Filosofía y figuras en las investigaciones filosóficas de Wittgenstein

Indexación: Revista UNABEn las investigaciones filosóficas Wittgenstein examina el impacto sobre la comprensión filosófica de ciertos modelos o figuras. Se distinguen cuatro tipos de figuras de esa naturaleza que serán denominadas aquí 'figuras ingenuas', 'figuras de la falsa mitología', 'figuras filosóficas' y 'figuras para alterar el modo de ver'. El objetivo de este artículo es interpretar el proyecto filosófico de Wittgenstein coordinando estas diversas categorías de figuras con su descripción de la vivencia de aspectos y su examen de la comprensión del significado. De acuerdo con esta interpretación, la filosofia del último Wittgenstein debe ser entendida como un intento de proponer maneras alternativas a partir de las cuales sería posible ver o interpretar la experiencia y los problemas de la filosofia tradicional. Abstract: In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein examines the impact on the philosophical understanding of certain models or pictures. Four types of pictures of that nature wiIl be distinguished and denominated here 'naive pictures', 'pictures of the false mythology', 'philosophical pictures' and 'pictures to alter the way of seeing'. The aim of this paper is to interpret the philosophical project of Wittgenstein by coordinating those diverse categories of pictures with his description of the experience of noticing an aspect and his account of the meaning understanding. According to this interpretation, the philosophy ofthe later Wittgenstein should be understood as an attempt of positing altemative ways by which it would be possible seeing or interpreting the experience and the traditional philosophy problems

Quotations as Pictures

The proposal of a semantics for quotations using explanatory notions drawn from philosophical theories of pictures. In Quotations as Pictures, Josef Stern develops a semantics for quotations using explanatory notions drawn from philosophical theories of pictures. He offers the first sustained analysis of the practice of quotation proper, as opposed to mentioning. Unlike other accounts that treat quotation as mentioning, Quotations as Pictures argues that the two practices have independent histories, that they behave differently semantically, that the inverted commas employed in both mentioning and quotation are homonymous, that so-called mixed quotation is nothing but subsentential quotation, and that the major problem of quotation is to explain its dual reference or meaning—its ordinary meaning and its metalinguistic reference to the quoted phrase attributed to the quoted subject. Stern argues that the key to understanding quotation is the idea that quotations are pictures or have a pictorial character. As a phenomenon where linguistic competence meets a nonlinguistic symbolic ability, the pictorial, quotation is a combination of features drawn from the two different symbol systems of language and pictures, which explains the exceptional and sometimes idiosyncratic data about quotation. In light of this analysis of verbal quotation, in the last chapters Stern analyzes scare quotation as a nonliteral expressive use of the inverted commas and explores the possibility of quotation in pictures themselves

Dielectric and thermal relaxation in the energy landscape

We derive an energy landscape interpretation of dielectric relaxation times in undercooled liquids, comparing it to the traditional Debye and Gemant-DiMarzio-Bishop pictures. The interaction between different local structural rearrangements in the energy landscape explains qualitatively the recently observed splitting of the flow process into an initial and a final stage. The initial mechanical relaxation stage is attributed to hopping processes, the final thermal or structural relaxation stage to the decay of the local double-well potentials. The energy landscape concept provides an explanation for the equality of thermal and dielectric relaxation times. The equality itself is once more demonstrated on the basis of literature data for salol.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures, 41 references, Workshop Disordered Systems, Molveno 2006, submitted to Philosophical Magazin

Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions

Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, and some may or may not portray actual objects aptly. Yet, unlike propositional attitudes, mental pictures do not allow for objective criteria by which one can judge that a certain picture is an apt portrait of someone or something

Philosophy of perception as a guide to aesthetics

The aim of this paper is to argue that it is a promising avenue of research to consider philosophy of perception to be a guide to aesthetics. More precisely, my claim is that many, maybe even most, traditional problems in aesthetics are in fact about philosophy of perception that can, as a result, be fruitfully addressed with the help of the conceptual apparatus of philosophy of perception. This claim may sound provocative, but after qualifying what I mean by aesthetics (to be contrasted with philosophy of art) and by philosophy of perception, it may be easier to accept

Philosophical Pictures from Philosopher Portraits

Portraits of Wittgenstein and Hume are used as test cases in some preliminary investigations of a new kind of philosophical picture. Such pictures are produced via a variety of visual transformations of the original portraits, with a final selection for display and discussion being based on the few results that seem to have some interesting relevance to the character or philosophical views of the philosopher in question

Sonic Pictures

Winning essay of the American Society for Aesthetics' inaugural Peter Kivy Prize. Extends Kivy's notion of sonic picturing through engagement with recent work in philosophy of perception. Argues that sonic pictures are more widespread and more aesthetically and artistically important than even Kivy envisioned. Topics discussed include: the nature of sonic pictures; the nature of sounds; what we can (and more importantly, cannot) conclude from musical listening; sonic pictures in film; beatboxing as an art of sonic picturing; and cover songs as sonic pictures. To be published in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

The Aesthetic Dimension of Wittgenstein's Later Writings

In this essay I argue the extent to which meaning and judgment in aesthetics figures in Wittgenstein’s later conception of language, particularly in his conception of how philosophy might go about explaining the ordinary functioning of language. Following a review of some biographical and textual matters concerning Wittgenstein’s life with music, I outline the connection among (1) Wittgenstein’s discussions of philosophical clarity or perspicuity, (2) our attempts to give clarity to our aesthetic experiences by wording them, and (3) the clarifying experience of the dawning of an aspect, which Wittgenstein pictures as the perception of an internal relation. By examining Wittgenstein’s use of “internal relation” from the Tractatus to his later writings, I come to challenge the still prevalent understanding of Wittgenstein’s appeals to grammar as an appeal to something given (e.g., to a set of grammatical rules). Instead, as I argue, Wittgensteinian appeals to grammatical criteria should be understood as modeled by the form of justification found in our conversations about art

Transparency and sensorimotor contingencies: Do we see through photographs?

It has been claimed that photographs are transparent: we see through them; we literally see the photographed object through the photograph. Whether this claim is true depends on the way we conceive of seeing. There has been a controversy about whether localizing the perceived object in one's egocentric space is a necessary feature of seeing, as if it is, then photographs are unlikely to be transparent. I would like to propose and defend another, much weaker, necessary condition for seeing: I argue that it is necessary for seeing that there is at least one way for me to move such that if I were to move this way, my view of the perceived object would change continuously as I move. Since this condition is not satisfied in the case of seeing objects in photographs, photographs are not transparen