20,064 research outputs found
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games
We show that the problem of finding an {\epsilon}-approximate Nash
equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven pure strategies is complete in
PPAD, when the approximation parameter {\epsilon} is exponentially small in the
number of players.Comment: full versio
Approximate Convex Optimization by Online Game Playing
Lagrangian relaxation and approximate optimization algorithms have received
much attention in the last two decades. Typically, the running time of these
methods to obtain a approximate solution is proportional to
. Recently, Bienstock and Iyengar, following Nesterov,
gave an algorithm for fractional packing linear programs which runs in
iterations. The latter algorithm requires to solve a
convex quadratic program every iteration - an optimization subroutine which
dominates the theoretical running time.
We give an algorithm for convex programs with strictly convex constraints
which runs in time proportional to . The algorithm does NOT
require to solve any quadratic program, but uses gradient steps and elementary
operations only. Problems which have strictly convex constraints include
maximum entropy frequency estimation, portfolio optimization with loss risk
constraints, and various computational problems in signal processing.
As a side product, we also obtain a simpler version of Bienstock and
Iyengar's result for general linear programming, with similar running time.
We derive these algorithms using a new framework for deriving convex
optimization algorithms from online game playing algorithms, which may be of
independent interest
Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games
We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms
that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff
function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is
\emph{query complexity}, that is, how many queries are necessary or sufficient
to compute an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium.
We show that exact equilibria cannot be found via query-efficient algorithms.
We also give an example of a 2-strategy, 3-player anonymous game that does not
have any exact Nash equilibrium in rational numbers. However, more positive
query-complexity bounds are attainable if either further symmetries of the
utility functions are assumed or we focus on approximate equilibria. We
investigate four sub-classes of anonymous games previously considered by
\cite{bfh09, dp14}.
Our main result is a new randomized query-efficient algorithm that finds a
-approximate Nash equilibrium querying
payoffs and runs in time . This improves on the running
time of pre-existing algorithms for approximate equilibria of anonymous games,
and is the first one to obtain an inverse polynomial approximation in
poly-time. We also show how this can be utilized as an efficient
polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS). Furthermore, we prove that
payoffs must be queried in order to find any
-well-supported Nash equilibrium, even by randomized algorithms
An Approximate Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Computation Technique for Repeated Games
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the
set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The
process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then
the initial hypercube is gradually partitioned on to a set of smaller adjacent
hypercubes, while those hypercubes that cannot contain any point belonging to
the set of SPE are simultaneously withdrawn.
Whether a given hypercube can contain an equilibrium point is verified by an
appropriate mathematical program. Three different formulations of the algorithm
for both approximately computing the set of SPE payoffs and extracting players'
strategies are then proposed: the first two that do not assume the presence of
an external coordination between players, and the third one that assumes a
certain level of coordination during game play for convexifying the set of
continuation payoffs after any repeated game history.
A special attention is paid to the question of extracting players' strategies
and their representability in form of finite automata, an important feature for
artificial agent systems.Comment: 26 pages, 13 figures, 1 tabl
Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium
concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such
equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist
polynomial-time algorithms that compute exact (coarse) correlated equilibria.
In light of these results, a natural question is how good are the (coarse)
correlated equilibria that can arise from any efficient algorithm or dynamics.
In this paper we address this question, and establish strong negative
results. In particular, we show that in multiplayer games that have a succinct
representation, it is NP-hard to compute any coarse correlated equilibrium (or
approximate coarse correlated equilibrium) with welfare strictly better than
the worst possible. The focus on succinct games ensures that the underlying
complexity question is interesting; many multiplayer games of interest are in
fact succinct. Our results imply that, while one can efficiently compute a
coarse correlated equilibrium, one cannot provide any nontrivial welfare
guarantee for the resulting equilibrium, unless P=NP. We show that analogous
hardness results hold for correlated equilibria, and persist under the
egalitarian objective or Pareto optimality.
To complement the hardness results, we develop an algorithmic framework that
identifies settings in which we can efficiently compute an approximate
correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare. We use this framework to
develop an efficient algorithm for computing an approximate correlated
equilibrium with near-optimal welfare in aggregative games.Comment: 21 page
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