The Effect of Animated Self-Concept Videos on Hispanic Fifth-Grade Students Self-Concept

Studies have documented a major downturn in the self-concept of fifth-grade students as they transition to middle school (Twenge & Crocker, 2000). Two of the major risk factors are being female and Hispanic (Cavazos-Rehg & DeLucia-Waa, 2009). Various interventions have been tried with limited success. The purpose of the present study is to use an animated self-concept video series to test if an animated self-concept video series could support and/or increase the self-concept of fifth-grade students, particularly those in the Hispanic and female risk categories. The study population (N = 192) was a convenience sample drawn from a sample size of 248 students in the fifth grade, average 10 years old, from a South Texas school district. The students were in two different elementary school buildings. The sample was predominantly Hispanic with 186 of the study population identifying as Hispanic. The scores of the non-Hispanic students were not included in the analysis. This quasi-experimental, nonequivalent control-group design (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007) used the Self-Perception Profile for Children (Harter, 2012) as the measurement instrument, which measured global self-worth. The instrument was used as a pre-test and post-test. The treatment group viewed one video each week for five weeks and the control group continued with the school district’s specified curriculum. No teacher intervention was specified. A Mann-Whitney U was utilized to evaluate the null hypotheses. The results indicated no statistically significant difference between the groups before or after the treatment, nor was there a statistically significant difference from beginning to end within the treatment group

Doxastic Voluntarism

Doxastic voluntarism is the thesis that our beliefs are subject to voluntary control. While there’s some controversy as to what “voluntary control” amounts to (see 1.2), it’s often understood as direct control: the ability to bring about a state of affairs “just like that,” without having to do anything else. Most of us have direct control over, for instance, bringing to mind an image of a pine tree. Can one, in like fashion, voluntarily bring it about that one believes a specific proposition? Doxastic voluntarists hold that, at least in some circumstances—such as when the evidence is ambiguous—we can. Doxastic involuntarists, in contrast, maintain that we cannot. Some involuntarists hold that the concept of belief itself precludes the possibility of believing voluntarily. Others hold that the impossibility of voluntary belief is a contingent psychological fact. Historically, the issue of doxastic voluntarism has been connected to how many think about religious commitment: a prominent view of faith is that it is a voluntary decision to believe. Furthermore, the issue of voluntarism has also been viewed as having bearing on fundamental questions in epistemology. For example, are epistemic norms duties to believe in certain ways? Are there practical or moral reasons to believe? If the answer to either question is “yes,” it seems some measure of voluntary doxastic control is required. In section 1, we expand on the definition of doxastic voluntarism, and survey various kinds of control (e.g. direct, indirect, long-range) and the doxastic attitudes we might control (e.g. outright belief, withholding, credences). In section 2, we discuss a number of historical views on doxastic voluntarism. In section 3, we survey motivations for rejecting doxastic voluntarism. There are two general strategies: arguments that appeal to psychological considerations, and conceptual arguments regarding the nature of belief. In section 4, we survey five approaches to defending voluntarism: those that appeal to epistemic permissivism, doxastic compatibilism, skepticism, one-off considerations, and non-standard views of belief. In section 5, we cover empirical work on doxastic voluntarism. The last two sections discuss two implications of voluntarism. In section 6, we discuss voluntarism’s implications for the ethics of belief, and in section 7, we discuss issues at the intersection of voluntarism and religious faith

On the analogy of free will and free belief

Compatibilist methods borrowed from the free will debate are often used to establish doxastic freedom and epistemic responsibility. Certain analogies between the formation of intention and belief make this approach especially promising. Despite being a compatibilist myself in the practical debate, I will argue that compatibilist methods fail to establish doxastic freedom. My rejection is not based on an argument against the analogy of free will and free belief. Rather, I aim at showing that compatibilist free will and free belief are equally misguided because freedom is a concept that only applies to an agent’s actions and not to her mental attitudes. Compatibilist strategies that seek to define control by reason-responsiveness merely weaken the conditions for freedom such that arbitrary forms of control can be defined. I will demonstrate that these methods also commit to freedom of fear, freedom of hope and freedom of anger. However, I accept the compatibilist challenge to account for the addict’s and the paranoid’s unfreedom. I will sketch a unified approach to compatibilist free agency that does justice to these phenomena without the help of free will or free belief.publishe