Enhancing Predicate Pairing with Abstraction for Relational Verification

Relational verification is a technique that aims at proving properties that relate two different program fragments, or two different program runs. It has been shown that constrained Horn clauses (CHCs) can effectively be used for relational verification by applying a CHC transformation, called predicate pairing, which allows the CHC solver to infer relations among arguments of different predicates. In this paper we study how the effects of the predicate pairing transformation can be enhanced by using various abstract domains based on linear arithmetic (i.e., the domain of convex polyhedra and some of its subdomains) during the transformation. After presenting an algorithm for predicate pairing with abstraction, we report on the experiments we have performed on over a hundred relational verification problems by using various abstract domains. The experiments have been performed by using the VeriMAP transformation and verification system, together with the Parma Polyhedra Library (PPL) and the Z3 solver for CHCs.Comment: Pre-proceedings paper presented at the 27th International Symposium on Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation (LOPSTR 2017), Namur, Belgium, 10-12 October 2017 (arXiv:1708.07854

Ubic: Bridging the gap between digital cryptography and the physical world

Advances in computing technology increasingly blur the boundary between the digital domain and the physical world. Although the research community has developed a large number of cryptographic primitives and has demonstrated their usability in all-digital communication, many of them have not yet made their way into the real world due to usability aspects. We aim to make another step towards a tighter integration of digital cryptography into real world interactions. We describe Ubic, a framework that allows users to bridge the gap between digital cryptography and the physical world. Ubic relies on head-mounted displays, like Google Glass, resource-friendly computer vision techniques as well as mathematically sound cryptographic primitives to provide users with better security and privacy guarantees. The framework covers key cryptographic primitives, such as secure identification, document verification using a novel secure physical document format, as well as content hiding. To make a contribution of practical value, we focused on making Ubic as simple, easily deployable, and user friendly as possible.Comment: In ESORICS 2014, volume 8712 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 56-75, Wroclaw, Poland, September 7-11, 2014. Springer, Berlin, German

Semantics of Separation-Logic Typing and Higher-order Frame Rules for<br> Algol-like Languages

We show how to give a coherent semantics to programs that are well-specified in a version of separation logic for a language with higher types: idealized algol extended with heaps (but with immutable stack variables). In particular, we provide simple sound rules for deriving higher-order frame rules, allowing for local reasoning

Towards mechanized correctness proofs for cryptographic algorithms: Axiomatization of a probabilistic Hoare style logic

In [Corin, den Hartog in ICALP 2006] we build a formal verification technique for game based correctness proofs of cryptograhic algorithms based on a probabilistic Hoare style logic [den Hartog, de Vink in IJFCS 13(3), 2002]. An important step towards enabling mechanized verification within this technique is an axiomatization of implication between predicates which is purely semantically defined in [den Hartog, de Vink in IJFCS 13(3), 2002]. In this paper we provide an axiomatization and illustrate its place in the formal verification technique of [Corin, den Hartog in ICALP 2006]

Actor-network procedures: Modeling multi-factor authentication, device pairing, social interactions

As computation spreads from computers to networks of computers, and migrates into cyberspace, it ceases to be globally programmable, but it remains programmable indirectly: network computations cannot be controlled, but they can be steered by local constraints on network nodes. The tasks of "programming" global behaviors through local constraints belong to the area of security. The "program particles" that assure that a system of local interactions leads towards some desired global goals are called security protocols. As computation spreads beyond cyberspace, into physical and social spaces, new security tasks and problems arise. As networks are extended by physical sensors and controllers, including the humans, and interlaced with social networks, the engineering concepts and techniques of computer security blend with the social processes of security. These new connectors for computational and social software require a new "discipline of programming" of global behaviors through local constraints. Since the new discipline seems to be emerging from a combination of established models of security protocols with older methods of procedural programming, we use the name procedures for these new connectors, that generalize protocols. In the present paper we propose actor-networks as a formal model of computation in heterogenous networks of computers, humans and their devices; and we introduce Procedure Derivation Logic (PDL) as a framework for reasoning about security in actor-networks. On the way, we survey the guiding ideas of Protocol Derivation Logic (also PDL) that evolved through our work in security in last 10 years. Both formalisms are geared towards graphic reasoning and tool support. We illustrate their workings by analysing a popular form of two-factor authentication, and a multi-channel device pairing procedure, devised for this occasion.Comment: 32 pages, 12 figures, 3 tables; journal submission; extended references, added discussio