2,309 research outputs found
On the Structure of Equilibrium Strategies in Dynamic Gaussian Signaling Games
This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the
well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The
mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a
sender who observes two Gaussian processes, state and bias, and a receiver who
takes an action based on the received message from the sender. The players
incur quadratic instantaneous costs as functions of the state, bias and action
variables. Our particular focus is on the Stackelberg equilibrium, which
corresponds to information disclosure and Bayesian persuasion problems in
economics. Prior work solved the static game, and showed that the Stackelberg
equilibrium is achieved by pure strategies that are linear functions of the
state and the bias variables. The main focus of this work is on the dynamic
(multi-stage) setting, where we show that the existence of a pure strategy
Stackelberg equilibrium, within the set of linear strategies, depends on the
problem parameters. Surprisingly, for most problem parameters, a pure linear
strategy does not achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium which implies the
existence of a trade-off between exploiting and revealing information, which
was also encountered in several other asymmetric information games.Comment: will appear in IEEE Multi-Conference on Systems and Control 201
Signaling equilibria for dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information
We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their
types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types
evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur
quadratic instantaneous costs. This forms a dynamic linear quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) game with asymmetric information. We show that under certain conditions,
players' strategies that are linear in their private types, together with
Gaussian beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game.
Furthermore, it is shown that this is a signaling equilibrium due to the fact
that future beliefs on players' types are affected by the equilibrium
strategies. We provide a backward-forward algorithm to find the PBE. Each step
of the backward algorithm reduces to solving an algebraic matrix equation for
every possible realization of the state estimate covariance matrix. The forward
algorithm consists of Kalman filter recursions, where state estimate covariance
matrices depend on equilibrium strategies
Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria
This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game
problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have
misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the
extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional
sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash
equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary
scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all
equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash
equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On
the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For
multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may
be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian
source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the
encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also
includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine
Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For
the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium
when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when
affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems
and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in
strategic environments.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure
On the Fictitious Play and Channel Selection Games
Considering the interaction through mutual interference of the different
radio devices, the channel selection (CS) problem in decentralized parallel
multiple access channels can be modeled by strategic-form games. Here, we show
that the CS problem is a potential game (PG) and thus the fictitious play (FP)
converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) either in pure or mixed strategies. Using
a 2-player 2-channel game, it is shown that convergence in mixed strategies
might lead to cycles of action profiles which lead to individual spectral
efficiencies (SE) which are worse than the SE at the worst NE in mixed and pure
strategies. Finally, exploiting the fact that the CS problem is a PG and an
aggregation game, we present a method to implement FP with local information
and minimum feedback.Comment: In proc. of the IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications
(LATINCOM), Bogota, Colombia, September, 201
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