotion processing regions of parents' and adolescents' brains. Results indicate increased cross-brain connectivity in emotion processing regions is associated with more positive parent-adolescent interactions, greater adolescent-perceived supportive parenting, and fewer adolescent emotion regulation difficulties and depressive symptoms

Exploiting Group Structures to Infer Social Interactions From Videos

In this thesis, we consider the task of inferring the social interactions between humans by analyzing multi-modal data. Specifically, we attempt to solve some of the problems in interaction analysis, such as long-term deception detection, political deception detection, and impression prediction. In this work, we emphasize the importance of using knowledge about the group structure of the analyzed interactions. Previous works on the matter mostly neglected this aspect and analyzed a single subject at a time. Using the new Resistance dataset, collected by our collaborators, we approach the problem of long-term deception detection by designing a class of histogram-based features and a novel class of meta-features we callLiarRank. We develop a LiarOrNot model to identify spies in Resistance videos. We achieve AUCs of over 0.70 outperforming our baselines by 3% and human judges by 12%. For the problem of political deception, we first collect a dataset of videos and transcripts of 76 politicians from 18 countries making truthful and deceptive statements. We call it the Global Political Deception Dataset. We then show how to analyze the statements in a broader context by building a Video-Article-Topic graph. From this graph, we create a novel class of features called Deception Score that captures how controversial each topic is and how it affects the truthfulness of each statement. We show that our approach achieves 0.775 AUC outperforming competing baselines. Finally, we use the Resistance data to solve the problem of dyadic impression prediction. Our proposed Dyadic Impression Prediction System (DIPS) contains four major innovations: a novel class of features called emotion ranks, sign imbalance features derived from signed graphs theory, a novel method to align the facial expressions of subjects, and finally, we propose the concept of a multilayered stochastic network we call Temporal Delayed Network. Our DIPS architecture beats eight baselines from the literature, yielding statistically significant improvements of 19.9-30.8% in AUC

Within China's orbit? China through the eyes of the Australian parliament

As the People’s Republic of China continues to develop as the subject of intense economic, political and cultural interest, this study examines the place ‘China’ has held in the parliamentary imagination by exploring the history of the Australian parliament’s dealings with China. The monograph’s period of historical focus is broad: it begins with an analysis of Federation debates over immigration restriction and concludes with a detailed assessment of the bilateral relationship during the 41st Parliament (November 2004–November 2007). While the monograph provides extensive coverage of the changing nature of Australia–China relations, it does not attempt a full narrative history of the period with which it is concerned; rather, it offers an analysis of a series of foundational moments in the development of the relationship. Such a methodological approach enables the research to document the profound transformation that has taken place in Australian parliamentary attitudes towards China

Climate Science: Is it currently designed to answer questions?

For a variety of inter-related cultural, organizational, and political reasons, progress in climate science and the actual solution of scientific problems in this field have moved at a much slower rate than would normally be possible. Not all these factors are unique to climate science, but the heavy influence of politics has served to amplify the role of the other factors. Such factors as the change in the scientific paradigm from a dialectic opposition between theory and observation to an emphasis on simulation and observational programs, the inordinate growth of administration in universities and the consequent increase in importance of grant overhead, and the hierarchical nature of formal scientific organizations are cosidered. This paper will deal with the origin of the cultural changes and with specific examples of the operation and interaction of these factors. In particular, we will show how political bodies act to control scientific institutions, how scientists adjust both data and even theory to accommodate politically correct positions, and how opposition to these positions is disposed of.Comment: 36 pages, no figures. v2: footnotes 16, 19, 20 added, footnote 17 changed, typos corrected. v3: description of John Holdren corrected, expanded discussion of I=PAT formula, typos corrected. v4: The reference to Deming (2005) added in v3 stated that a 1995 email in question was from Jonathan Overpeck. In fact, Deming had left the sender of the email unnamed. The revision v4 now omits the identification of Overpeck. However, the revision v4 now includes a more recent and verifiable reference to a 2005 emai

Propaganda and the presidency : an analysis of Lyndon B. Johnson's media relations, 1963-1968

Lyndon Johnson's presidency saw a great shift in the balance of domestic politics in the United States. While there was great merit to many of his domestic aspirations the erosion of his own credibility damaged the standing of the Democratic Party and ensured that the Republicans swept back into office in 1968. The Democrats saw only one president - Jimmy Carter - elected between 1968 and 1992 following Johnson's presidency and four of the subsequent five presidents were Republicans; Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush.;The failure of the Great Society and subsequent inflation crisis caused in part by spending on domestic concerns and Vietnam were influential on a general upswing in conservatism, and although it should not be argued that the Johnson administration was wholly responsible for this, there is at least some evidence to suggest that a grassroots rise in conservatism happened under Johnson's watch. The legacy of the administration was to usher in an era of suspicion and mistrust of the presidency, which would ultimately culminate in the Watergate Scandal under his successor Nixon.;Robert Dallek perhaps best summed up the Johnson presidency when he said, 'Whatever impulse future historians may have to pigeonhole Johnson as a near great, average, or failed President, I am confident that a close review of his time in office will leave them reluctant to put a single stamp on his term.' This is certainly true. Johnson is incredibly difficult to categorise as a president, with possibly the best description of his immediate legacy coming from Newsweek columnist Charles Roberts, following his death in 1973:;He leaves office a man whose epitaph will some day defy the confines of even a Texas-size tombstone: the most militant civil-rights advocate ever to occupy the White House, reviled by negro militants; a Southerner scorned by Southerners as a turncoat; a liberal despised by liberals despite the fact he achieved most of what they sought for thirty years; a friend of education rejected by intellectuals; a compromiser who could not compromise a war ten thousand miles away; a consensus-seeker who in the clutch abandoned his consensus rather than his convictions; a power hungry partisan politician who, in the end, shunned power and partisanship to achieve national unity.;There is no question that Lyndon Johnson is an important president, and his achievements with Medicare, civil rights legislation and anti-poverty acts were monumental. His influence on the presidency and politics in the years following his time in office should not be underestimated. What he was not however, was a man who could use the press to his advantage. Johnson presided over an era of changing attitudes and a more open and technologically advanced press than had existed in America prior to the 1960s. As we have seen, he consistently showed a short-term, reactive strategy toward dealing with press coverage and sliding approval ratings, and with each reaction and each ill-thought-out response to political problems, he created further issues for himself as his presidency went on.;This was evident in his planning for the 1964 election, when he positioned himself as the anti-war candidate against Barry Goldwater's hard-line views, even while he knew that escalation in Vietnam was assured. It was apparent in 1965, when James Greenfield criticised the administration for only meeting the crisis of the moment and not looking further ahead. It was clear in 1966, when the press openly reported on the credibility gap between Johnson and the people. By the time the administration took note and conducted what might be termed as a public relations offensive in late 1967, it was too late. In their assessments of how well the country was doing, they failed to look forward and see what reports already told them; the Tet Offensive of January 1968 was already being foreshadowed by enemy actions.;Tet shattered the goodwill that Johnson earned with his most pro-active strategy, and permanently ruined his credibility with the American people. While there is undoubtedly an argument to be made that external circumstances and the political volatility of the 1960s had an effect on how pro-active the president could be in his press dealings, the administration failed to effectively organise a strategy to propagandise the policies of the presidency and ultimately that failure lay chiefly with Lyndon B Johnson, himself.Lyndon Johnson's presidency saw a great shift in the balance of domestic politics in the United States. While there was great merit to many of his domestic aspirations the erosion of his own credibility damaged the standing of the Democratic Party and ensured that the Republicans swept back into office in 1968. The Democrats saw only one president - Jimmy Carter - elected between 1968 and 1992 following Johnson's presidency and four of the subsequent five presidents were Republicans; Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush.;The failure of the Great Society and subsequent inflation crisis caused in part by spending on domestic concerns and Vietnam were influential on a general upswing in conservatism, and although it should not be argued that the Johnson administration was wholly responsible for this, there is at least some evidence to suggest that a grassroots rise in conservatism happened under Johnson's watch. The legacy of the administration was to usher in an era of suspicion and mistrust of the presidency, which would ultimately culminate in the Watergate Scandal under his successor Nixon.;Robert Dallek perhaps best summed up the Johnson presidency when he said, 'Whatever impulse future historians may have to pigeonhole Johnson as a near great, average, or failed President, I am confident that a close review of his time in office will leave them reluctant to put a single stamp on his term.' This is certainly true. Johnson is incredibly difficult to categorise as a president, with possibly the best description of his immediate legacy coming from Newsweek columnist Charles Roberts, following his death in 1973:;He leaves office a man whose epitaph will some day defy the confines of even a Texas-size tombstone: the most militant civil-rights advocate ever to occupy the White House, reviled by negro militants; a Southerner scorned by Southerners as a turncoat; a liberal despised by liberals despite the fact he achieved most of what they sought for thirty years; a friend of education rejected by intellectuals; a compromiser who could not compromise a war ten thousand miles away; a consensus-seeker who in the clutch abandoned his consensus rather than his convictions; a power hungry partisan politician who, in the end, shunned power and partisanship to achieve national unity.;There is no question that Lyndon Johnson is an important president, and his achievements with Medicare, civil rights legislation and anti-poverty acts were monumental. His influence on the presidency and politics in the years following his time in office should not be underestimated. What he was not however, was a man who could use the press to his advantage. Johnson presided over an era of changing attitudes and a more open and technologically advanced press than had existed in America prior to the 1960s. As we have seen, he consistently showed a short-term, reactive strategy toward dealing with press coverage and sliding approval ratings, and with each reaction and each ill-thought-out response to political problems, he created further issues for himself as his presidency went on.;This was evident in his planning for the 1964 election, when he positioned himself as the anti-war candidate against Barry Goldwater's hard-line views, even while he knew that escalation in Vietnam was assured. It was apparent in 1965, when James Greenfield criticised the administration for only meeting the crisis of the moment and not looking further ahead. It was clear in 1966, when the press openly reported on the credibility gap between Johnson and the people. By the time the administration took note and conducted what might be termed as a public relations offensive in late 1967, it was too late. In their assessments of how well the country was doing, they failed to look forward and see what reports already told them; the Tet Offensive of January 1968 was already being foreshadowed by enemy actions.;Tet shattered the goodwill that Johnson earned with his most pro-active strategy, and permanently ruined his credibility with the American people. While there is undoubtedly an argument to be made that external circumstances and the political volatility of the 1960s had an effect on how pro-active the president could be in his press dealings, the administration failed to effectively organise a strategy to propagandise the policies of the presidency and ultimately that failure lay chiefly with Lyndon B Johnson, himself