Envy-Free Configurations in the Market Economy

Using an extended framework in which an agent is endowed with three types of preference orders: an allocation preference order, an opportunity preference order, and an overall preference order, this paper introduces several notions related to efficiency and equity-as-no-envy and examines the performance of competitive market mechanisms. We also axiomatically characterize the equal income Walras rule for pure exchange economies.

Envy-Free Configurations in the Market Economy

Using an extended framework in which an agent is endowed with three types of preference orders: an allocation preference order, an opportunity preference order, and an overall preference order, this paper introduces several notions related to efficiency and equity-as-no-envy and examines the performance of competitive market mechanisms. We also axiomatically characterize the equal income Walras rule for pure exchange economies.

Moment characterization of higher-order risk preferences

It is often said that prudence and temperance play key roles in aversion to negative skewness and kurtosis, respectively. This paper puts a new perspective on these relationships and presents a characterization of higher-order risk preferences in terms of statistical moments. An implication is, for example, that prudence implies preference for distributions with higher skewness as defined by all odd moments. Moreover, we show that this preference is robust towards variation in kurtosis as defined by all even moments. We thus speak of the kurtosis robustness feature of prudence. Further, we show that all higher-order risk preferences of odd order imply skewness preference, but for different distributions than prudence. Similar results are presented for temperance and higher-order risk preferences of even order that can be related to kurtosis aversion and have a skewness robustness feature.decision making under risk, higher-order risk preferences, kurtosis aversion, moments, prudence, skewness preference, temperance

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Risky social choice with approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being

We develop a model of social choice over lotteries, where people's psychological characteristics are mutable, their preferences may be incomplete, and approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being are possible. Formally, we suppose individual preferences are described by a von~Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preference order on a space of lotteries over psychophysical states; the social planner must construct a vNM preference order on lotteries over social states. First we consider a model when the individual vNM preference order is incomplete (so not all interpersonal comparisons are possible). Then we consider a model where the individual vNM preference order is complete, but unknown to the planner, and thus modeled by a random variable. In both cases, we obtain characterizations of a utilitarian social welfare function.interpersonal comparisons; social welfare; social choice; utility; utilitarian; von Neumann-Morgenstern; risk

Does Flower Morphology affect Honey Bee Preference?

Considering honey bee populations are at threat of declining. Flower preference is important to understand how we can attempt to preserve their habitats. The difference in abundance and time spent on composite vs non composite flowers is important to know in order to conserve habitats, and since bees are important for helping flowers and plants reproduce. Will composite flowers have more honey bees than non composite flowers? Composite flowers had significantly more honey bees than non composite flowers and the honey bees tended to stay longer as well. With more knowledge on flower preference we can take steps to restore habitats for honey bees, and improve agriculture. The purpose of this research is to gain a better understanding of flower preference in honey bees in order to maintain their habitats