Increasing Dominance - the Role of Advertising, Pricing and Product Design

Despite the empirical relevance of advertising strategies in concentrated markets, the economics literature is largely silent on the effect of persuasive advertising strategies on pricing, market structure and increasing (or decreasing) dominance. In a simple model of persuasive advertising and pricing with differentiated goods, we analyze the interdependencies between ex-ante asymmetries in consumer appeal, advertising and prices. Products with larger initial appeal to consumers will be advertised more heavily but priced at a higher level - that is, advertising and price discounts are strategic substitutes for products with asymmetric initial appeal. We find that the escalating effect of advertising dominates the moderating effect of pricing so that post-competition market shares are more asymmetric than pre-competition differences in consumer appeal. We further find that collusive advertising (but competitive pricing) generates the same market outcomes, and that network effects lead to even more extreme market outcomes, both directly and via the effect on advertising

Advertising and Business Cycle Fluctuations

This paper provides new empirical evidence for quarterly U.S. aggregate advertisingexpenditures, showing that advertising has a well defined pattern over the BusinessCycle. To understand this pattern we develop a general equilibrium model wheretargeted advertising increases the marginal utility of the advertised good. Advertisingintensity is endogenously determined by profit maximizing firms. We embed thisassumption into an otherwise standard model of the business cycle withmonopolistic competition. We find that advertising affects the aggregate dynamics ina relevant way, and it exacerbates the welfare costs of fluctuations for the consumer.Finally, we provide estimates of our setup using Bayesian techniques.Advertising, DSGE model, Business Cycle fluctuations, Bayesian

Increasing Dominance - the Role of Advertising, Pricing and Product Design

Despite the empirical relevance of advertising strategies in concentrated markets, the economics literature is largely silent on the effect of persuasive advertising strategies on pricing, market structure and increasing (or decreasing) dominance. In a simple model of persuasive advertising and pricing with differentiated goods, we analyze the interdependencies between ex-ante asymmetries in consumer appeal, advertising and prices. Products with larger initial appeal to consumers will be advertised more heavily but priced at a higher level - that is, advertising and price discounts are strategic substitutes for products with asymmetric initial appeal. We find that the escalating effect of advertising dominates the moderating effect of pricing so that post-competition market shares are more asymmetric than pre-competition differences in consumer appeal. We further find that collusive advertising (but competitive pricing) generates the same market outcomes, and that network effects lead to even more extreme market outcomes, both directly and via the effect on advertising.Increasing dominance; persuasive advertising; duopoly; network effects

When Are Capitalization Exceptions Justified?

It is a widely accepted general principle that a taxpayer should capitalize an expenditure that produces a benefit lasting beyond the current tax period. Yet rules putting this principle into practice are among the most controversial in all of federal income taxation. Many argue that a retreat from the general principle is warranted when designing capitalization rules, and even those who argue that capitalization rules ought to be sweeping usually conclude that exceptions are necessary or desirable. For instance, most commentators accept uncritically that expenses incurred to procure certain intangible capital should be expensed, as under current law, without exploring whether expensing of intangibles costs is inevitable, although some have considered the implications of excepting intangibles costs from capitalization. Although the arguments with respect to exceptions to capitalization for tangible assets have received more attention, no consensus view has emerged regarding whether many of the exceptions are desirable as a matter of policy. This Article is a systematic analysis of the arguments in favor of departing from the normative or first-best capitalization rule

Sunk costs, market contestability, and the size distribution of firms

This paper offers a new economic explanation for the observed inter-industry differences in the size distribution of firms. The empirical estimates--based on three temporal (1982, 1987, and 1992) cross-sections of the four-digit United States manufacturing industries--indicate that increased market contestability, as signified by low sunk costs, tends to reduce the dispersion of firm sizes. These findings provide support for one of the key predictions of the theory of contestable markets: that market forces under contestability would tend to render any inefficient organization of the industry unsustainable and, consequently, tighten the distribution of firms around the optimum.Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Water and Industry,Access to Markets,Debt Markets

Stochastic Maximum Principle for optimal advertising models with delay and non-convex control space

In this paper we study optimal advertising problems that model the introduction of a new product into the market in the presence of carryover effects of the advertisement and with memory effects in the level of goodwill. In particular, we let the dynamics of the product goodwill to depend on the past, and also on past advertising efforts. We treat the problem by means of the stochastic Pontryagin maximum principle, that here is considered for a class of problems where in the state equation either the state or the control depend on the past. Moreover the control acts on the martingale term and the space of controls U can be chosen to be non-convex but now the space of controls U can be chosen to be non-convex. The maximum principle is thus formulated using a first-order adjoint Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs), which can be explicitly computed due to the specific characteristics of the model, and a second-order adjoint relation

Strategic Advertising for Entry Deterrence Purposes

This paper evaluates the possible effects of advertising on conditions of entry in a market with one incumbent and one potential entrant. Through a game-theoretic framework, it is shown that the use of pre-entry advertising expenditures (which are supposed to exhibit diminishing returns) may discourage entry even when firms behave rationally and face the same conditions of cost and demand.market structure; advertising

Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods

We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the model to integrate elements of social rather than private learning and turnover among buyers.Monopoly, dynamic pricing, learning, experience goods, continuous time, Markov perfect equilibrium