Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice

The term dual-use characterizes technologies that can have both military and civilian applications. What is the state of current efforts to control the spread of these powerful technologies—nuclear, biological, cyber—that can simultaneously advance social and economic well-being and also be harnessed for hostile purposes? What have previous efforts to govern, for example, nuclear and biological weapons taught us about the potential for the control of these dual-use technologies? What are the implications for governance when the range of actors who could cause harm with these technologies include not just national governments but also non-state actors like terrorists? These are some of the questions addressed by Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice, the new publication released today by the Global Nuclear Future Initiative of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The publication's editor is Elisa D. Harris, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. Governance of Dual-Use Technologies examines the similarities and differences between the strategies used for the control of nuclear technologies and those proposed for biotechnology and information technology. The publication makes clear the challenges concomitant with dual-use governance. For example, general agreement exists internationally on the need to restrict access to technologies enabling the development of nuclear weapons. However, no similar consensus exists in the bio and information technology domains. The publication also explores the limitations of military measures like deterrence, defense, and reprisal in preventing globally available biological and information technologies from being misused. Some of the other questions explored by the publication include: What types of governance measures for these dual-use technologies have already been adopted? What objectives have those measures sought to achieve? How have the technical characteristics of the technology affected governance prospects? What have been the primary obstacles to effective governance, and what gaps exist in the current governance regime? Are further governance measures feasible? In addition to a preface from Global Nuclear Future Initiative Co-Director Robert Rosner (University of Chicago) and an introduction and conclusion from Elisa Harris, Governance of Dual-Use Technologiesincludes:On the Regulation of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology by James M. Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)Dual-Use Threats: The Case of Biotechnology by Elisa D. Harris (University of Maryland)Governance of Information Technology and Cyber Weapons by Herbert Lin (Stanford University

Understanding the Workforce Needs of New Jersey's Public Health and Other Disaster Management Employers

This report explores the priority workforce needs of New Jersey's public disaster management system. An advisory group of disaster management-related employers from law enforcement and state and local public health systems and educational institutions was convened in the spring of 2006 to identify priority workforce skill needs. Researchers also conducted interviews with state officials, domestic security, public health, and disaster planning experts, as well as reviews of labor market information, state and national websites, and industry and scholarly literature

Report of the 2014 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure

This event was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant Number 1234408. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed at the event or in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation

NEUROWAR IS HERE!

Mysterious attacks on the human brain have begun plaguing U.S. diplomats and officials with increasing frequency, ranging from overseas diplomatic outposts to right here in the United States. Known in the media as Havana Syndrome, these attacks appear to be signaling a new form of warfare—one that is focused on enhancing, targeting, and weaponizing the human brain—neurowarfare. Indeed, the human brain is at the center of a biotechnological revolution currently underway. At the same time, great power competition has returned to the forefront of international relations, as China and Russia seek to contest America’s global leadership. In an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, this contest is ultimately a battle of ideas and influence, with more value placed on information and non-lethal means to manipulate and control both adversaries and domestic populations alike. The battle for influence begins and ends in the human mind, where reality is perceived. The implications of these developments point to both a new form and domain of warfare centering on the human brain. By highlighting recent attacks targeting the brain and revealing research from the United States and its two main competitors—China and Russia—this thesis seeks to argue that neurowar is not just coming, but rather is already here and is likely to fundamentally alter conflict and warfare.Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air ForceMajor, United States Air ForceApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

"Out of the loop": autonomous weapon systems and the law of armed conflict

The introduction of autonomous weapon systems into the “battlespace” will profoundly influence the nature of future warfare. This reality has begun to draw the attention of the international legal community, with increasing calls for an outright ban on the use of autonomous weapons systems in armed conflict. This Article is intended to help infuse granularity and precision into the legal debates surrounding such weapon systems and their future uses. It suggests that whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might be prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only when employed in a manner that runs contrary to the law of armed conflict’s prescriptive norms governing the “conduct of hostilities.” This Article concludes that an outright ban of autonomous weapon systems is insupportable as a matter of law, policy, and operational good sense. Indeed, proponents of a ban underestimate the extent to which the law of armed conflict, including its customary law aspect, will control autonomous weapon system operations. Some autonomous weapon systems that might be developed would already be unlawful per se under existing customary law, irrespective of any treaty ban. The use of certain others would be severely limited by that law. Furthermore, an outright ban is premature since no such weapons have even left the drawing board. Critics typically either fail to take account of likely developments in autonomous weapon systems technology or base their analysis on unfounded assumptions about the nature of the systems. From a national security perspective, passing on the opportunity to develop these systems before they are fully understood would be irresponsible. Perhaps even more troubling is the prospect that banning autonomous weapon systems altogether based on speculation as to their future form could forfeit their potential use in a manner that would minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when compared to non-autonomous weapon systems

Update NPS / November 2012

NPS Graduate Honored with Navy's Stockdale Leadership Award; Army's Cyber Commander Explores NPS Education, Research Programs; Student Dissertation Looks at Privatization of Global Securit

Investigating Capability Development Management for the Air Force Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SPDE) Office

The Air Force provides unique capabilities for the defense of our nation. Capabilities do not come to fruition instantly; they must go through a development process. Managing the development of a capability is a difficult but necessary task. In 2016, a report from the Air Force Studies Board prompted the Air Force to focus on the Capability Development Process and its improvement. In response to the report, the Strategic Development Planning & Experimentation (SDPE) Office was formed. The SDPE Office is tasked to support Enterprise Capability Collaboration Teams (ECCTs), which are, in turn, tasked to research and solve prominent issues articulated by Air Force leadership. To support ECCTs and the Capability Development Council, the SDPE Office must manage capability development. This research investigates how other Military Services and civilian service sectors handle capability development. The results from this analysis will provide the SDPE Office recommendations for managing responsibilities, based on the best practices found among the organizations studied

Cyber-Human Systems, Space Technologies, and Threats

CYBER-HUMAN SYSTEMS, SPACE TECHNOLOGIES, AND THREATS is our eighth textbook in a series covering the world of UASs / CUAS/ UUVs / SPACE. Other textbooks in our series are Space Systems Emerging Technologies and Operations; Drone Delivery of CBNRECy – DEW Weapons: Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption (WMDD); Disruptive Technologies with applications in Airline, Marine, Defense Industries; Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations On Air, Sea, Land; Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations; Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd edition; and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 1st edition. Our previous seven titles have received considerable global recognition in the field. (Nichols & Carter, 2022) (Nichols, et al., 2021) (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) (Nichols R. , et al., 2020) (Nichols R. , et al., 2019) (Nichols R. K., 2018) (Nichols R. K., et al., 2022)https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/1052/thumbnail.jp