A DSA-based scheme for defending against IP prefix hijacking without repositories

Krađa IP prefiksa predstavlja ozbiljnu prijetnju za sigurnost Interneta. Kriptografsko ustanovljavanje autentičnosti porijekla ASes (Autonomnih Sustava) oglašenog prefiksa, što predstavlja učinkovit način sprećavanja krađe IP prefiksa, široko je prihvaćeno. Međutim, postojećim se shemama upućuju različiti kritički komentari vezani za njihovu neučinkovitost kod kriptografskog ustanovljavanja autentičnosti porijekla ASes. U svrhu poboljšanja učinkovitosti, koristimo prednosti specifičnih obilježja DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) te predstavljamo shemu za sprećavanje krađe IP prefiksa. Postoje dva obilježja predložene sheme, temeljena na DSA i učinkovita. Prvo, budući da je DSA standard za digitalne potpise federalne vlade SAD, DSA temeljeno obilježje može zadržati kompatibilnost s DSA i njegovim analitičkim alatima te je na taj način olakšano široko prihvaćanje i primjena u praksi predložene sheme. Drugo, državni ključni certifikati (key certificates) nisu potrebni jer se mogu izračunati pomoću formule. Odvojeni potpisi za verifikaciju u tim certifikatima, koji su neizbježni u gotovo svim postojećim shemama temeljenim na kriptografiji, mogu se zamijeniti računanjem multi-eksponencijalne formule. Na taj je način postignuta učinkovitost.IP prefix hijacking poses a serious threat to the security of the Internet. Cryptographic authenticating origin ASes (Autonomous Systems) of advertised prefix, which is an effective way of preventing IP prefix hijacking, has received wide acceptance. However, these existing schemes received various critical comments on their inefficiency when cryptographic authenticating origin ASes. For improving efficiency, we take full advantage of specific characteristics of DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) and thus present a scheme for preventing IP prefix hijacking. There are two characteristics, which are DSA-based and efficient, in the proposed scheme. Firstly, because DSA is a United States Federal Government standard for digital signatures, the DSA-based can maintain compatibility with the DSA and its analytical tools, and thus it is easier for proposed scheme to be widely accepted and applied into practice. Secondly, public key certificates are not necessary because public keys can be computed by using a formula. Separated verifying signatures in these certificates, which are inevitable in almost all existing cryptography-based schemes, can be replaced with computing of a multi-exponentiation formula. Thus, the efficiency is achieved

BGP Security in Partial Deployment: Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze?

As the rollout of secure route origin authentication with the RPKI slowly gains traction among network operators, there is a push to standardize secure path validation for BGP (i.e., S*BGP: S-BGP, soBGP, BGPSEC, etc.). Origin authentication already does much to improve routing security. Moreover, the transition to S*BGP is expected to be long and slow, with S*BGP coexisting in "partial deployment" alongside BGP for a long time. We therefore use theoretical and experimental approach to study the security benefits provided by partially-deployed S*BGP, vis-a-vis those already provided by origin authentication. Because routing policies have a profound impact on routing security, we use a survey of 100 network operators to find the policies that are likely to be most popular during partial S*BGP deployment. We find that S*BGP provides only meagre benefits over origin authentication when these popular policies are used. We also study the security benefits of other routing policies, provide prescriptive guidelines for partially-deployed S*BGP, and show how interactions between S*BGP and BGP can introduce new vulnerabilities into the routing system

Ordered Multisignatures and Identity-Based Sequential Aggregate Signatures, with Applications to Secure Routing

We construct two new multiparty digital signature schemes that allow multiple signers to sequentially produce a compact, fixed-length signature. First, we introduce a new primitive that we call \emph{ordered multisignatures} (OMS), which allows signers to attest to a common message as well as the order in which they signed. Our OMS construction substantially improves computational efficiency and scalability over any existing scheme with suitable functionality. Second, we design a new identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme, where signers can attest to different messages and signature verification does not require knowledge of traditional public keys. The latter property permits savings on bandwidth and storage as compared to public-key solutions. In contrast to the only prior scheme to provide this functionality, ours offers improved security that does not rely on synchronized clocks or a trusted first signer. We provide formal security definitions and support the proposed schemes with security proofs under appropriate computational assumptions. We focus on potential applications of our schemes to secure network routing, but we believe they will find many other applications as well

A software defined networking architecture for secure routing

Tese de mestrado, Segurança Informática, Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências, 2014O tamanho e aceitação que a internet ganhou veio ajudar à inovação e a partilha entre utilizadores, mas em contrapartida aumentou o risco de tanto a infraestrutura da internet como as pessoas que a utilizam serem alvos de ciber-ataques. Esta é apenas uma visão parcial do problema, pois para suportar a crescente utilização da internet a infraestrutura cresceu sem a maturação de vários protocols e algoritmos que executam alguns dos serviços mais básicos com que convivemos todos os dias na internet. Um dos melhores exemplos ´e o do Border Gateway Protocol, um protocolo de troca de informação de roteamento que está em uso há mais de 20 anos mas possui vários problemas de segurança conhecidos. O desenho inicial do protocolo, aliado à ineficiência das redes tradicionais impediram a adoção das várias adições de segurança já propostas para o protocolo. O protocolo não possui atualizações de segurança que o protejam contra os vários tipos de ataques já descobertos, como prefix hijacking, intercepção e ataques no plano de dados. Estes ataques podem ter consequências graves durante períodos de tempo não negligenciáveis, como reportado em [33, 19]. As propostas já existentes, como o S-BGP[27], soBGP[48] e Origin Authentication[12], apesar de eficazes na proteção contra um ou mais ataques contra o BGP, não foram adoptadas na prática devido aos seus elevados requisitos computacionais ou de implementação. Neste trabalho resumimos os problemas para adopcão de soluções de segurança em três pontos principais: 1. Algumas soluções requerem poder computacional ou capacidade de memória que nem todos os dispositivos de rede que correm BGP em funcionamento conseguem suportar; 2. A solução requer alterações ao protocolo BGP em funcionamento; 3. A solução não garante benefícios de segurança imediatos ao AS que a adoptar; A investigação actual tem chegado à conclusão que muitos dos problemas das redes tradicionais surgem devido `a necessidade de os dispositivos de rede participarem em protocolos complexos para executar funções de rede que vão além do seu objetivo: encaminhar pacotes [24]. Como consequência, as redes tornaram-se bastante complexas e portanto difíceis de gerir e escalar. A falta de segurança radica também neste problema. Em alternativa às redes tradicionais, a comunidade científica e a indústria têm vindo a adoptar um novo tipo de redes, as Software Defined Networks (SDN). Estas redes sepathe datapathram o plano de controlo do plano de dados, passando toda a lógica e estado de rede para um controlador logicamente centralizado, mantendo nos dispositivos de rede apenas a tarefa de encaminhar pacotes. Os controladores SDN implementam funções de rede através de aplicações que executam no próprio ambiente do controlador em vez de obrigar os dispositivos de rede a implementarem esses protocolos. Um desses controladores é o OpenDaylight, que tem o apoio de alguns dos maiores nomes da indústria como a Cisco, IBM, HP e Juniper, e espera-se ser a principal referência no futuro. Neste trabalho propomos duas aplicações SDNs para o controlador OpenDaylight: RFProxy e BGPSec. O RFProxy é um dos três componentes base da aplicação Route- Flow, uma plataforma de servic¸os de roteamento para SDN. O RFProxy é o único componente da aplicação a executar no controlador e é responsável por gerir e configurar os switches de acordo com as decisões tomadas pelo RFServer. Esta aplicação vem aumentar o número de opções para a utilização do RouteFlow e proporciona uma plataforma de roteamento avançada e eficiente para o OpenDaylight. A aplicação BGPSec tem como objetivo garantir proteção contra ataques de prefix hijacking, onde um atacante tenta redireccionar todo o tráfego destinado a um AS para si. Esta proteção é conseguida através da validação dos dados recebidos do BGP. Ao utilizar uma aplicação para a validação dos anúncios BGP em vez de obrigar os dispositivos de rede a executarem este processamento, o desenho e implementação tornam-se mais simples e permitem um maior conjunto de opções quando comparado com as implementações necessárias em redes tradicionais. A utilização de uma aplicação SDN para este efeito é algo inovador e traz vantagens quando comparada com as redes tradicionais. Em particular, o ambiente SDN permite mitigar os dois primeiros problemas de adopção de uma extensão de segurança, ao passar o processamento para o controlador e a não requerer uma alteração protocolo BGP. As contribuições principais deste trabalho podem ser resumidas da seguinte forma: 1. Implementação e avaliação de um serviço avançado de roteamento em ambiente SDN, nomeadamente ao controlador OpenDaylight; 2. Análise dos problemas de segurança do BGP e das extensões de segurança já propostas para redes tradicionais; 3. Desenho, implementação e avaliação de uma aplicação de segurança para o BGP baseada em SDN;The Internet has evolved from a small group of interconnected computers to an infrastructure that supports billions of devices including computers, smartphones, etc, all with increasing demands in terms of network requirements. The architecture of traditional networks hinders their capability of fulfilling these demands, mainly due to the tight coupling of the data and control planes. Network devices are required to handle and participate in complex distributed protocols to perform network tasks such as routing, making networks very complex and thus affecting their scalability, performance, management and innovation ease. The Border Gateway Protocol, the de facto protocol for routing between Autonomous Systems (ASes) is one of the fundamental protocols for the operation of the internet. However, it was created in a time where the internet was composed of fewer ASes that trusted each other and in the information they provided, which is now unsafe to assume. The internet growth also resulted in an increase in the attacks against the internet routing infrastructure, and several misbehaviors have been detected, either due to attacks against the protocol or misconfiguration. Although several solutions have been presented to solve the security issues of BGP, no proposal has yet been adopted due to three main reasons:_ The solution requires either a computational power or memory size that not all currently deployed BGP speakers will be able to withstand; _ The solution incurs changes to the BGP protocol currently in use; _ The solution does not bring immediate security benefits for the adopting AS; Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging network paradigm that aims to solve the problems of traditional networks by decoupling the data and control planes, moving the latter to a logically centralized controller while making network devices execute solely the former. All network tasks and applications run on top of the controller, which abstracts the network and greatly simplifies the development and testing of new applications and protocols. Forwarding rules are installed and removed using OpenFlow, a vendor-independent communications protocol for SDNs. Several SDN controllers have been developed by different companies and researchers, several of them open-source. One of such kind is the OpenDaylight (ODL) controller, supported by some of the top names in the IT industry (e.g. Cisco, IBM, HP). The goal of ODL is to create a controller of reference and help accelerate SDN evolution and adoption. Although the controller is the core component of a SDN, network logic is performed by an application running on top of it. An example is RouteFlow, a routing platform that provides flexible and scalabe IP routing services to a SDN. Routing decisions are made by creating a virtual network that mimics the topology of the physical infrastructure and by analyzing the routing tables of the virtual devices. RouteFlow is composed by three components: RFClient, RFServer and RFProxy, with the latter running in the controller. The first contribution of this work is the implementation and evaluation of the RFProxy module for the OpenDaylight controller. An SDN architecture provides a new environment to improve BGP security through the creation of an application to run on top of the controller. Such approach mitigates the first two adoption problems mentioned above by offloading the additional processing to the controller and by not requiring changes to the BGP protocol. The other contribution of this work is the study and analysis of the BGP security problems and traditional solutions, and how to address them in a SDN environment. We implemented and evaluated BGPSec, a security application for the OpenDaylight controller that provides the network with protection against prefix hijacking attacks, where a malicious AS tries to direct the traffic destined to an AS onto itself

ROVER: a DNS-based method to detect and prevent IP hijacks

2013 Fall.Includes bibliographical references.The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is critical to the global internet infrastructure. Unfortunately BGP routing was designed with limited regard for security. As a result, IP route hijacking has been observed for more than 16 years. Well known incidents include a 2008 hijack of YouTube, loss of connectivity for Australia in February 2012, and an event that partially crippled Google in November 2012. Concern has been escalating as critical national infrastructure is reliant on a secure foundation for the Internet. Disruptions to military, banking, utilities, industry, and commerce can be catastrophic. In this dissertation we propose ROVER (Route Origin VERification System), a novel and practical solution for detecting and preventing origin and sub-prefix hijacks. ROVER exploits the reverse DNS for storing route origin data and provides a fail-safe, best effort approach to authentication. This approach can be used with a variety of operational models including fully dynamic in-line BGP filtering, periodically updated authenticated route filters, and real-time notifications for network operators. Our thesis is that ROVER systems can be deployed by a small number of institutions in an incremental fashion and still effectively thwart origin and sub-prefix IP hijacking despite non-participation by the majority of Autonomous System owners. We then present research results supporting this statement. We evaluate the effectiveness of ROVER using simulations on an Internet scale topology as well as with tests on real operational systems. Analyses include a study of IP hijack propagation patterns, effectiveness of various deployment models, critical mass requirements, and an examination of ROVER resilience and scalability

Detecting IP prefix hijack events using BGP activity and AS connectivity analysis

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the main component of core Internet connectivity, suffers vulnerability issues related to the impersonation of the ownership of IP prefixes for Autonomous Systems (ASes). In this context, a number of studies have focused on securing the BGP through several techniques, such as monitoring-based, historical-based and statistical-based behavioural models. In spite of the significant research undertaken, the proposed solutions cannot detect the IP prefix hijack accurately or even differentiate it from other types of attacks that could threaten the performance of the BGP. This research proposes three novel detection methods aimed at tracking the behaviour of BGP edge routers and detecting IP prefix hijacks based on statistical analysis of variance, the attack signature approach and a classification-based technique. The first detection method uses statistical analysis of variance to identify hijacking behaviour through the normal operation of routing information being exchanged among routers and their behaviour during the occurrence of IP prefix hijacking. However, this method failed to find any indication of IP prefix hijacking because of the difficulty of having raw BGP data hijacking-free. The research also proposes another detection method that parses BGP advertisements (announcements) and checks whether IP prefixes are announced or advertised by more than one AS. If so, events are selected for further validation using Regional Internet Registry (RIR) databases to determine whether the ASes announcing the prefixes are owned by the same organisation or different organisations. Advertisements for the same IP prefix made by ASes owned by different organisations are subsequently identified as hijacking events. The proposed algorithm of the detection method was validated using the 2008 YouTube Pakistan hijack event; the analysis demonstrates that the algorithm qualitatively increases the accuracy of detecting IP prefix hijacks. The algorithm is very accurate as long as the RIRs (Regional Internet Registries) are updated concurrently with hijacking detection. The detection method and can be integrated and work with BGP routers separately. Another detection method is proposed to detect IP prefix hijacking using a combination of signature-based (parsing-based) and classification-based techniques. The parsing technique is used as a pre-processing phase before the classification-based method. Some features are extracted based on the connectivity behaviour of the suspicious ASes given by the parsing technique. In other words, this detection method tracks the behaviour of the suspicious ASes and follows up with an analysis of their interaction with directly and indirectly connected neighbours based on a set of features extracted from the ASPATH information about the suspicious ASes. Before sending the extracted feature values to the best five classifiers that can work with the specifications of an implemented classification dataset, the detection method computes the similarity between benign and malicious behaviours to determine to what extent the classifiers can distinguish suspicious behaviour from benign behaviour and then detect the hijacking. Evaluation tests of the proposed algorithm demonstrated that the detection method was able to detect the hijacks with 96% accuracy and can be integrated and work with BGP routers separately.Saudi Cultural Burea