Building Machines That Learn and Think Like People

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn, and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (a) build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; (b) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology, to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (c) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes towards these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.Comment: In press at Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Open call for commentary proposals (until Nov. 22, 2016). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/information/calls-for-commentary/open-calls-for-commentar

Categories as paradigms for comparative cognition

Forming categories is a basic cognitive operation allowing animals to attain concepts, i.e. to represent various classes of objects, natural or artificial, physical or social. Categories can also be formed about the relations holding among these objects, notably similarity and identity. Some of the cognitive processes involved in categorisation will be enumerated. Also, special reference will be made to a much neglected area of research, that of social representations. Here, animals conceive the natural class of their conspecifics as well as the relationships established between them in groups. Two types of social categories were mentioned: (1) intraspecies recognition including recognition of individual conspecifics; and (2) representation of dominance hierarchies and of their transitivity in linear orders

Multimodal Grounding for Language Processing

This survey discusses how recent developments in multimodal processing facilitate conceptual grounding of language. We categorize the information flow in multimodal processing with respect to cognitive models of human information processing and analyze different methods for combining multimodal representations. Based on this methodological inventory, we discuss the benefit of multimodal grounding for a variety of language processing tasks and the challenges that arise. We particularly focus on multimodal grounding of verbs which play a crucial role for the compositional power of language.Comment: The paper has been published in the Proceedings of the 27 Conference of Computational Linguistics. Please refer to this version for citations: https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/papers/C/C18/C18-1197

The role of simulations in consumer experiences and behavior: insights from the grounded cognition theory of desire

What are the mechanisms by which extrinsic and environmental cues affect consumer experiences, desires, and choices? Based on the recent grounded cognition theory of desire, we argue that consumption and reward simulations constitute a central mechanism in these phenomena. Specifically, we argue that appetitive stimuli, such as specific product cues, can activate simulations of consuming and enjoying the respective products, based on previous learning experiences. These consumption and reward simulations can lead to motivated behavior, and can be modulated by state and trait individual differences, situational factors, and product-extrinsic cues. We outline the role of simulations within the grounded theory of desire, offering a theoretical framework for understanding motivational processes in consumer behavior. Then we illustrate the theory with behavioral, physiological, and neuroimaging findings on simulations in appetitive behavior and sensory marketing. Finally, we outline important issues for further research and applications for stimulating healthy, prosocial, and sustainable consumer choices

Categorization and conceptual behavior in nonhuman primates

This essay describes some of the studies that have been carried out in the past 5 years with two species of baboons, both in laboratory-controlled conditions (Guinea baboons, Papio papio) and in outdoor settings (olive baboons, Papio anubis)

What does semantic tiling of the cortex tell us about semantics?

Recent use of voxel-wise modeling in cognitive neuroscience suggests that semantic maps tile the cortex. Although this impressive research establishes distributed cortical areas active during the conceptual processing that underlies semantics, it tells us little about the nature of this processing. While mapping concepts between Marr's computational and implementation levels to support neural encoding and decoding, this approach ignores Marr's algorithmic level, central for understanding the mechanisms that implement cognition, in general, and conceptual processing, in particular. Following decades of research in cognitive science and neuroscience, what do we know so far about the representation and processing mechanisms that implement conceptual abilities? Most basically, much is known about the mechanisms associated with: (1) features and frame representations, (2) grounded, abstract, and linguistic representations, (3) knowledge-based inference, (4) concept composition, and (5) conceptual flexibility. Rather than explaining these fundamental representation and processing mechanisms, semantic tiles simply provide a trace of their activity over a relatively short time period within a specific learning context. Establishing the mechanisms that implement conceptual processing in the brain will require more than mapping it to cortical (and sub-cortical) activity, with process models from cognitive science likely to play central roles in specifying the intervening mechanisms. More generally, neuroscience will not achieve its basic goals until it establishes algorithmic-level mechanisms that contribute essential explanations to how the brain works, going beyond simply establishing the brain areas that respond to various task conditions

Cognitive Penetration and Attention

Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be direct and exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism

Conceptual development from the perspective of a brain-inspired robotic architecture

Concepts are central to reasoning and intelligent behaviour. Scientific evidence shows that conceptual development is fundamental for the emergence of high-cognitive phenomena. Here, we model such phenomena in a brain-inspired cognitive robotic model and examine how the robot can learn, categorise, and abstract concepts to voluntary control behaviour. The paper argues that such competence arises with sufficient conceptual content from physical and social experience. Hence, senses, motor abilities and language, all contribute to a robot's intelligent behaviour. To this aim, we devised a method for attaining concepts, which computationally reproduces the steps of the inductive thinking strategy of the Concept Attainment Model (CAM). Initially, the robot is tutor-guided through socio-centric cues to attain concepts and is then tested consistently to use these concepts to solve complex tasks. We demonstrate how the robot uses language to create new categories by abstraction in response to human language-directed instructions. Linguistic stimuli also change the representations of the robot's experiences and generate more complex representations for further concepts. Most notably, this work shows that this competence emerges by the robot's ability to understand the concepts similarly to human understanding. Such understanding was also maintained when concepts were expressed in multilingual lexicalisations showing that labels represent concepts that allowed the model to adapt to unfamiliar contingencies in which it did not have directly related experiences. The work concludes that language is an essential component of conceptual development, which scaffolds the cognitive continuum of a robot from low-to-high cognitive skills, including its skill to understand

Self-directedness, integration and higher cognition

In this paper I discuss connections between self-directedness, integration and higher cognition. I present a model of self-directedness as a basis for approaching higher cognition from a situated cognition perspective. According to this model increases in sensorimotor complexity create pressure for integrative higher order control and learning processes for acquiring information about the context in which action occurs. This generates complex articulated abstractive information processing, which forms the major basis for higher cognition. I present evidence that indicates that the same integrative characteristics found in lower cognitive process such as motor adaptation are present in a range of higher cognitive process, including conceptual learning. This account helps explain situated cognition phenomena in humans because the integrative processes by which the brain adapts to control interaction are relatively agnostic concerning the source of the structure participating in the process. Thus, from the perspective of the motor control system using a tool is not fundamentally different to simply controlling an arm