4,461 research outputs found
Characterizing Optimal Adword Auctions
We present a number of models for the adword auctions used for pricing
advertising slots on search engines such as Google, Yahoo! etc. We begin with a
general problem formulation which allows the privately known valuation per
click to be a function of both the identity of the advertiser and the slot. We
present a compact characterization of the set of all deterministic incentive
compatible direct mechanisms for this model. This new characterization allows
us to conclude that there are incentive compatible mechanisms for this auction
with a multi-dimensional type-space that are {\em not} affine maximizers. Next,
we discuss two interesting special cases: slot independent valuation and slot
independent valuation up to a privately known slot and zero thereafter. For
both of these special cases, we characterize revenue maximizing and efficiency
maximizing mechanisms and show that these mechanisms can be computed with a
worst case computational complexity and respectively,
where is number of bidders and is number of slots. Next, we
characterize optimal rank based allocation rules and propose a new mechanism
that we call the customized rank based allocation. We report the results of a
numerical study that compare the revenue and efficiency of the proposed
mechanisms. The numerical results suggest that customized rank-based allocation
rule is significantly superior to the rank-based allocation rules.Comment: 29 pages, work was presented at a) Second Workshop on Sponsored
Search Auctions, Ann Arbor, MI b) INFORMS Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh c)
Decision Sciences Seminar, Fuqua School of Business, Duke Universit
Optimal pricing using online auction experiments: A P\'olya tree approach
We show how a retailer can estimate the optimal price of a new product using
observed transaction prices from online second-price auction experiments. For
this purpose we propose a Bayesian P\'olya tree approach which, given the
limited nature of the data, requires a specially tailored implementation.
Avoiding the need for a priori parametric assumptions, the P\'olya tree
approach allows for flexible inference of the valuation distribution, leading
to more robust estimation of optimal price than competing parametric
approaches. In collaboration with an online jewelry retailer, we illustrate how
our methodology can be combined with managerial prior knowledge to estimate the
profit maximizing price of a new jewelry product.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/11-AOAS503 the Annals of
Applied Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aoas/) by the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org
Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach
This article addresses two important issues in crowd-sourcing: ex ante uncertainty about the quality and cost of different workers and strategic behaviour. We present a novel multi-dimensional auction that incentivises the workers to make partial enquiry into the task and to honestly report quality-cost estimates based on which the crowd-sourcer can choose the worker that offers the best value for money. The mechanism extends second score auction design to settings where the quality is uncertain and it provides incentives to both collect information and deliver desired qualities
The Copula Approach to Sample Selection Modelling: An Application to the Recreational Value of Forests
The sample selection model is based upon a bivariate or a multivariate structure, and distributional assumptions are in this context more severe than in univariate settings, due to the limited availability of tractable multivariate distributions. While the standard FIML estimation of the selectivity model assumes normality of the joint distribution, alternative approaches require less stringent distributional hypotheses. As shown by Smith (2003), copulas allow great flexibility also in FIML models. The copula model is very useful in situations where the applied researcher has a prior on the distributional form of the margins, since it allows separating their modelling from that of the dependence structure. In the present paper the copula approach to sample selection is first compared to the semiparametric approach and to the standard FIML, bivariate normal model, in an illustrative application on female work data. Then its performance is analysed more thoroughly in an application to Contingent Valuation data on recreational values of forests.Contingent valuation, Selectivity bias, Bivariate models, Copulas
A Game-theoretic Machine Learning Approach for Revenue Maximization in Sponsored Search
Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in
which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and
determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces
of work in the literature that investigate how to design an auction mechanism
in order to optimize the revenue of the search engine. However, due to some
unrealistic assumptions used, the practical values of these studies are not
very clear. In this paper, we propose a novel \emph{game-theoretic machine
learning} approach, which naturally combines machine learning and game theory,
and learns the auction mechanism using a bilevel optimization framework. In
particular, we first learn a Markov model from historical data to describe how
advertisers change their bids in response to an auction mechanism, and then for
any given auction mechanism, we use the learnt model to predict its
corresponding future bid sequences. Next we learn the auction mechanism through
empirical revenue maximization on the predicted bid sequences. We show that the
empirical revenue will converge when the prediction period approaches infinity,
and a Genetic Programming algorithm can effectively optimize this empirical
revenue. Our experiments indicate that the proposed approach is able to produce
a much more effective auction mechanism than several baselines.Comment: Twenty-third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI 2013
Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of
the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a
wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting
and specifically seek mechanisms that guarantee good outcomes under both
complete and incomplete information. A variant of the generalized first-price
mechanism with multi-dimensional bids turns out to be the only standard
mechanism able to achieve this goal, even when types are one-dimensional. The
fact that expressiveness beyond the type space is both necessary and sufficient
for this kind of robustness provides an interesting counterpoint to previous
work on position auctions that has highlighted the benefits of simplicity. From
a technical perspective our results are interesting because they establish
equilibrium existence for a multi-dimensional bid space, where standard
techniques break down. The structure of the equilibrium bids moreover provides
an intuitive explanation for why first-price payments may be able to support
equilibria in a wider range of circumstances than second-price payments
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