123 research outputs found
Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games
A general class of models is developed for analyzing games with population uncertainty. Within this general class, a special class of Poisson games is defined. It is shown that Poisson games are uniquely characterized by properties of independent actions and enviornmental equivalence. The general definition of equilibrium for games with population uncertainty is formulated, and it is shown that the equilibria of Poisson games are invariant under payoff-irrelevant type splitting. An example of a large voting game is discussed, to illustrate the advantages of using a Poisson game model for large games.
Complementarities and Macroeconomics: Poisson Games
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators e.t.c. is large. In particular, we follow Myerson (1998, 2000) that in large games “a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game”. In more detail, we model the coordination problem as a Poisson game, and investigate the conditions under which unique equilibrium selection is obtained.Strategic Complementarities, Coordination Games, Poisson Games, Currency Crises, Innovation.
The possibility of impossible stairways and greener grass
In classical game theory, players have finitely many actions and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allowing a larger, but countable, player set introduces a host of phenomena that are impossible in finite games. Firstly, in coordination games, all players have the same preferences: switching to a weakly dominant action makes everyone at least as well off as before. Nevertheless, there are coordination games where the best outcome occurs if everyone chooses a weakly dominated action, while the worst outcome occurs if everyone chooses the weakly dominant action. Secondly, the location of payoff-dominant equilibria behaves capriciously: two coordination games that look so much alike that even the consequences of unilateral deviations are the same may nevertheless have disjoint sets of payoff-dominant equilibria. Thirdly, a large class of games has no (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria. Following the proverb ``the grass is always greener on the other side of the hedge'', greener-grass games model constant discontent: in one part of the strategy space, players would rather switch to its complement. Once there, they'd rather switch back.coordination games; dominant strategies; payoff-dominance; nonexistence of equilibrium; tail events
Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games
In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We
prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies
The Possibility of Impossible Stairways and Greener Grass
In classical game theory, players have finitely many actions and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allowing a larger, but countable, player set introduces a host of phenomena that are impossible in finite games. Firstly, in coordination games, all players have the same preferences: switching to a weakly dominant action makes everyone at least as well off as before. Nevertheless, there are coordina- tion games where the best outcome occurs if everyone chooses a weakly dominated action, while the worst outcome occurs if everyone chooses the weakly dominant action. Secondly, the location of payoff-dominant equilibria behaves capriciously: two coordination games that look so much alike that even the consequences of unilateral deviations are the same may nevertheless have disjoint sets of payoff-dominant equilibria. Thirdly, a large class of games has no (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria. Following the proverb \the grass is always greener on the other side of the hedge", greener-grass games model constant discontent: in one part of the strategy space, players would rather switch to its complement. Once there, they'd rather switch back.coordination games;dominant strategies;payoff-dominance;nonexistence of equi- librium;tail events
Manipulation in Elections with Uncertain Preferences
A decision scheme (Gibbard (1977)) is a function mapping profiles of strict preferences over a set of social alternatives to lotteries over the social alternatives. Motivated by conditions typically prevailing in elections with many voters, we say that a decision scheme is weakly strategy-proof if it is never possible for a voter to increase expected utility (for some vNM utility function consistent with her true preferences) by misrepresenting her preferences when her belief about the preferences of other voters is generated by a model in which the other voters are i.i.d. draws from a distribution over possible preferences. We show that if there are at least three alternatives, a decision scheme is necessarily a random dictatorship if it is weakly strategy-proof, never assigns positive probability to Pareto dominated alternatives, and is anonymous in the sense of being unaffected by permutations of the components of the profile. This result is established in two settings- a) a model with a fixed set of voters; b) the Poisson voting model of Meyerson (1998a,b, 2000, 2002).
Evolutionary Poisson Games for Controlling Large Population Behaviors
Emerging applications in engineering such as crowd-sourcing and
(mis)information propagation involve a large population of heterogeneous users
or agents in a complex network who strategically make dynamic decisions. In
this work, we establish an evolutionary Poisson game framework to capture the
random, dynamic and heterogeneous interactions of agents in a holistic fashion,
and design mechanisms to control their behaviors to achieve a system-wide
objective. We use the antivirus protection challenge in cyber security to
motivate the framework, where each user in the network can choose whether or
not to adopt the software. We introduce the notion of evolutionary Poisson
stable equilibrium for the game, and show its existence and uniqueness. Online
algorithms are developed using the techniques of stochastic approximation
coupled with the population dynamics, and they are shown to converge to the
optimal solution of the controller problem. Numerical examples are used to
illustrate and corroborate our results
Price of Anarchy for Non-atomic Congestion Games with Stochastic Demands
We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to
non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds
on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and
demand distributions, namely, (a) affine cost functions and general
distributions, (b) polynomial cost functions and general positive-valued
distributions, and (c) polynomial cost functions and the normal distributions.
All the upper bounds are tight in some special cases, including the case of
deterministic demands.Comment: 31 page
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