Determinants of power spreads in electricity futures markets: A multinational analysis. ESRI WP580, December 2017

The growth in variable renewable energy (vRES) and the need for flexibility in power systems go hand in hand. We study how vRES and other factors, namely the price of substitute fuels, power price volatility, structural breaks, and seasonality impact the hedgeable power spreads (profit margins) of the main dispatchable flexibility providers in the current power systems - gas and coal power plants. We particularly focus on power spreads that are hedgeable in futures markets in three European electricity markets (Germany, UK, Nordic) over the time period 2009-2016. We find that market participants who use power spreads need to pay attention to the fundamental supply and demand changes in the underlying markets (electricity, CO2, and coal/gas). Specifically, we show that the total vRES capacity installed during 2009-2016 is associated with a drop of 3-22% in hedgeable profit margins of coal and especially gas power generators. While this shows that the expansion of vRES has a significant negative effect on the hedgeable profitability of dispatchable, flexible power generators, it also suggests that the overall decline in power spreads is further driven by the price dynamics in the CO2 and fuel markets during the sample period. We also find significant persistence (and asymmetric effects) in the power spreads volatility using a univariate TGARCH model

Auction Basics for Wholesale Power Markets: Objectives and Pricing Rules

Power systems have distinctive features that greatly complicate the development of auction designs. This study reviews the theory and practice of auction design as it relates specifically to U.S. restructured wholesale power markets, i.e., centrally-administered wholesale power markets with congestion managed by locational marginal prices. Basic auction concepts such as reservation value, net seller surplus, net buyer surplus, competitive market clearing, market efficiency, market pricing rules, supply offers, demand bids, strategic capacity withholding, and market power are explained and illustrated. Complicating factors specific to wholesale power markets are clarified, and recent advances in computational tools designed to address these complications are briefly noted.market power; Auction markets; power systems; design; efficency; pricing rules; agent-based test beds

Combined hydro-wind generation bids in a pool-based electricity market

Present regulatory trends are promoting the irect participation of wind energy in electricity markets. The final result of these markets sets the production scheduling for the operation time, including a power commitment from the wind generators. However, wind resources are uncertain, and the final power delivered usually differs from the initial power committed. This imbalance produces an overcost in the system, which must be paid by those who produce it, e.g., wind generators among others. As a result, wind farm revenue decreases, but it could increase by allowing wind farms to submit their bids to the markets together with a hydro generating unit, which may easily modify its production according to the expected imbalance. This paper presents a stochastic optimization technique that maximizes the joint profit of hydro and wind generators in a pool-based electricity market, taking into account the uncertainty of wind power prediction.En prens

Buyer Power in International Markets

This paper investigates the implications for international markets of the existence of retailers/wholesalers with market power. Two main results are shown. First, in the presence of buyer power trade liberalization may lead to retail market concentration. Due to this concentration retail prices may be higher and welfare may be lower in free trade than in autarky, thus reversing the standard e¤ects of trade liberalization. Second, the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization are weaker under buyer power than under seller power.buyer power, retailing, international trade.

10-04 "Buyer Power in U.S. Hog Markets: A Critical Review of the Literature"

The U.S. Departments of Justice and Agriculture have focused attention recently on rising levels of corporate concentration in agricultural markets and the challenges that may pose to U.S. anti-trust enforcement and agricultural policies. Both agencies have raised particular concerns about dominant firms’ exercise of buyer power over farmers, especially in livestock markets controlled by a shrinking number of large multinational meat packers. U.S. hog markets have undergone rapid concentration in the last 25 years, with the top four packers now controlling two-thirds of the market and Smithfield Foods, the industry leader, commanding 31 percent. Despite the rapid structural changes in the U.S. hog industry, the literature on buyer power in hog markets is quite limited. In this paper, we review the available literature, which has been generally presented as demonstrating that buyer power is not a significant problem. We find that interpretation to be poorly justified. Researchers have found well-documented evidence of market power on both the seller and the buyer sides of the market, though the studies have been less clear on the specific causes. Mirroring prevailing practices in Justice Department merger reviews, researchers have often discounted buyer power using methodologies more appropriate to seller power, then dismissed findings of seller power by pointing to offsetting “efficiency gains” from concentration. Yet such apparent efficiency gains in seller markets can include reductions in the prices concentrated firms pay for animals through their exercise of buyer power. We also raise the question of how buyer power in concentrated retail markets may compound the exercise of buyer power by packers. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for further research, including the refinement of methodologies for the study of buyer power, and an assessment of proposed new USDA regulations on packer buying practices.

Predicting market power in wholesale electricity markets

The traditional measure of market power is the HHI, which gives implausible results given the low elasticity of demand in electricity spot markets, unless it is adapted to take account of contracting. In its place the Residual Supply Index has been proposed as a more suitable index to measure potential market power in electricity markets, notably in California and more recently in the EU Sector Inquiry. The paper investigates its value in identifying the ability of firms to raise prices in an electricity market with contracts and capacity constraints and find that it is most useful for the case of a single dominant supplier, or with a natural extension, for the case of a symmetric oligoply. Estimates from the Sector Inquiry seem to fit this case better than might be expected, but suggests an alternative defintion of the RSI defined over flexible output that should give a more reliable relationship

Market Power in Interactive Environmental and Energy Markets: The case of Green Certificates

Markets for environmental externalities are typically closely related to the markets causing such externalities, whereupon strategic interactions may result. Along these lines, the market for Green Certificates is strongly interwoven in the electricity market as the producers of green electricity are also suppliers of Green Certificates. In this paper, we formulate an analytic equilibrium model for simultaneously functioning electricity and Green Certificates markets, and focus on the role of market power. We consider two versions of a Nash-Cournot game; a standard Nash-Cournot game where the players treat the market for Green Certificates and the electricity market as separate markets; and a Nash-Cournot game with endogenous treatment of the interaction between the electricity and Green Certificates markets with conjectured responses. One result is that a certificate system faced with market power may collapse into a system of per unit subsidies, as the producers involved start to game on the joint functioning of markets.renewable energy; electricity; Green Certificates; market power

Market Power in Pollution Permit Markets

As with other commodity markets, markets for trading pollution permits have not been immune to market power concerns. In this paper, I survey the existing literature on market power in permit trading but also contribute with some new results and ideas. I start the survey with Hahn’s (1984) dominant-firm (static) model that I then extend to the case in which there are two or more strategic firms that may also strategically interact in the output market, to the case in which current permits can be stored for future use (as in most existing and proposed market designs), to the possibility of collusive behavior, and to the case in which permits are auctioned off instead of allocated for free to firms. I finish the paper with a review of empirical evidence on market power, if any, with particular attention to the U.S. sulfur market and the Southern California NOx market.Market power, emissions trading, pollution permits, storable permits

MEAT-PACKER CONDUCT IN FED CATTLE PRICING: MULTIPLE-MARKET OLIGOPSONY POWER

The exercise of market power across multiple geographic fed cattle markets is measured with an econometric model which links behavior of the margin between boxed beef and regional fed cattle prices to an oligopsony model of multiple-market conduct. The game theoretic economic model suggests that for market power to be exercised in a single market a discontinuous pricing strategy must be followed. Total market power is enhance if meat-packers coordinate this pricing strategy across geographic markets. Tests reject independence of pricing conduct across geographic markets which suggests multiple-market power is present. The extent of the market power also is consistent with the economic model. More market power is exercised across regions with the same meat-packing firms. However, the magnitude of the market power is small and decreased between the early and late 1980s.Demand and Price Analysis,

Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design

Forward markets, both medium term and long term, complement the spot market for wholesale electricity. The forward markets reduce risk, mitigate market power, and coordinate new investment. In the medium term, a forward energy market lets suppliers and demanders lock in energy prices and quantities for one to three years. In the long term, a forward reliability market assures adequate resources are available when they are needed most. The forward markets reduce risk for both sides of the market, since they reduce the quantity of energy that trades at the more volatile spot price. Spot market power is mitigated by putting suppliers and demanders in a more balanced position at the time of the spot market. The markets also reduce transaction costs and improve liquidity and transparency. Recent innovations to the Colombia market illustrate the basic elements of the forward markets and their beneficial role.Auctions, electricity auctions, market design, forward markets