20,207 research outputs found
Quantum Interaction Approach in Cognition, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has been successfully
employed in the last years to model situations in which the use of classical
structures gives rise to problematical situations, and where typically quantum
effects, such as 'contextuality' and 'entanglement', have been recognized. This
'Quantum Interaction Approach' is briefly reviewed in this paper focusing, in
particular, on the quantum models that have been elaborated to describe how
concepts combine in cognitive science, and on the ensuing identification of a
quantum structure in human thought. We point out that these results provide
interesting insights toward the development of a unified theory for meaning and
knowledge formalization and representation. Then, we analyze the technological
aspects and implications of our approach, and a particular attention is devoted
to the connections with symbolic artificial intelligence, quantum computation
and robotics.Comment: 10 page
How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox
The general thesis of this paper is that metasemantic theories can play a central role in determining the correct solution to the liar paradox. I argue for the thesis by providing a specific example. I show how Lewis’s reference-magnetic metasemantic theory may decide between two of the most influential solutions to the liar paradox: Kripke’s minimal fixed point theory of truth and Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. In particular, I suggest that Lewis’s metasemantic theory favours Kripke’s solution to the paradox over Gupta and Belnap’s. I then sketch how other standard criteria for assessing solutions to the liar paradox, such as whether a solution faces a so-called revenge paradox, fit into this picture. While the discussion of the specific example is itself important, the underlying lesson is that we have an unused strategy for resolving one of the hardest problems in philosophy
Gestalt Shifts in the Liar Or Why KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities
ABSTRACT: This chapter offers a revenge-free solution to the liar paradox (at the centre of which is the notion of Gestalt shift) and presents a formal representation of truth in, or for, a natural language like English, which proposes to show both why -- and how -- truth is coherent and how it appears to be incoherent, while preserving classical logic and most principles that some philosophers have taken to be central to the concept of truth and our use of that notion. The chapter argues that, by using a truth operator rather than truth predicate, it is possible to provide a coherent, model-theoretic representation of truth with various desirable features. After investigating what features of liar sentences are responsible for their paradoxicality, the chapter identifies the logic as the normal modal logic KT4M (= S4M). Drawing on the structure of KT4M (=S4M), the author proposes that, pace deflationism, truth has content, that the content of truth is bivalence, and that the notions of both truth and bivalence are semideterminable
Quantum Machine and SR Approach: a Unified Model
The Geneva-Brussels approach to quantum mechanics (QM) and the semantic
realism (SR) nonstandard interpretation of QM exhibit some common features and
some deep conceptual differences. We discuss in this paper two elementary
models provided in the two approaches as intuitive supports to general
reasonings and as a proof of consistency of general assumptions, and show that
Aerts' quantum machine can be embodied into a macroscopic version of the
microscopic SR model, overcoming the seeming incompatibility between the two
models. This result provides some hints for the construction of a unified
perspective in which the two approaches can be properly placed.Comment: 21 pages, 5 figures. Introduction and Conclusions improved, minor
corrections in several sections. Accepted for publication in Foundations of
Physic
Inconsistency, paraconsistency and ω-inconsistency
In this paper I'll explore the relation between ω-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I'll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting feature of being able to handle semantic and arithmetic concepts, maintaining the standard model. However, it can be easily shown that both theories are ω-inconsistent. Although usually a theory of truth is generally expected to be ω-consistent, all conceptual concerns don't apply to inconsistent theories. Finally, I'll explore if it's possible to have an inconsistent, but ω-consistent theory of truth, restricting my analysis to substructural theories.Fil: Da Re, Bruno. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones CientĂficas y TĂ©cnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones FilosĂłficas - Sadaf; Argentin
A Paradox of Inferentialism
John McDowell articulated a radical criticism of normative inferentialism against Robert Brandom’s expressivist account of conceptual contents. One of his main concerns consists in vindicating a notion of intentionality that could not be reduced to the deontic relations that are established by discursive practitioners. Noticeably, large part of this discussion is focused on empirical knowledge and observational judgments. McDowell
argues that there is no role for inference in the application of observational concepts, except the paradoxical one of justifying the content of an observational judgment in terms of itself. This paper examines the semantical consequences of the analysis of the content of empirical judgments in terms of their inferential role. These, it is suggested, are distinct from the epistemological paradoxes that McDowell charges the inferentialist approach with
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