87,848 research outputs found
Consensus as a Nash Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game
Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a
prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently
minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost
function penalizes a member's differences of opinion from the others as well as
from his/her own initial opinion, weighted by influence and stubbornness
parameters. Each member uses its rate of change of opinion as a control input.
This defines a dynamic non-cooperative game that turns out to have a unique
Nash equilibrium. Analytic explicit expressions are derived for the opinion
trajectory of each member for two representative cases obtained by suitable
assumptions on the graph topology of the network. These trajectories are then
examined under different assumptions on the relative sizes of the influence and
stubbornness parameters that appear in the cost functions.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure, Pre-print from the Proceedings of the 12th
International Conference on Signal Image Technology and Internet-based
Systems (SITIS), 201
Evolution of Social Power for Opinion Dynamics Networks
This article studies the evolution of opinions and interpersonal influence
structures in a group of agents as they discuss a sequence of issues, each of
which follows an opinion dynamics model. In this work, we propose a general
opinion dynamics model and an evolution of interpersonal influence structures
based on the model of reflected appraisals proposed by Friedkin. Our
contributions can be summarized as follows: (i) we introduce a model of opinion
dynamics and evolution of interpersonal influence structures between issues
viewed as a best response cost minimization to the neighbor's actions, (ii) we
show that DeGroot's and Friedkin-Johnsen's models of opinion dynamics and their
evolution of interpersonal influence structures are particular cases of our
proposed model, and (iii) we prove the existence of an equilibrium. This work
is a step towards providing a solid formulation of the evolution of opinions
and interpersonal influence structures over a sequence of issues
Playing Stackelberg Opinion Optimization with Randomized Algorithms for Combinatorial Strategies
From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in
social networks, the "opinion maximization (or minimization)" problem has been
studied mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We furthermore define
a two-player zero-sum Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization by
letting the player under study as the first-mover minimize the sum of expressed
opinions by doing so-called "internal opinion design", knowing that the other
adversarial player as the follower is to maximize the same objective by also
conducting her own internal opinion design.
We propose for the min player to play the "follow-the-perturbed-leader"
algorithm in such Stackelberg game, obtaining losses depending on the other
adversarial player's play. Since our strategy of subset selection is
combinatorial in nature, the probabilities in a distribution over all the
strategies would be too many to be enumerated one by one. Thus, we design a
randomized algorithm to produce a (randomized) pure strategy. We show that the
strategy output by the randomized algorithm for the min player is essentially
an approximate equilibrium strategy against the other adversarial player
The Web as an Adaptive Network: Coevolution of Web Behavior and Web Structure
Much is known about the complex network structure of the Web, and about behavioral dynamics on the Web. A number of studies address how behaviors on the Web are affected by different network topologies, whilst others address how the behavior of users on the Web alters network topology. These represent complementary directions of influence, but they are generally not combined within any one study. In network science, the study of the coupled interaction between topology and behavior, or state-topology coevolution, is known as 'adaptive networks', and is a rapidly developing area of research. In this paper, we review the case for considering the Web as an adaptive network and several examples of state-topology coevolution on the Web. We also review some abstract results from recent literature in adaptive networks and discuss their implications for Web Science. We conclude that adaptive networks provide a formal framework for characterizing processes acting 'on' and 'of' the Web, and offers potential for identifying general organizing principles that seem otherwise illusive in Web Scienc
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