7,285 research outputs found

    Optimizing Strategy in Agent-Based Automated Negotiation

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    The significance of bidding, accepting and opponent modeling in automated negotiation

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    Given the growing interest in automated negotiation, the search for effective strategies has produced a variety of different negotiation agents. Despite their diversity, there is a common structure to their design. A negotiation agent comprises three key components: the bidding strategy, the opponent model and the acceptance criteria. We show that this three-component view of a negotiating architecture not only provides a useful basis for developing such agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By combining these components in varying ways, we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and thus determine the key contributing components. Moreover, we are able to study the interaction between components and present detailed interaction effects. Furthermore, we find that the bidding strategy in particular is of critical importance to the negotiator's success and far exceeds the importance of opponent preference modeling techniques. Our results contribute to the shaping of a research agenda for negotiating agent design by providing guidelines on how agent developers can spend their time most effectively

    A multi-agent system with application in project scheduling

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    The new economic and social dynamics increase project complexity and makes scheduling problems more difficult, therefore scheduling requires more versatile solutions as Multi Agent Systems (MAS). In this paper the authors analyze the implementation of a Multi-Agent System (MAS) considering two scheduling problems: TCPSP (Time-Constrained Project Scheduling), and RCPSP (Resource-Constrained Project Scheduling). The authors propose an improved BDI (Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions) model and present the first the MAS implementation results in JADE platform.multi-agent architecture, scheduling, project management, BDI architecture, JADE.

    HiTrust: building cross-organizational trust relationship based on a hybrid negotiation tree

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    Small-world phenomena have been observed in existing peer-to-peer (P2P) networks which has proved useful in the design of P2P file-sharing systems. Most studies of constructing small world behaviours on P2P are based on the concept of clustering peer nodes into groups, communities, or clusters. However, managing additional multilayer topology increases maintenance overhead, especially in highly dynamic environments. In this paper, we present Social-like P2P systems (Social-P2Ps) for object discovery by self-managing P2P topology with human tactics in social networks. In Social-P2Ps, queries are routed intelligently even with limited cached knowledge and node connections. Unlike community-based P2P file-sharing systems, we do not intend to create and maintain peer groups or communities consciously. In contrast, each node connects to other peer nodes with the same interests spontaneously by the result of daily searches

    Preliminary specification and design documentation for software components to achieve catallaxy in computational systems

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    This Report is about the preliminary specifications and design documentation for software components to achieve Catallaxy in computational systems. -- Die Arbeit beschreibt die Spezifikation und das Design von Softwarekomponenten, um das Konzept der Katallaxie in Grid Systemen umzusetzen. Eine Einführung ordnet das Konzept der Katallaxie in bestehende Grid Taxonomien ein und stellt grundlegende Komponenten vor. Anschließend werden diese Komponenten auf ihre Anwendbarkeit in bestehenden Application Layer Netzwerken untersucht.Grid Computing

    Machine Learning Approach for Optimizing Negotiation Agents

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    The increasing popularity of Internet and World Wide Web (WWW) fuels the rise of electronic commerce (E-Commerce). Negotiation plays an important role in ecommerce as business deals are often made through some kind of negotiations. Negotiation is the process of resolving conflicts among parties having different criteria so that they can reach an agreement in which all their constraints are satisfied. Automating negotiation can save human’s time and effort to solve these combinatorial problems. Intelligent Trading Agency (ITA) is an automated agentbased one-to-many negotiation framework which is incorporated by several one-toone negotiations. ITA uses constraint satisfaction approach to evaluate and generate offers during the negotiation. This one-to-many negotiation model in e-commerce retail has advantages in terms of customizability, scalability, reusability and robustness. Since negotiation agents practice predefined negotiation strategies, decisions of the agents to select the best course of action do not take the dynamics of negotiation into consideration. The lack of knowledge capturing between agents during the negotiation causes the inefficiency of negotiation while the final outcomes obtained are probably sub-optimal. The objective of this research is to implement machine learning approach that allows agents to reuse their negotiation experience to improve the final outcomes of one-to-many negotiation. The preliminary research on automated negotiation agents utilizes case-based reasoning, Bayesian learning and evolutionary approach to learn the negotiation. The geneticbased and Bayesian learning model of multi-attribute one-to-many negotiation, namely GA Improved-ITA and Bayes Improved-ITA are proposed. In these models, agents learn the negotiation by capturing their opponent’s preferences and constraints. The two models are tested in randomly generated negotiation problems to observe their performance in negotiation learning. The learnability of GA Improved-ITA enables the agents to identify their opponent’s preferable negotiation issues. Bayes Improved-ITA agents model their opponent’s utility structure by employing Bayesian belief updating process. Results from the experimental work indicate that it is promising to employ machine learning approach in negotiation problems. GA Improved-ITA and Bayes Improved-ITA have achieved better performance in terms of negotiation payoff, negotiation cost and justification of negotiation decision in comparison with ITA. The joint utility of GA Improved-ITA and Bayes Improved-ITA is 137.5% and 125% higher than the joint utility of ITA while the negotiation cost of GA Improved-ITA is 28.6% lower than ITA. The negotiation successful rate of GA Improved-ITA and Bayes Improved-ITA is 10.2% and 37.12% higher than ITA. By having knowledge of opponent’s preferences and constraints, negotiation agents can obtain more optimal outcomes. As a conclusion, the adaptive nature of agents will increase the fitness of autonomous agents in the dynamic electronic market rather than practicing the sophisticated negotiation strategies. As future work, the GA and Bayes Improved-ITA can be integrated with grid concept to allocate and acquire resource among cross-platform agents during negotiation

    Unconventional Negotiation: Survey and New Directions

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    The increasing demand for building large-scale complex and distributed systems such as Cloud/Grid computing systems accentuates the need for complex negotiation mechanisms for managing computing resources. The contribution of this paper includes: 1) summarizing classical negotiation problems and conventional negotiation in terms of the utility function, strategy, and protocol, 2) discussing the differences between conventional negotiation and unconventional negotiation, 3) reviewing and comparing the state-of-the-art developments in both relaxed-criteria negotiation, and complex and concurrent negotiation, and 4) suggesting new directions in complex negotiation and its applications

    What to bid and when to stop

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    Negotiation is an important activity in human society, and is studied by various disciplines, ranging from economics and game theory, to electronic commerce, social psychology, and artificial intelligence. Traditionally, negotiation is a necessary, but also time-consuming and expensive activity. Therefore, in the last decades there has been a large interest in the automation of negotiation, for example in the setting of e-commerce. This interest is fueled by the promise of automated agents eventually being able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators.Every year, automated negotiation agents are improving in various ways, and there is now a large body of negotiation strategies available, all with their unique strengths and weaknesses. For example, some agents are able to predict the opponent's preferences very well, while others focus more on having a sophisticated bidding strategy. The problem however, is that there is little incremental improvement in agent design, as the agents are tested in varying negotiation settings, using a diverse set of performance measures. This makes it very difficult to meaningfully compare the agents, let alone their underlying techniques. As a result, we lack a reliable way to pinpoint the most effective components in a negotiating agent.There are two major advantages of distinguishing between the different components of a negotiating agent's strategy: first, it allows the study of the behavior and performance of the components in isolation. For example, it becomes possible to compare the preference learning component of all agents, and to identify the best among them. Second, we can proceed to mix and match different components to create new negotiation strategies., e.g.: replacing the preference learning technique of an agent and then examining whether this makes a difference. Such a procedure enables us to combine the individual components to systematically explore the space of possible negotiation strategies.To develop a compositional approach to evaluate and combine the components, we identify structure in most agent designs by introducing the BOA architecture, in which we can develop and integrate the different components of a negotiating agent. We identify three main components of a general negotiation strategy; namely a bidding strategy (B), possibly an opponent model (O), and an acceptance strategy (A). The bidding strategy considers what concessions it deems appropriate given its own preferences, and takes the opponent into account by using an opponent model. The acceptance strategy decides whether offers proposed by the opponent should be accepted.The BOA architecture is integrated into a generic negotiation environment called Genius, which is a software environment for designing and evaluating negotiation strategies. To explore the negotiation strategy space of the negotiation research community, we amend the Genius repository with various existing agents and scenarios from literature. Additionally, we organize a yearly international negotiation competition (ANAC) to harvest even more strategies and scenarios. ANAC also acts as an evaluation tool for negotiation strategies, and encourages the design of negotiation strategies and scenarios.We re-implement agents from literature and ANAC and decouple them to fit into the BOA architecture without introducing any changes in their behavior. For each of the three components, we manage to find and analyze the best ones for specific cases, as described below. We show that the BOA framework leads to significant improvements in agent design by wining ANAC 2013, which had 19 participating teams from 8 international institutions, with an agent that is designed using the BOA framework and is informed by a preliminary analysis of the different components.In every negotiation, one of the negotiating parties must accept an offer to reach an agreement. Therefore, it is important that a negotiator employs a proficient mechanism to decide under which conditions to accept. When contemplating whether to accept an offer, the agent is faced with the acceptance dilemma: accepting the offer may be suboptimal, as better offers may still be presented before time runs out. On the other hand, accepting too late may prevent an agreement from being reached, resulting in a break off with no gain for either party. We classify and compare state-of-the-art generic acceptance conditions. We propose new acceptance strategies and we demonstrate that they outperform the other conditions. We also provide insight into why some conditions work better than others and investigate correlations between the properties of the negotiation scenario and the efficacy of acceptance conditions.Later, we adopt a more principled approach by applying optimal stopping theory to calculate the optimal decision on the acceptance of an offer. We approach the decision of whether to accept as a sequential decision problem, by modeling the bids received as a stochastic process. We determine the optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes and we present an approach to estimate the expected range of offers when the type of opponent is unknown. We show that the proposed approach is able to find the optimal time to accept, and improves upon all existing acceptance strategies.Another principal component of a negotiating agent's strategy is its ability to take the opponent's preferences into account. The quality of an opponent model can be measured in two different ways. One is to use the agent's performance as a benchmark for the model's quality. We evaluate and compare the performance of a selection of state-of-the-art opponent modeling techniques in negotiation. We provide an overview of the factors influencing the quality of a model and we analyze how the performance of opponent models depends on the negotiation setting. We identify a class of simple and surprisingly effective opponent modeling techniques that did not receive much previous attention in literature.The other way to measure the quality of an opponent model is to directly evaluate its accuracy by using similarity measures. We review all methods to measure the accuracy of an opponent model and we then analyze how changes in accuracy translate into performance differences. Moreover, we pinpoint the best predictors for good performance. This leads to new insights concerning how to construct an opponent model, and what we need to measure when optimizing performance.Finally, we take two different approaches to gain more insight into effective bidding strategies. We present a new classification method for negotiation strategies, based on their pattern of concession making against different kinds of opponents. We apply this technique to classify some well-known negotiating strategies, and we formulate guidelines on how agents should bid in order to be successful, which gives insight into the bidding strategy space of negotiating agents. Furthermore, we apply optimal stopping theory again, this time to find the concessions that maximize utility for the bidder against particular opponents. We show there is an interesting connection between optimal bidding and optimal acceptance strategies, in the sense that they are mirrored versions of each other.Lastly, after analyzing all components separately, we put the pieces back together again. We take all BOA components accumulated so far, including the best ones, and combine them all together to explore the space of negotiation strategies.We compute the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and we study the interaction between components. We find that combining the best agent components indeed makes the strongest agents. This shows that the component-based view of the BOA architecture not only provides a useful basis for developing negotiating agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By varying the BOA components we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each component to the negotiation result, and thus analyze the significance of each. The bidding strategy is by far the most important to consider, followed by the acceptance conditions and finally followed by the opponent model.Our results validate the analytical approach of the BOA framework to first optimize the individual components, and then to recombine them into a negotiating agent

    Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 3

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    In this document the developments in defining the computational and theoretical framework for economical resource allocation are described. Accordingly the formal specification of the market mechanisms, bidding strategies of the involved agents and the integration of the market mechanisms into the simulator were refined. --Grid Computing
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