Vulnerability analysis of satellite-based synchronized smart grids monitoring systems

The large-scale deployment of wide-area monitoring systems could play a strategic role in supporting the evolution of traditional power systems toward smarter and self-healing grids. The correct operation of these synchronized monitoring systems requires a common and accurate timing reference usually provided by a satellite-based global positioning system. Although these satellites signals provide timing accuracy that easily exceeds the needs of the power industry, they are extremely vulnerable to radio frequency interference. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying their potential vulnerabilities is of paramount importance for correct and safe wide-area monitoring system operation. Armed with such a vision, this article presents and discusses the results of an experimental analysis aimed at characterizing the vulnerability of global positioning system based wide-area monitoring systems to external interferences. The article outlines the potential strategies that could be adopted to protect global positioning system receivers from external cyber-attacks and proposes decentralized defense strategies based on self-organizing sensor networks aimed at assuring correct time synchronization in the presence of external attacks

Towards Secure Deep Neural Networks for Cyber-Physical Systems

In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly investigated in the literature to be employed in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). DNNs own inherent advantages in complex pattern identifying and achieve state-of-the-art performances in many important CPS applications. However, DNN-based systems usually require large datasets for model training, which introduces new data management issues. Meanwhile, research in the computer vision domain demonstrated that the DNNs are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples. Therefore, the security risks of employing DNNs in CPSs applications are of concern. In this dissertation, we study the security of employing DNNs in CPSs from both the data domain and learning domain. For the data domain, we study the data privacy issues of outsourcing the CPS data to cloud service providers (CSP). We design a space-efficient searchable symmetric encryption scheme that allows the user to query keywords over the encrypted CPS data that is stored in the cloud. After that, we study the security risks that adversarial machine learning (AML) can bring to the CPSs. Based on the attacker properties, we further separate AML in CPS into the customer domain and control domain. We analyze the DNN-based energy theft detection in advanced meter infrastructure as an example for customer domain attacks. The adversarial attacks to control domain CPS applications are more challenging and stringent. We then propose ConAML, a general AML framework that enables the attacker to generate adversarial examples under practical constraints. We evaluate the framework with three CPS applications in transportation systems, power grids, and water systems. To mitigate the threat of adversarial attacks, more robust DNNs are required for critical CPSs. We summarize the defense requirements for CPS applications and evaluate several typical defense mechanisms. For control domain adversarial attacks, we demonstrate that defensive methods like adversarial detection are not capable due to the practical attack requirements. We propose a random padding framework that can significantly increase the DNN robustness under adversarial attacks. The evaluation results show that our padding framework can reduce the effectiveness of adversarial examples in both customer domain and control domain applications

Cost-benefit analysis of moving-target defense in power grids

We study moving-target defense (MTD) that actively perturbs transmission line reactances to thwart stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in a power grid. Prior work on this topic has proposed MTD based on randomly selected reactance perturbations, but these perturbations cannot guarantee effective attack detection. To address the issue, we present formal design criteria to select MTD reactance perturbations that are truly effective. However, based on a key optimal power flow (OPF) formulation, we find that the effective MTD may incur a non-trivial operational cost that has not hitherto received attention. Accordingly, we characterize important tradeoffs between the MTD's detection capability and its associated required cost. Extensive simulations, using the MATPOWER simulator and benchmark IEEE bus systems, verify and illustrate the proposed design approach that for the first time addresses both key aspects of cost and effectiveness of the MTD

Stealthy MTD against unsupervised learning-based blind FDI Attacks in power systems

This paper examines how moving target defenses (MTD) implemented in power systems can be countered by unsupervised learning-based false data injection (FDI) attack and how MTD can be combined with physical watermarking to enhance the system resilience. A novel intelligent attack, which incorporates dimensionality reduction and density-based spatial clustering, is developed and shown to be effective in maintaining stealth in the presence of traditional MTD strategies. In resisting this new type of attack, a novel implementation of MTD combining with physical watermarking is proposed by adding Gaussian watermark into physical plant parameters to drive detection of traditional and intelligent FDI attacks, while remaining hidden to the attackers and limiting the impact on system operation and stability

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Moving-Target Defense in Power Grids

We study moving-target defense (MTD) that actively perturbs transmission line reactances to thwart stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in a power grid. Prior work on this topic has proposed MTD based on randomly selected reactance perturbations, but these perturbations cannot guarantee effective attack detection. To address the issue, we present formal design criteria to select MTD reactance perturbations that are truly effective. However, based on a key optimal power flow (OPF) formulation, we find that the effective MTD may incur a non-trivial operational cost that has not hitherto received attention. Accordingly, we characterize important tradeoffs between the MTD's detection capability and its associated required cost. Extensive simulations, using the MATPOWER simulator and benchmark IEEE bus systems, verify and illustrate the proposed design approach that for the first time addresses both key aspects of cost and effectiveness of the MTD.Comment: IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) - 201