Toward a social psychophysics of face communication

As a highly social species, humans are equipped with a powerful tool for social communication—the face, which can elicit multiple social perceptions in others due to the rich and complex variations of its movements, morphology, and complexion. Consequently, identifying precisely what face information elicits different social perceptions is a complex empirical challenge that has largely remained beyond the reach of traditional research methods. More recently, the emerging field of social psychophysics has developed new methods designed to address this challenge. Here, we introduce and review the foundational methodological developments of social psychophysics, present recent work that has advanced our understanding of the face as a tool for social communication, and discuss the main challenges that lie ahead

A 3D descriptor to detect task-oriented grasping points in clothing

© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Manipulating textile objects with a robot is a challenging task, especially because the garment perception is difficult due to the endless configurations it can adopt, coupled with a large variety of colors and designs. Most current approaches follow a multiple re-grasp strategy, in which clothes are sequentially grasped from different points until one of them yields a recognizable configuration. In this work we propose a method that combines 3D and appearance information to directly select a suitable grasping point for the task at hand, which in our case consists of hanging a shirt or a polo shirt from a hook. Our method follows a coarse-to-fine approach in which, first, the collar of the garment is detected and, next, a grasping point on the lapel is chosen using a novel 3D descriptor. In contrast to current 3D descriptors, ours can run in real time, even when it needs to be densely computed over the input image. Our central idea is to take advantage of the structured nature of range images that most depth sensors provide and, by exploiting integral imaging, achieve speed-ups of two orders of magnitude with respect to competing approaches, while maintaining performance. This makes it especially adequate for robotic applications as we thoroughly demonstrate in the experimental section.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Building Machines That Learn and Think Like People

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn, and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (a) build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; (b) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology, to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (c) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes towards these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.Comment: In press at Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Open call for commentary proposals (until Nov. 22, 2016). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/information/calls-for-commentary/open-calls-for-commentar

Mental Structures

An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are “iconic” or “sentential,” “analog” or “digital,” and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle of the ridge. More specific structural claims of this sort are a guide to how mental states fall within broader representational kinds. Moreover, these claims have significant implications of their own about semantic, functional, and epistemic features of our mental lives. But what are the conditions on a mental state's having one type of constituent structure rather than another? Drawing on explanatory strategies in vision science, I argue that, other things being equal, the constituent structure of a mental state determines what I call its distributional properties—namely, how mental states of that type can, cannot, or must co‐occur with other mental states in a given system. Distributional properties depend critically on and are informative about the underlying structures of mental states, they abstract in important ways from aspects of how mental states are processed, and they can yield significant insights into the variegation of psychological capacities