7 research outputs found
Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions
We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions with censored
feedback, where a bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each
auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize her cumulative payoff.
To achieve this goal, the bidder faces a challenging dilemma: if she wins the
bid--the only way to achieve positive payoffs--then she is not able to observe
the highest bid of the other bidders, which we assume is iid drawn from an
unknown distribution. This dilemma, despite being reminiscent of the
exploration-exploitation trade-off in contextual bandits, cannot directly be
addressed by the existing UCB or Thompson sampling algorithms in that
literature, mainly because contrary to the standard bandits setting, when a
positive reward is obtained here, nothing about the environment can be learned.
In this paper, by exploiting the structural properties of first-price
auctions, we develop the first learning algorithm that achieves
regret bound when the bidder's private values are
stochastically generated. We do so by providing an algorithm on a general class
of problems, which we call monotone group contextual bandits, where the same
regret bound is established under stochastically generated contexts. Further,
by a novel lower bound argument, we characterize an lower
bound for the case where the contexts are adversarially generated, thus
highlighting the impact of the contexts generation mechanism on the fundamental
learning limit. Despite this, we further exploit the structure of first-price
auctions and develop a learning algorithm that operates sample-efficiently (and
computationally efficiently) in the presence of adversarially generated private
values. We establish an regret bound for this algorithm,
hence providing a complete characterization of optimal learning guarantees for
this problem
Online Second Price Auction with Semi-Bandit Feedback under the Non-Stationary Setting
In this paper, we study the non-stationary online second price auction problem. We assume that the seller is selling the same type of items in T rounds by the second price auction, and she can set the reserve price in each round. In each round, the bidders draw their private values from a joint distribution unknown to the seller. Then, the seller announced the reserve price in this round. Next, bidders with private values higher than the announced reserve price in that round will report their values to the seller as their bids. The bidder with the highest bid larger than the reserved price would win the item and she will pay to the seller the price equal to the second-highest bid or the reserve price, whichever is larger. The seller wants to maximize her total revenue during the time horizon T while learning the distribution of private values over time. The problem is more challenging than the standard online learning scenario since the private value distribution is non-stationary, meaning that the distribution of bidders' private values may change over time, and we need to use the non-stationary regret to measure the performance of our algorithm. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the repeated auction in the non-stationary setting theoretically. Our algorithm achieves the non-stationary regret upper bound Õ(min{√S T, V¯⅓T⅔), where S is the number of switches in the distribution, and V¯ is the sum of total variation, and S and V¯ are not needed to be known by the algorithm. We also prove regret lower bounds Ω(√S T) in the switching case and Ω(V¯⅓T⅔) in the dynamic case, showing that our algorithm has nearly optimal non-stationary regret
Learning in Repeated Multi-Unit Pay-As-Bid Auctions
Motivated by Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes, Treasury Auctions, and
Procurement Auctions, which all involve the auctioning of homogeneous multiple
units, we consider the problem of learning how to bid in repeated multi-unit
pay-as-bid auctions. In each of these auctions, a large number of (identical)
items are to be allocated to the largest submitted bids, where the price of
each of the winning bids is equal to the bid itself. The problem of learning
how to bid in pay-as-bid auctions is challenging due to the combinatorial
nature of the action space. We overcome this challenge by focusing on the
offline setting, where the bidder optimizes their vector of bids while only
having access to the past submitted bids by other bidders. We show that the
optimal solution to the offline problem can be obtained using a polynomial time
dynamic programming (DP) scheme. We leverage the structure of the DP scheme to
design online learning algorithms with polynomial time and space complexity
under full information and bandit feedback settings. We achieve an upper bound
on regret of and respectively, where is the number of units demanded by the
bidder, is the total number of auctions, and is the size of
the discretized bid space. We accompany these results with a regret lower
bound, which match the linear dependency in . Our numerical results suggest
that when all agents behave according to our proposed no regret learning
algorithms, the resulting market dynamics mainly converge to a welfare
maximizing equilibrium where bidders submit uniform bids. Lastly, our
experiments demonstrate that the pay-as-bid auction consistently generates
significantly higher revenue compared to its popular alternative, the uniform
price auction.Comment: 51 pages, 12 Figure