4,089 research outputs found
An efficient and private RFID authentication protocol supporting ownership transfer
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems are getting pervasively deployed in many daily life applications. But this increased usage of RFID systems brings some serious problems together, security and privacy. In some applications, ownership transfer of RFID labels is sine qua non need. Specifically, the owner of RFID tag might be required to change several times during its lifetime. Besides, after ownership transfer, the authentication protocol should also prevent the old owner to trace the tags and disallow the new owner to trace old transactions of the tags. On the other hand, while achieving privacy and security concerns, the computation complexity should be considered. In order to resolve these issues, numerous authentication protocols have been proposed in the literature. Many of them failed and their computation load on the server side is very high. Motivated by this need, we propose an RFID mutual authentication protocol to provide ownership transfer. In our protocol, the server needs only a constant-time complexity for identification when the tag and server are synchronized. In case of ownership transfer, our protocol preserves both old and new owners’ privacy. Our protocol is backward untraceable against a strong adversary who compromise tag, and also forward untraceable under an assumption
Cryptanalysis of two mutual authentication protocols for low-cost RFID
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is appearing as a favorite technology
for automated identification, which can be widely applied to many applications
such as e-passport, supply chain management and ticketing. However, researchers
have found many security and privacy problems along RFID technology. In recent
years, many researchers are interested in RFID authentication protocols and
their security flaws. In this paper, we analyze two of the newest RFID
authentication protocols which proposed by Fu et al. and Li et al. from several
security viewpoints. We present different attacks such as desynchronization
attack and privacy analysis over these protocols.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, 1 table, International Journal of Distributed
and Parallel system
On the Security of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Protocol
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the communications
protocol currently being rolled out as part of next generation air
transportation systems. As the heart of modern air traffic control, it will
play an essential role in the protection of two billion passengers per year,
besides being crucial to many other interest groups in aviation. The inherent
lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a topic in both
the aviation circles and in the academic community. Due to recently published
proof-of-concept attacks, the topic is becoming ever more pressing, especially
with the deadline for mandatory implementation in most airspaces fast
approaching.
This survey first summarizes the attacks and problems that have been reported
in relation to ADS-B security. Thereafter, it surveys both the theoretical and
practical efforts which have been previously conducted concerning these issues,
including possible countermeasures. In addition, the survey seeks to go beyond
the current state of the art and gives a detailed assessment of security
measures which have been developed more generally for related wireless networks
such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks, including a taxonomy of
all considered approaches.Comment: Survey, 22 Pages, 21 Figure
A Survey on Wireless Security: Technical Challenges, Recent Advances and Future Trends
This paper examines the security vulnerabilities and threats imposed by the
inherent open nature of wireless communications and to devise efficient defense
mechanisms for improving the wireless network security. We first summarize the
security requirements of wireless networks, including their authenticity,
confidentiality, integrity and availability issues. Next, a comprehensive
overview of security attacks encountered in wireless networks is presented in
view of the network protocol architecture, where the potential security threats
are discussed at each protocol layer. We also provide a survey of the existing
security protocols and algorithms that are adopted in the existing wireless
network standards, such as the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and the long-term
evolution (LTE) systems. Then, we discuss the state-of-the-art in
physical-layer security, which is an emerging technique of securing the open
communications environment against eavesdropping attacks at the physical layer.
We also introduce the family of various jamming attacks and their
counter-measures, including the constant jammer, intermittent jammer, reactive
jammer, adaptive jammer and intelligent jammer. Additionally, we discuss the
integration of physical-layer security into existing authentication and
cryptography mechanisms for further securing wireless networks. Finally, some
technical challenges which remain unresolved at the time of writing are
summarized and the future trends in wireless security are discussed.Comment: 36 pages. Accepted to Appear in Proceedings of the IEEE, 201
A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic
The MIFARE Classic is the most widely used contactless smart card in the
market. Its design and implementation details are kept secret by its
manufacturer. This paper studies the architecture of the card and the
communication protocol between card and reader. Then it gives a practical,
low-cost, attack that recovers secret information from the memory of the card.
Due to a weakness in the pseudo-random generator, we are able to recover the
keystream generated by the CRYPTO1 stream cipher. We exploit the malleability
of the stream cipher to read all memory blocks of the first sector of the card.
Moreover, we are able to read any sector of the memory of the card, provided
that we know one memory block within this sector. Finally, and perhaps more
damaging, the same holds for modifying memory blocks
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