Cryptocurrencies and Bitcoin: Charting the Research Landscape

This systematic literature review examines cryptocurrencies (CCs) and Bitcoin. Because cryptocurrency research has not gained much attention from Information Systems (IS) researchers and needs a more vivid discussion, this review summarizes the main concepts of 42 papers and aligns them to IS Research. Although, cryptocurrency research has not reached IS mainstream yet, there is massive potential for multifaceted research ranging from protocol development to designing alternative digital currency schemes. Cryptocurrencies entail a core digital artifact and present a rich phenomenon based on the intertwining of technological artifacts and social contexts. We argue that cryptocurrencies are an alternative payment method that may replace intermediaries with cryptographic methods and should be embedded in the research areas of SIGeBIZ and SIGSEC. At the end of this literature review, we discuss some open research gaps like new business models based on cryptocurrencies or the influence of culture on cryptocurrencies and Bitcoin

Coded Merkle Tree: Solving Data Availability Attacks in Blockchains

In this paper, we propose coded Merkle tree (CMT), a novel hash accumulator that offers a constant-cost protection against data availability attacks in blockchains, even if the majority of the network nodes are malicious. A CMT is constructed using a family of sparse erasure codes on each layer, and is recovered by iteratively applying a peeling-decoding technique that enables a compact proof for data availability attack on any layer. Our algorithm enables any node to verify the full availability of any data block generated by the system by just downloading a $\Theta(1)$ byte block hash commitment and randomly sampling $\Theta(\log b)$ bytes, where $b$ is the size of the data block. With the help of only one connected honest node in the system, our method also allows any node to verify any tampering of the coded Merkle tree by just downloading $\Theta(\log b)$ bytes. We provide a modular library for CMT in Rust and Python and demonstrate its efficacy inside the Parity Bitcoin client.Comment: To appear in Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC) 202

Applying Private Information Retrieval to Lightweight Bitcoin Clients

Lightweight Bitcoin clients execute a Simple Payment Verification (SPV) protocol to verify the validity of transactions related to a particular user. Currently, lightweight clients use Bloom filters to significantly reduce the amount of bandwidth required to validate a particular transaction. This is despite the fact that research has shown that Bloom filters are insufficient at preserving the privacy of clients' queries. In this paper we describe our design of an SPV protocol that leverages Private Information Retrieval (PIR) to create fully private and performant queries. We show that our protocol has a low bandwidth and latency cost; properties that make our protocol a viable alternative for lightweight Bitcoin clients and other cryptocurrencies with a similar SPV model. In contract to Bloom filters, our PIR-based approach offers deterministic privacy to the user. Among our results, we show that in the worst case, clients who would like to verify 100 transactions occurring in the past week incurs a bandwidth cost of 33.54 MB with an associated latency of approximately 4.8 minutes, when using our protocol. The same query executed using the Bloom-filter-based SPV protocol incurs a bandwidth cost of 12.85 MB; this is a modest overhead considering the privacy guarantees it provides

No Transaction Fees? No Problem! Achieving Fairness in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

The recently proposed Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) literature studies the strategic interaction between the miner of a block and the transaction creators (or users) in a blockchain. In a TFM, the miner includes transactions that maximize its utility while users submit fees for a slot in the block. The existing TFM literature focuses on satisfying standard incentive properties -- which may limit widespread adoption. We argue that a TFM is "fair" to the transaction creators if it satisfies specific notions, namely Zero-fee Transaction Inclusion and Monotonicity. First, we prove that one generally cannot ensure both these properties and prevent a miner's strategic manipulation. We also show that existing TFMs either do not satisfy these notions or do so at a high cost to the miners' utility. As such, we introduce a novel TFM using on-chain randomness -- rTFM. We prove that rTFM guarantees incentive compatibility for miners and users while satisfying our novel fairness constraints.Comment: Extended Abstract (AAMAS '24