Measuring and comparing immigration, asylum and naturalization policies across countries: challenges and solutions

Academics and policy makers require a better understanding of the variation of policies that regulate global migration, asylum and immigrant naturalization. At present, however, there is no comprehensive cross-national, time-series database of such policies, rendering the analysis of policy trends across and within these areas difficult at best. Several new immigration databases and indices have been developed in recent years. However, there is no consensus on how best to conceptualize, measure and aggregate migration policy indicators to allow for meaningful comparisons through time and across space. This article discusses these methodological challenges and introduces practical solutions that involve historical, multi-dimensional, disaggregated and transparent conceptualizing, measuring and compiling of cross-national immigration policies. Such an approach informs the International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) database

The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal

An agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another party is traditionally per se illegal under the antitrust laws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers, and thus to deter undesirable behavior that state-sponsored courts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactions and induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs institutional economics to understand the role of coordinated refusals to deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes that if the objective of antitrust law is to promote economic efficiency, then per se treatment-or any heightened presumption of illegality-of reputation mechanisms with coordinated punishments is misplaced

Negotiating Asylum

How is access to asylum and other forms of extraterritorial protection regulated in the European Union? Is the EU acquis in these areas in conformity with international law? Which tools does international law offer to solve collisions between both? And, finally, is law capable of bridging the foundational oppositions embedded in migration and asylum issues? This work combines the potential of legal formalism with an analytical framework drawing on political theory. It analyses the argumentative strategies used by international lawyers, and developed them further, exploiting the interpretative methodology of international law as well as elaborate discrimination arguments. The author concludes that deflecting protection seekers by means of visa requirements may constitute a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, and that the prescriptions of international law oblige Member States to apply the Dublin Convention and the Spanish Protocol in a manner emptying it of its main control functions. The author also shows that burden-sharing remains the pivotal element in the normative dynamics behind the EU acquis, and explains why the European Court of Human Rights must be regarded as the only transnational forum for the legitimate negotiation of asylum in Europe