29 research outputs found
A New Array Search On Encrypted Spatial Records
Accessible encryption is a procedure to perform significant questions on encoded information without uncovering protection. Be that as it may, geometric range look on spatial information has not been completely examined nor bolstered by existing accessible encryption plans. In this we plan a symmetric-key accessible encryption conspire that can bolster geometric range inquiries on encoded spatial information. One of our real commitments is that our outline is a general approach, which can bolster diverse sorts of geometric range questions. At the end of the day, our outline on encrypted information is free from the states of geometric range questions. In addition, we additionally expand our plan with the extra utilization of tree structures to accomplish look multifaceted nature that is speedier than linear
POPE: Partial Order Preserving Encoding
Recently there has been much interest in performing search queries over
encrypted data to enable functionality while protecting sensitive data. One
particularly efficient mechanism for executing such queries is order-preserving
encryption/encoding (OPE) which results in ciphertexts that preserve the
relative order of the underlying plaintexts thus allowing range and comparison
queries to be performed directly on ciphertexts. In this paper, we propose an
alternative approach to range queries over encrypted data that is optimized to
support insert-heavy workloads as are common in "big data" applications while
still maintaining search functionality and achieving stronger security.
Specifically, we propose a new primitive called partial order preserving
encoding (POPE) that achieves ideal OPE security with frequency hiding and also
leaves a sizable fraction of the data pairwise incomparable. Using only O(1)
persistent and non-persistent client storage for
, our POPE scheme provides extremely fast batch insertion
consisting of a single round, and efficient search with O(1) amortized cost for
up to search queries. This improved security and
performance makes our scheme better suited for today's insert-heavy databases.Comment: Appears in ACM CCS 2016 Proceeding
A Practical and Secure Stateless Order Preserving Encryption for Outsourced Databases
Order-preserving encryption (OPE) plays an important role in securing outsourced databases. OPE schemes can be either Stateless or Stateful. Stateful schemes can achieve the ideal security of order-preserving encryption, i.e., “reveal no information about the plaintexts besides order.” However, comparing to stateless schemes, stateful schemes require maintaining some state information locally besides encryption keys and the ciphertexts are mutable. On the other hand, stateless schemes only require remembering encryption keys and thus is more efficient. It is a common belief that stateless schemes cannot provide the same level of security as stateful ones because stateless schemes reveal the relative distance among their corresponding plaintext. In real world applications, such security defects may lead to the leakage of statistical and sensitive information, e.g., the data distribution, or even negates the whole encryption. In this paper, we propose a practical and secure stateless order-preserving encryption scheme. With prior knowledge of the data to be encrypted, our scheme can achieve IND-CCPA (INDistinguishability under Committed ordered Chosen Plaintext Attacks) security for static data set. Though the IND-CCPA security can\u27t be met for dynamic data set, our new scheme can still significantly improve the security in real world applications. Along with the encryption scheme, in this paper we also provide methods to eliminate access pattern leakage in communications and thus prevents some common attacks to OPE schemes in practice
Equivalence-based Security for Querying Encrypted Databases: Theory and Application to Privacy Policy Audits
Motivated by the problem of simultaneously preserving confidentiality and
usability of data outsourced to third-party clouds, we present two different
database encryption schemes that largely hide data but reveal enough
information to support a wide-range of relational queries. We provide a
security definition for database encryption that captures confidentiality based
on a notion of equivalence of databases from the adversary's perspective. As a
specific application, we adapt an existing algorithm for finding violations of
privacy policies to run on logs encrypted under our schemes and observe low to
moderate overheads.Comment: CCS 2015 paper technical report, in progres
HardIDX: Practical and Secure Index with SGX
Software-based approaches for search over encrypted data are still either
challenged by lack of proper, low-leakage encryption or slow performance.
Existing hardware-based approaches do not scale well due to hardware
limitations and software designs that are not specifically tailored to the
hardware architecture, and are rarely well analyzed for their security (e.g.,
the impact of side channels). Additionally, existing hardware-based solutions
often have a large code footprint in the trusted environment susceptible to
software compromises. In this paper we present HardIDX: a hardware-based
approach, leveraging Intel's SGX, for search over encrypted data. It implements
only the security critical core, i.e., the search functionality, in the trusted
environment and resorts to untrusted software for the remainder. HardIDX is
deployable as a highly performant encrypted database index: it is logarithmic
in the size of the index and searches are performed within a few milliseconds
rather than seconds. We formally model and prove the security of our scheme
showing that its leakage is equivalent to the best known searchable encryption
schemes. Our implementation has a very small code and memory footprint yet
still scales to virtually unlimited search index sizes, i.e., size is limited
only by the general - non-secure - hardware resources