The Art of Compromise

Policy is modeled as the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash’s (1950) bargaining framework, modified to account for a simultaneous legislative ratification vote. Though agreements favor the legislative representative least willing to compromise, agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties’ ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.Vote balancing; intergovernmental bargaining; legislative ratification; willingness to compromise

Russia: The Long Road to Ratification. Internal Institution and Pressure Groups in the Kyoto Protocol’s Adoption Process

The Russian Federation played a crucial role in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, after the US decision not to comply with the treaty, its ratification turned out to be indispensable for the Protocol to become legally binding. In early 2002, the Russian government decided to initiate the ratification process. However, notwithstanding this initial commitment, the country long hesitated to fulfil its promises, and for the last two years it sent numerous contradictory signals with respect to its position on climate policy. As a consequence, the factors that shape Russia’s behaviour in the context of climate negotiations received increasing attention. The main focus has been on the economic and international aspects motivating the Russian strategy. This paper attempts to complete this analysis by concentrating on a further feature that significantly contributed to Russia’s final decision, namely domestic forces. These factors have often been overlooked in the discussion of the Russian strategy. In order to fill this gap, this paper reconstructs the Russian ratification process, trying to identify the main domestic players and their role. Our findings provide various indications on the reasons of the recent developments in Russia, confirming the key role of the Russian President.Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements

We consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation' rule in a political integration process between two countries. We study three potential types of delegation: strong, weak or no delegation, this last case corresponding to a referendum. We show that populations decide to bind themselves by delegating the national policy decision to a "powerfull conservative representative", in order to improve their bargaining position. These non-cooperative behaviors of countries when they decide on their delegation rule induce negative political externalities between countries, which cancel the gains achieved by the internalization of economic externalities in the case of political integration. We then propose two extensions. First, we assume a pre-play game where the countries choose whether or not to initiate political integration. Secondly, we examine the consequences of ratification by referendum. We conclude that a Pareto improvement of the political integration process would be to specify within the international treaty itself the means for its ratification; more precisely, to incorporate a formal ratification procedure, corresponding to an ex post referendum.Delegation, International Agreements, Nash Bargaining Solution, Political Integration, Ratification, Referendum

On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements

We consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation' rule in a political integration process between two countries. We study three potential types of delegation: strong, weak or no delegation, this last case corresponding to a referendum. We show that populations decide to bind themselves by delegating the national policy decision to a "powerfull conservative representative", in order to improve their bargaining position. These non-cooperative behaviors of countries when they decide on their delegation rule induce negative political externalities between countries, which cancel the gains achieved by the internalization of economic externalities in the case of political integration. We then propose two extensions. First, we assume a pre-play game where the countries choose whether or not to initiate political integration. Secondly, we examine the consequences of ratification by referendum. We conclude that a Pareto improvement of the political integration process would be to specify within the international treaty itself the means for its ratification; more precisely, to incorporate a formal ratification procedure, corresponding to an ex post referendum.Delegation;International Agreements;Nash Bargaining Solution;Political Integration;Ratification;Referendum

Signed, Sealed, Delivered, and ?: The Correlation between Policy Areas, Signing, and Legal Ratification of Organization of American States’ Treaties by Member States.

Abstract: Signed, Sealed, Delivered, and ?: The Correlation Between Policy areas, Signing, and Legal Ratification of Organization of American States’ Treaties by Member States. Like any organization, the Organization of American States’ ability to affect lasting policy changes through treaties is only as strong as the will of the federal legislative bodies of its member states. No matter how lofty or well-meaning the OAS’s goals in any area or matter addressed by a treaty, or the number of OAS member states which sign onto a treaty reflecting these goals, under the OAS Charter, and the federal constitutions of most member states, these treaties are merely aspirational unless they are ratified by the federal legislatures of the member states. Although it could be assumed that a member state’s signing of an OAS treaty is indicative of the member state administration’s policy goals - and hence the policy goals of the member state as a whole - there is often a counter-intuitive negative correlation between the number and type of treaties signed by member states and those treaties which are ultimately ratified by the member state’s federal legislature and adopted as binding law on the state. Even in the event of ratification, many member states feature federal constitutional provisions which subsume the primacy of treaty law to domestic law, regardless of when the law was promulgated or the policy choices behind it. Given the disconnect between OAS policy goals and member states’ federal legislative choices, it can easily seem that there is little political or legal force behind treaties promulgated by the OAS. Examining OAS treaties promulgated during the period from post-World War II to the present, however, sheds light on the incidents of positive and negative signing to ratification correlations. This article conducts such an examination, focusing on several themes of treaty promulgation and signing to ratification correlation. One area of focus is the legal requirements for treaty signing and ratification under the OAS Charter, as well as the individual constitutional requirements for individual member states under their federal constitutions. A second area of focus is the basic signature to ratification correlations, including a discussion of those member states which elect to become treaty signatories, or indeed to ratify treaties, with express reservations made to some or most of the treaty terms. The author extrapolates that reservations are often used as a way to help ensure domestic ratification of treaty provisions, and points to the effectiveness of this political/legal strategy. A third area of focus is the type of treaty policy areas used and their past and future uses as indicators of treaty success within the OAS and the federal legislatures of the member states. The conclusion of this article uses the legal, political, and statistical information offered in the previous parts to go beyond a historical summary of OAS treaty policy and the actions of member states and to predict policy areas which will be maximally or minimally accepted by member states as areas in which domestic legal primacy will or will not be ceded to OAS community ideas and goals. This article argues that, however laudable many of the OAS policy goals, as expressed by treaty, have been, the OAS and its member states should consider focusing their calls for cooperation and treaty law ratification on several policy areas with proven records of signing to ratification correlative success

Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Trade Obligations: A Theoretical Analysis of the Doha Proposal

The Doha declaration on trade and environment proposed to clarify the relationship between multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) trade obligations and WTO rules by only guaranteeing economic integration upon ratification of certain MEAs. In other words, it pushed to authorize the use of trade measures against non-compliance, denying a non-signatory of its WTO rights to exercise countervailing tariffs. This paper demonstrates that the Doha proposal can be effective when environmental policy and its trade obligations are endogenous. Under plausible circumstances, ratification by a non-signatory to the MEA along with free trade as a reward is the unique equilibrium outcome. Delocation to pollution havens does not occur, as optimal tariffs are positive if standards are not adopted. Tariffs however only work as a credible threat and do not emerge in equilibrium. Results are consistent with broad empirical evidence that opposes the pollution haven hypothesis and suggests capital movements to be non-pollution related.Environmental policy, WTO, Location of firms, Green tariffs, Multilateral environmental agreements, Doha declaration

U.S. Participation in Global Climate Change Resolutions: Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol

The ratification of treaties, particularly the Kyoto Protocol (KP), is complicated due to domestic forces such as democracies, presidency, and public opinion. The United States is the second largest emitter of carbon emission and has yet to sign on to the stringent mitigation efforts of the KP. Climate change is an issue considered unrelated to national security; however, it is one of the most dangerous national and global threats. Ratification and implementation are domestic factors that increase the stability and credibility of international agreements. The process may be dreadfully slow, but the commitment level of democratic states tends to be significantly high. The lack of legislative support during President Clinton’s administration and President Bush’s links with the energy industry are additional examples of factors constraining support for the agreement. Lastly, public opposition towards anthropogenic climate change stems from disbelief in global warming. Climate change is one of the most pressing global issues present today requiring critical repair. Implementing the stringent goals of the KP is an excellent way towards mitigation and key elements of international governance. The U.S. can maintain its role as a superpower by taking the lead on this issue and avoiding domestic forces constraining the adoption of this agreement. If the U.S. ratifies the KP, other countries are more likely to follow this nation’s footsteps. Although the ratification process is complex, it is important that our current legislative and executive powers push the policy forward by placing it higher on the political agenda through the use of news and online outlets

Weak Presidents, Treaty Ratification, and Presidential Leadership Style

Traditionally, the president is seen as getting his way when it comes to foreign-policy issues; however, with treaty making, an aspect very much related to foreign policy, things are different. Treaties are seen as salient, high-profile, and requiring direct positive action by the Senate. Presidents with high approval ratings would expect to have a relatively easy job at getting treaties approved by the Senate, but when a president is faced with low public approval, one of the most useful tools at his disposal to get Senate approval is not in play. The authors look at a case study of President Carter and the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties to suggest what “weak” presidents can do to get their way