On Generalized Computable Universal Priors and their Convergence

Solomonoff unified Occam's razor and Epicurus' principle of multiple explanations to one elegant, formal, universal theory of inductive inference, which initiated the field of algorithmic information theory. His central result is that the posterior of the universal semimeasure M converges rapidly to the true sequence generating posterior mu, if the latter is computable. Hence, M is eligible as a universal predictor in case of unknown mu. The first part of the paper investigates the existence and convergence of computable universal (semi)measures for a hierarchy of computability classes: recursive, estimable, enumerable, and approximable. For instance, M is known to be enumerable, but not estimable, and to dominate all enumerable semimeasures. We present proofs for discrete and continuous semimeasures. The second part investigates more closely the types of convergence, possibly implied by universality: in difference and in ratio, with probability 1, in mean sum, and for Martin-Loef random sequences. We introduce a generalized concept of randomness for individual sequences and use it to exhibit difficulties regarding these issues. In particular, we show that convergence fails (holds) on generalized-random sequences in gappy (dense) Bernoulli classes.Comment: 22 page

On Universal Prediction and Bayesian Confirmation

The Bayesian framework is a well-studied and successful framework for inductive reasoning, which includes hypothesis testing and confirmation, parameter estimation, sequence prediction, classification, and regression. But standard statistical guidelines for choosing the model class and prior are not always available or fail, in particular in complex situations. Solomonoff completed the Bayesian framework by providing a rigorous, unique, formal, and universal choice for the model class and the prior. We discuss in breadth how and in which sense universal (non-i.i.d.) sequence prediction solves various (philosophical) problems of traditional Bayesian sequence prediction. We show that Solomonoff's model possesses many desirable properties: Strong total and weak instantaneous bounds, and in contrast to most classical continuous prior densities has no zero p(oste)rior problem, i.e. can confirm universal hypotheses, is reparametrization and regrouping invariant, and avoids the old-evidence and updating problem. It even performs well (actually better) in non-computable environments.Comment: 24 page

Ultimate Intelligence Part I: Physical Completeness and Objectivity of Induction

We propose that Solomonoff induction is complete in the physical sense via several strong physical arguments. We also argue that Solomonoff induction is fully applicable to quantum mechanics. We show how to choose an objective reference machine for universal induction by defining a physical message complexity and physical message probability, and argue that this choice dissolves some well-known objections to universal induction. We also introduce many more variants of physical message complexity based on energy and action, and discuss the ramifications of our proposals.Comment: Under review at AGI-2015 conference. An early draft was submitted to ALT-2014. This paper is now being split into two papers, one philosophical, and one more technical. We intend that all installments of the paper series will be on the arxi

Sequential Predictions based on Algorithmic Complexity

This paper studies sequence prediction based on the monotone Kolmogorov complexity Km=-log m, i.e. based on universal deterministic/one-part MDL. m is extremely close to Solomonoff's universal prior M, the latter being an excellent predictor in deterministic as well as probabilistic environments, where performance is measured in terms of convergence of posteriors or losses. Despite this closeness to M, it is difficult to assess the prediction quality of m, since little is known about the closeness of their posteriors, which are the important quantities for prediction. We show that for deterministic computable environments, the "posterior" and losses of m converge, but rapid convergence could only be shown on-sequence; the off-sequence convergence can be slow. In probabilistic environments, neither the posterior nor the losses converge, in general.Comment: 26 pages, LaTe

Solomonoff Induction: A Solution to the Problem of the Priors?

In this essay, I investigate whether Solomonoff’s prior can be used to solve the problem of the priors for Bayesianism. In outline, the idea is to give higher prior probability to hypotheses that are "simpler", where simplicity is given a precise formal definition. I begin with a review of Bayesianism, including a survey of past proposed solutions of the problem of the priors. I then introduce the formal framework of Solomonoff induction, and go through some of its properties, before finally turning to some applications. After this, I discuss several potential problems for the framework. Among these are the fact that Solomonoff’s prior is incomputable, that the prior is highly dependent on the choice of a universal Turing machine to use in the definition, and the fact that it assumes that the hypotheses under consideration are computable. I also discuss whether a bias toward simplicity can be justified. I argue that there are two main considerations favoring Solomonoff’s prior: (i) it allows us to assign strictly positive probability to every hypothesis in a countably infinite set in a non-arbitrary way, and (ii) it minimizes the number of "retractions" and "errors" in the worst case

On Martin-Löf convergence of Solomonoff’s mixture

We study the convergence of Solomonoff’s universal mixture on individual Martin-Löf random sequences. A new result is presented extending the work of Hutter and Muchnik (2004) by showing that there does not exist a universal mixture that converges on all Martin-Löf random sequences

Optimality of Universal Bayesian Sequence Prediction for General Loss and Alphabet

Various optimality properties of universal sequence predictors based on Bayes-mixtures in general, and Solomonoff's prediction scheme in particular, will be studied. The probability of observing $x_t$ at time $t$, given past observations $x_1...x_{t-1}$ can be computed with the chain rule if the true generating distribution $\mu$ of the sequences $x_1x_2x_3...$ is known. If $\mu$ is unknown, but known to belong to a countable or continuous class \M one can base ones prediction on the Bayes-mixture $\xi$ defined as a $w_\nu$-weighted sum or integral of distributions \nu\in\M. The cumulative expected loss of the Bayes-optimal universal prediction scheme based on $\xi$ is shown to be close to the loss of the Bayes-optimal, but infeasible prediction scheme based on $\mu$. We show that the bounds are tight and that no other predictor can lead to significantly smaller bounds. Furthermore, for various performance measures, we show Pareto-optimality of $\xi$ and give an Occam's razor argument that the choice $w_\nu\sim 2^{-K(\nu)}$ for the weights is optimal, where $K(\nu)$ is the length of the shortest program describing $\nu$. The results are applied to games of chance, defined as a sequence of bets, observations, and rewards. The prediction schemes (and bounds) are compared to the popular predictors based on expert advice. Extensions to infinite alphabets, partial, delayed and probabilistic prediction, classification, and more active systems are briefly discussed.Comment: 34 page

(Non-)Equivalence of Universal Priors

Ray Solomonoff invented the notion of universal induction featuring an aptly termed "universal" prior probability function over all possible computable environments. The essential property of this prior was its ability to dominate all other such priors. Later, Levin introduced another construction --- a mixture of all possible priors or `universal mixture'. These priors are well known to be equivalent up to multiplicative constants. Here, we seek to clarify further the relationships between these three characterisations of a universal prior (Solomonoff's, universal mixtures, and universally dominant priors). We see that the the constructions of Solomonoff and Levin define an identical class of priors, while the class of universally dominant priors is strictly larger. We provide some characterisation of the discrepancy.Comment: 10 LaTeX pages, 1 figur