Forwarding Techniques for IP Fragmented Packets in a Real 6LoWPAN Network

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are attracting more and more interest since they offer a low-cost solution to the problem of providing a means to deploy large sensor networks in a number of application domains. We believe that a crucial aspect to facilitate WSN diffusion is to make them interoperable with external IP networks. This can be achieved by using the 6LoWPAN protocol stack. 6LoWPAN enables the transmission of IPv6 packets over WSNs based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. IPv6 packet size is considerably larger than that of IEEE 802.15.4 data frame. To overcome this problem, 6LoWPAN introduces an adaptation layer between the network and data link layers, allowing IPv6 packets to be adapted to the lower layer constraints. This adaptation layer provides fragmentation and header compression of IP packets. Furthermore, it also can be involved in routing decisions. Depending on which layer is responsible for routing decisions, 6LoWPAN divides routing in two categories: mesh under if the layer concerned is the adaptation layer and route over if it is the network layer. In this paper we analyze different routing solutions (route over, mesh under and enhanced route over) focusing on how they forward fragments. We evaluate their performance in terms of latency and energy consumption when transmitting IP fragmented packets. All the tests have been performed in a real 6LoWPAN implementation. After consideration of the main problems in forwarding of mesh frames in WSN, we propose and analyze a new alternative scheme based on mesh under, which we call controlled mesh under

Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges in next-generation networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to the service providers. Unlike traditional Wi-Fi networks, with each access point (AP) connected to the wired network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs are required to be connected to the wired network. The APs that are connected to the wired network are called the Internet gateways (IGWs), while the APs that do not have wired connections are called the mesh routers (MRs). The MRs are connected to the IGWs using multi-hop communication. The IGWs provide access to conventional clients and interconnect ad hoc, sensor, cellular, and other networks to the Internet. However, most of the existing routing protocols for WMNs are extensions of protocols originally designed for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and thus they perform sub-optimally. Moreover, most routing protocols for WMNs are designed without security issues in mind, where the nodes are all assumed to be honest. In practical deployment scenarios, this assumption does not hold. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of security issues in WMNs and then particularly focuses on secure routing in these networks. First, it identifies security vulnerabilities in the medium access control (MAC) and the network layers. Various possibilities of compromising data confidentiality, data integrity, replay attacks and offline cryptanalysis are also discussed. Then various types of attacks in the MAC and the network layers are discussed. After enumerating the various types of attacks on the MAC and the network layer, the chapter briefly discusses on some of the preventive mechanisms for these attacks.Comment: 44 pages, 17 figures, 5 table

RECOMAC: a cross-layer cooperative network protocol for wireless ad hoc networks

A novel decentralized cross-layer multi-hop cooperative protocol, namely, Routing Enabled Cooperative Medium Access Control (RECOMAC) is proposed for wireless ad hoc networks. The protocol architecture makes use of cooperative forwarding methods, in which coded packets are forwarded via opportunistically formed cooperative sets within a region, as RECOMAC spans the physical, medium access control (MAC) and routing layers. Randomized coding is exploited at the physical layer to realize cooperative transmissions, and cooperative forwarding is implemented for routing functionality, which is submerged into the MAC layer, while the overhead for MAC and route set up is minimized. RECOMAC is shown to provide dramatic performance improvements of eight times higher throughput and one tenth of end-to-end delay than that of the conventional architecture in practical wireless mesh networks

Isolating SDN Control Traffic with Layer-2 Slicing in 6TiSCH Industrial IoT Networks

Recent standardization efforts in IEEE 802.15.4-2015 Time Scheduled Channel Hopping (TSCH) and the IETF 6TiSCH Working Group (WG), aim to provide deterministic communications and efficient allocation of resources across constrained Internet of Things (IoT) networks, particularly in Industrial IoT (IIoT) scenarios. Within 6TiSCH, Software Defined Networking (SDN) has been identified as means of providing centralized control in a number of key situations. However, implementing a centralized SDN architecture in a Low Power and Lossy Network (LLN) faces considerable challenges: not only is controller traffic subject to jitter due to unreliable links and network contention, but the overhead generated by SDN can severely affect the performance of other traffic. This paper proposes using 6TiSCH tracks, a Layer-2 slicing mechanism for creating dedicated forwarding paths across TSCH networks, in order to isolate the SDN control overhead. Not only does this prevent control traffic from affecting the performance of other data flows, but the properties of 6TiSCH tracks allows deterministic, low-latency SDN controller communication. Using our own lightweight SDN implementation for Contiki OS, we firstly demonstrate the effect of SDN control traffic on application data flows across a 6TiSCH network. We then show that by slicing the network through the allocation of dedicated resources along a SDN control path, tracks provide an effective means of mitigating the cost of SDN control overhead in IEEE 802.15.4-2015 TSCH networks

Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio