Computing the Least-core and Nucleolus for Threshold Cardinality Matching Games

Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable profit allocation in multi-agent systems. \emph{Core}, \emph{least-core} and \emph{nucleolus} are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on the least-core and nucleolus of threshold cardinality matching games (TCMG). A TCMG is defined on a graph $G=(V,E)$ and a threshold $T$, in which the player set is $V$ and the profit of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is 1 if the size of a maximum matching in $G[S]$ meets or exceeds $T$, and 0 otherwise. We first show that for a TCMG, the problems of computing least-core value, finding and verifying least-core payoff are all polynomial time solvable. We also provide a general characterization of the least core for a large class of TCMG. Next, based on Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition in matching theory, we give a concise formulation of the nucleolus for a typical case of TCMG which the threshold $T$ equals $1$. When the threshold $T$ is relevant to the input size, we prove that the nucleolus can be obtained in polynomial time in bipartite graphs and graphs with a perfect matching

Bi-Criteria and Approximation Algorithms for Restricted Matchings

In this work we study approximation algorithms for the \textit{Bounded Color Matching} problem (a.k.a. Restricted Matching problem) which is defined as follows: given a graph in which each edge $e$ has a color $c_e$ and a profit $p_e \in \mathbb{Q}^+$, we want to compute a maximum (cardinality or profit) matching in which no more than $w_j \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ edges of color $c_j$ are present. This kind of problems, beside the theoretical interest on its own right, emerges in multi-fiber optical networking systems, where we interpret each unique wavelength that can travel through the fiber as a color class and we would like to establish communication between pairs of systems. We study approximation and bi-criteria algorithms for this problem which are based on linear programming techniques and, in particular, on polyhedral characterizations of the natural linear formulation of the problem. In our setting, we allow violations of the bounds $w_j$ and we model our problem as a bi-criteria problem: we have two objectives to optimize namely (a) to maximize the profit (maximum matching) while (b) minimizing the violation of the color bounds. We prove how we can "beat" the integrality gap of the natural linear programming formulation of the problem by allowing only a slight violation of the color bounds. In particular, our main result is \textit{constant} approximation bounds for both criteria of the corresponding bi-criteria optimization problem

Truthful Assignment without Money

We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information. We study several variants of the GAP starting with matching. For the unweighted version, we give an optimal strategyproof mechanism; for maximum weight bipartite matching, however, we show give a 2-approximate strategyproof mechanism and show by a matching lowerbound that this is optimal. Next we study knapsack-like problems, which are APX-hard. For these problems, we develop a general LP-based technique that extends the ideas of Lavi and Swamy to reduce designing a truthful mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism for the fractional version of the problem, at a loss of a factor equal to the integrality gap in the approximation ratio. We use this technique to obtain strategyproof mechanisms with constant approximation ratios for these problems. We then design an O(log n)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the GAP by reducing, with logarithmic loss in the approximation, to our solution for the value-invariant GAP. Our technique may be of independent interest for designing truthful mechanisms without money for other LP-based problems.Comment: Extended abstract appears in the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 201

Monotone Projection Lower Bounds from Extended Formulation Lower Bounds

In this short note, we reduce lower bounds on monotone projections of polynomials to lower bounds on extended formulations of polytopes. Applying our reduction to the seminal extended formulation lower bounds of Fiorini, Massar, Pokutta, Tiwari, & de Wolf (STOC 2012; J. ACM, 2015) and Rothvoss (STOC 2014; J. ACM, 2017), we obtain the following interesting consequences. 1. The Hamiltonian Cycle polynomial is not a monotone subexponential-size projection of the permanent; this both rules out a natural attempt at a monotone lower bound on the Boolean permanent, and shows that the permanent is not complete for non-negative polynomials in VNP$_{{\mathbb R}}$ under monotone p-projections. 2. The cut polynomials and the perfect matching polynomial (or "unsigned Pfaffian") are not monotone p-projections of the permanent. The latter, over the Boolean and-or semi-ring, rules out monotone reductions in one of the natural approaches to reducing perfect matchings in general graphs to perfect matchings in bipartite graphs. As the permanent is universal for monotone formulas, these results also imply exponential lower bounds on the monotone formula size and monotone circuit size of these polynomials.Comment: Published in Theory of Computing, Volume 13 (2017), Article 18; Received: November 10, 2015, Revised: July 27, 2016, Published: December 22, 201