Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.Negotiation theory, Water, Agreeements, Stochasticity, Stakeholders

Enhancing cooperation in wireless networks using different concepts of game theory

PhDOptimizing radio resource within a network and across cooperating heterogeneous networks is the focus of this thesis. Cooperation in a multi-network environment is tackled by investigating network selection mechanisms. These play an important role in ensuring quality of service for users in a multi-network environment. Churning of mobile users from one service provider to another is already common when people change contracts and in a heterogeneous communication environment, where mobile users have freedom to choose the best wireless service-real time selection is expected to become common feature. This real time selection impacts both the technical and the economic aspects of wireless network operations. Next generation wireless networks will enable a dynamic environment whereby the nodes of the same or even different network operator can interact and cooperate to improve their performance. Cooperation has emerged as a novel communication paradigm that can yield tremendous performance gains from the physical layer all the way up to the application layer. Game theory and in particular coalitional game theory is a highly suited mathematical tool for modelling cooperation between wireless networks and is investigated in this thesis. In this thesis, the churning behaviour of wireless service users is modelled by using evolutionary game theory in the context of WLAN access points and WiMAX networks. This approach illustrates how to improve the user perceived QoS in heterogeneous networks using a two-layered optimization. The top layer views the problem of prediction of the network that would be chosen by a user where the criteria are offered bit rate, price, mobility support and reputation. At the second level, conditional on the strategies chosen by the users, the network provider hypothetically, reconfigures the network, subject to the network constraints of bandwidth and acceptable SNR and optimizes the network coverage to support users who would otherwise not be serviced adequately. This forms an iterative cycle until a solution that optimizes the user satisfaction subject to the adjustments that the network provider can make to mitigate the binding constraints, is found and applied to the real network. The evolutionary equilibrium, which is used to 3 compute the average number of users choosing each wireless service, is taken as the solution. This thesis also proposes a fair and practical cooperation framework in which the base stations belonging to the same network provider cooperate, to serve each other‘s customers. How this cooperation can potentially increase their aggregate payoffs through efficient utilization of resources is shown for the case of dynamic frequency allocation. This cooperation framework needs to intelligently determine the cooperating partner and provide a rational basis for sharing aggregate payoff between the cooperative partners for the stability of the coalition. The optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the allocations of the channels to mobile customers, can be obtained as solutions of linear programming optimizations

Clean up your own mess: an experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency

Although market-based environmental policy instruments feature prominently in economic theory and are widely employed, they often meet with public resistance. We argue that such resistance may be driven by a feeling of moral responsibility where citizens prefer to tackle environmental problems themselves, rather than delegating the task to others by means of a market mechanism. Using a laboratory experiment that isolates moral responsibility from alternative explanations, we show that moral responsibility induces participants to incur a sizable cost on themselves as well as on other participants. We discuss the implications of this finding for the design and implementation of environmental policies

Markets for leaked information

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information to those types of third parties who harm the agent most. In equilibrium, this limits information transmission by the agent, but never fully deters it. We also consider agents who naively provide information to the market. Their presence renders traded information more valuable and, thus, harms sophisticated agents by increasing the third party's demand for information. Halfbaked regulatory interventions may hurt naive agents without helping sophisticated agents. Comparing monopoly and oligopoly markets, we find that oligopoly is often better for the agent: it requires a higher value of traded information and therefore has to grant the agent more privacy

Agent Based Modeling of Electronic Markets To Analyze the Sustainability of Mutual Cooperation

According to game theory, dominant strategy of Prisoner’s Dilemma game is defecting. Since online trading between two strangers falls in the realm of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, failure should be the only logical conclusion of such electronic commerce situation. Traders are less likely to cooperate since they are not required to deal with the same buyer again given the enormous population of online traders. Thus one could argue that markets like eBay should never exist. Then what is the reason behind resounding success of such electronic markets? The answer lies in the reputation system that they established. Google page rankings and reader reviews on various sites like Amazon.com and Epinions.com are some other examples of the reputation system pointing towards the enormous influence that they wield in our everyday life. This research thus attempts to analyze importance of reputation system in an online trading using Agent Based Simulation. The effect of reputation system on the sustainability of mutual cooperation between online traders is analyzed by taking into account key factors like level of gullibility of online traders and the weight of influence given to their past behavior. Results indicate that reputation system is certainly capable of sustaining cooperation among online traders. However, weightage given to the past behavior of agents should be decided only after taking into account the level of gullibility of agents. Use of agent based modeling for studying dynamics of online trading is a relatively new concept. Sustaining cooperation among online traders is often perceived to be difficult task. The reputation system proposed in this research is expected to make contribution towards this goal

Environmental analysis for application layer networks

Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechnern über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt. --Grid Computing

Energy management of micro-grid using cooperative game theory

Micro-grid (MG) has been introduced as a low voltage and a very small power system connected to a distribution grid through the point of common coupling. It consists of distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar Photovoltaic (PV), wind turbine, fuel cell, etc.), interconnected load and energy storage sources. It can operate in grid-connected (i.e. when connected to the main grid) or islanded (i.e. when not connected to the main grid) mode. It has an advantage of utilizing low carbon sources and the possibility of its use in the remote local environment, which means that the transmission infrastructures and their associated costs may be deferred. Although there has been a proliferation of optimization methods of energy management in the MG, most of these methods consider self-interest of the players in profit distribution. Moreover, only a few of them consider a fair profit distribution using Nash bargaining solution (NBS) (i.e. when utility function is linear) leading to even profit distribution and high degree of dissatisfaction. For the MG to achieve better economic outcomes, a novel method based on weighted fair energy management among the participants (i.e. building of different types, such as residential buildings, schools, and shops) is proposed. The novelty of the proposed method lies in the new profit sharing method to favour certain participant by assigning a weight to each participant with cooperative game theory (CGT) approach using generalized Nash bargaining solution (GNBS). The proposed approach achieves a fair (reasonable or just) profit allocation with negotiating power indicator. In this work, a case study of six different participant sites is proposed using the CGT method of energy management. The proposed method is able to cope with the drawbacks of the existing independent method, which negotiate directly with other participants for selfish profit distribution. It is demonstrated that the independent method results in (1) a reduction in the profit of each participant of MG when compared with CGT approach and (2) the variation of transfer prices in some participants having profit below the specified lower bound profit since the method does not take into consideration the lower profit bounds. The use of CGT method (i.e. when participants form a coalition) to finding multi-partner profit level subject to specified lower bounds is demonstrated. This results in (1) increase in the profit of the MG participants (2) maintaining the profit level of all the participants above status-quo profit (lower specified profit bounds) with variation in transfer prices and (3) allowing certain participant to be favoured by assigning higher negotiating power to such participant. To achieve the optimal solution in the proposed method, a teaching-learning-based optimization (TLBO) algorithm is presented to efficiently solve the problem. For TLBO algorithm, no specific control parameters are needed except the number of generations and population size. This is in contrast with other heuristic algorithms such as genetic algorithm (GA) and particle swarm optimization (PSO) that require other control parameters (i.e. GA requires selection and crossover operation, while PSO makes use of social parameters and cognitive weight). To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed TLBO method, the profit allocations are tested in the grid-connected and the islanded mode using both the CGT and the independent method. In this work, the proposed TLBO method is compared with one traditional method, i.e. Lambda iteration method and two heuristic methods, i.e. PSO and GA. Thus, by using TLBO a considerable amount of computation time is saved. Using the same parameter setting for all the heuristic algorithms used, 20 trials are performed to be able to compare the quality of solution and convergence characteristics. The investigation reveals that TLBO gives the highest quality solutions and better convergence characteristics compared to PSO and GA