A Conceptual Framework of Reverse Logistics Impact on Firm Performance

This study aims to examine the reverse logistics factors that impact upon firm performance. We review reverse logistics factors under three research streams: (a) resource-based view of the firm, including: Firm strategy, Operations management, and Customer loyalty (b) relational theory, including: Supply chain efficiency, Supply chain collaboration, and institutional theory, including: Government support and Cultural alignment. We measured firm performance with 5 measures: profitability, cost, innovativeness, perceived competitive advantage, and perceived customer satisfaction. We discuss implications for research, policy and practice

Assessing farmer behaviour as affected by policy and technological innovations: bio-economic farm models

Farm Management,

Mergers and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Market

The U.S. pharmaceutical industry has experienced in recent years two dramatic changes: stagnation in the growth of new molecular entities approved for marketing, and a wave of mergers linking inter alia some of the largest companies. This paper explores possible links between these two phenomena and proposes alternative approach to merger policy. It points to the high degree of uncertainty encountered in the discovery and development of new pharmaceutical entities and shows how optimal strategies entail the pursue of parallel research and development paths. Uncertainties afflict both success rates and financial gains contingent upon success. A new model simulating optimal strategies given prevalent market uncertainties is presented. Parallelism can be sustained both within individual companies' R&D programs and across competing companies. The paper points to data showing little parallelism of programs within companies and argues that inter-company mergers jeopardize desirable parallelism across companies.

DEA-Based Incentive Regimes in Health-Care Provision

A major challenge to legislators, insurance providers and municipalities will be how to manage the reimbursement of health-care on partially open markets under increasing fiscal pressure and an aging population. Although efficiency theoretically can be obtained by private solutions using fixed-payment schemes, the informational rents and production distortions may limit their implementation. The healthcare agency problem is characterized by (i) a complex multi-input multi-output technology, (ii) information uncertainty and asymmetry, and (iii) fuzzy social preferences. First, the technology, inherently nonlinear and with externalities between factors, yield parametric estimation difficult. However, the flexible production structure in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) offers a solution that allows for the gradual and successive refinement of potentially nonconvex technologies. Second, the information structure of healthcare suggests a context of considerable asymmetric information and considerable uncertainty about the underlying technology, but limited uncertainty or noise in the registration of the outcome. Again, we shall argue that the DEA dynamic yardsticks (Bogetoft, 1994, 1997, Agrell and Bogetoft, 2001) are suitable for such contexts. A third important characteristic of the health sector is the somewhat fuzzy social priorities and the numerous potential conflicts between the stakeholders in the health system. Social preferences are likely dynamic and contingent on the disclosed information. Similarly, there are several potential hidden action (moral hazard) and hidden information (adverse selection) conflicts between the different agents in the health system. The flexible and transparent response to preferential ambiguity is one of the strongest justifications for a DEA-approach. DEA yardstick regimes have been successfully implemented in other sectors (electricity distribution) and we present an operalization of the power-parameter p in an pseudo-competitive setting that both limits the informational rents and incites the truthful revelation of information. Recent work (Agrell and Bogetoft, 2002) on strategic implementation of DEA yardsticks is commented in the healthcare context, where social priorities change the tradeoff between the motivation and coordination functions of the yardstick. The paper is closed with policy recommendations and some areas of further work.Data Envelopment Analysis, regulation, health care systems, efficiency, Health Economics and Policy,

Export diversification and resource-based industrialization: the case of natural gas

For resource-rich economies, primary commodity specialization has often been considered to be detrimental to growth. Accordingly, export diversification policies centered on resource-based industries have long been advocated as effective ways to moderate the large variability of export revenues. This paper discusses the applicability of a mean-variance portfolio approach to design these strategies and proposes some modifications aimed at capturing the key features of resource processing industries (presence of scale economies and investment lumpiness). These modifications help make the approach more plausible for use in resource-rich countries. An application to the case of natural gas is then discussed using data obtained from Monte Carlo simulations of a calibrated empirical model. Lastly, the proposed framework is put to work to evaluate the performances of the diversification strategies implemented in a set of nine gas-rich economies. These results are then used to formulate some policy recommendations

EFFICIECY OF AGRARIAN ORGANISATIONS

The goal of this paper is to incorporate achievements of the New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics to analysis of efficiency of agrarian organizations in transitional economies. That modern framework for analysis of agrarian organizations is based on their role to govern transactions between individual agents. Since governing (coordination, organization) of transactions is associated with significant costs (for finding best prices and partners, for negotiation and contracting, for monitoring and enforcement of contract terms, for adjustment and re-negotiation according to changed conditions of exchange, for dispute resolutions etc.), the economic efficiency of agrarian organizations has to assess not only their capacity to minimize the production costs, but their potential to economize transacting costs as well. Initially, main kinds of transactions of the managers of agrarian transactions (farms entrepreneurs) are clarified as land, labor, service, inputs, and finance supply; marketing; and collective actions. After that, the alternative market, non-market, and mixed modes for organization of different types of agrarian transitions are identified. Next, various types of costs associated with each form of transacting are determined. And then, the comparative efficiency of different governance structures is estimated according to (minimum) transacting costs criteria. One direction for evaluation of comparative efficiency of governing structures is based on direct assessment of items of costs for transaction in different organizations. However, that manner is often restricted since: difficulties (or impossibility) to measure absolute level of transaction costs; opposite dynamics of different items of costs in various organizations; great use of complex (and interlinked) rather than pure modes in transitional agriculture; and not existence (missing) of alternative form for organization (the base for comparison). Another direction is through comparative structural (qualitative) analysis of alternative governing forms. Firstly, critical factors of transactions in particular institutional environment are identified. These factors affect transaction costs variation, and they are associated: with behavioral characteristic of agrarian agents (bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, building of reputation, risk aversion, level of trusts); and with economic dimensions of individual transactions (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity and appropriability). Secondly, assessment is made on effective potential of alternative organizational modes to: minimize bounded rationality of agrarian agents and uncertainty associated with transacting; to appropriate and protect private investments from possible opportunism; to recover long-term investments for organizational development through high recurrence of transactions between same agents; to exploit economy of size and scale on specific for relationship with a particular partner capital etc. Third, principal matrix of generic organizational modes is build for effective governance of transactions with different combination of critical dimensions: free market mode if effective to carry out transactions with high appropriability and low assets specificity; the special contract form is appropriate for transactions with high frequency, and increased uncertainty and assets specificity; the internal integration can manage effectively repeated transactions with high capital dependency and big uncertainty; the hybrid and public modes are the most effective forms for occasional transactions with low appropriability and high assets specificity. Finally, effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of every specific form within each generic modes could be determined through comparison of their potential to explore economy of size (scale) on specific or (and) specialized assets, and their comparative efficiency to minimize bounded rationality and to control opportunism of counterparts.agrarian governance, efficiency of agrarian organizations, new institutional and transaction costs economics

Governing of agrarian innovations

This paper adapts the principles of the new developing New Institutional and Transaction Cost Economics (integrating Economics, Organization, Law, Political and Behavioral Sciences) to the area of agrarian research and innovations. The major institutional, behavioral, dimensional, technological and transaction costs factors for governing research and innovation activities are determined. The specific market, private, public and hybrid modes for organization of agrarian innovations are specified. The effective boundaries of different governing modes are assessed, and needs and forms for public intervention in agrarian research and innovation are clarified.governance, agrarian research and innovation, research and innovation institutions, new institutional economics, public, private and hybrid organizations