Security through Obscurity: Layout Obfuscation of Digital Integrated Circuits using Don't Care Conditions

Contemporary integrated circuits are designed and manufactured in a globalized environment leading to concerns of piracy, overproduction and counterfeiting. One class of techniques to combat these threats is circuit obfuscation which seeks to modify the gate-level (or structural) description of a circuit without affecting its functionality in order to increase the complexity and cost of reverse engineering. Most of the existing circuit obfuscation methods are based on the insertion of additional logic (called “key gates”) or camouflaging existing gates in order to make it difficult for a malicious user to get the complete layout information without extensive computations to determine key-gate values. However, when the netlist or the circuit layout, although camouflaged, is available to the attacker, he/she can use advanced logic analysis and circuit simulation tools and Boolean SAT solvers to reveal the unknown gate-level information without exhaustively trying all the input vectors, thus bringing down the complexity of reverse engineering. To counter this problem, some ‘provably secure’ logic encryption algorithms that emphasize methodical selection of camouflaged gates have been proposed previously in literature [1,2,3]. The contribution of this paper is the creation and simulation of a new layout obfuscation method that uses don't care conditions. We also present proof-of-concept of a new functional or logic obfuscation technique that not only conceals, but modifies the circuit functionality in addition to the gate-level description, and can be implemented automatically during the design process. Our layout obfuscation technique utilizes don’t care conditions (namely, Observability and Satisfiability Don’t Cares) inherent in the circuit to camouflage selected gates and modify sub-circuit functionality while meeting the overall circuit specification. Here, camouflaging or obfuscating a gate means replacing the candidate gate by a 4X1 Multiplexer which can be configured to perform all possible 2-input/ 1-output functions as proposed by Bao et al. [4]. It is important to emphasize that our approach not only obfuscates but alters sub-circuit level functionality in an attempt to make IP piracy difficult. The choice of gates to obfuscate determines the effort required to reverse engineer or brute force the design. As such, we propose a method of camouflaged gate selection based on the intersection of output logic cones. By choosing these candidate gates methodically, the complexity of reverse engineering can be made exponential, thus making it computationally very expensive to determine the true circuit functionality. We propose several heuristic algorithms to maximize the RE complexity based on don’t care based obfuscation and methodical gate selection. Thus, the goal of protecting the design IP from malicious end-users is achieved. It also makes it significantly harder for rogue elements in the supply chain to use, copy or replicate the same design with a different logic. We analyze the reverse engineering complexity by applying our obfuscation algorithm on ISCAS-85 benchmarks. Our experimental results indicate that significant reverse engineering complexity can be achieved at minimal design overhead (average area overhead for the proposed layout obfuscation methods is 5.51% and average delay overhead is about 7.732%). We discuss the strengths and limitations of our approach and suggest directions that may lead to improved logic encryption algorithms in the future. References: [1] R. Chakraborty and S. Bhunia, “HARPOON: An Obfuscation-Based SoC Design Methodology for Hardware Protection,” IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, vol. 28, no. 10, pp. 1493–1502, 2009. [2] J. A. Roy, F. Koushanfar, and I. L. Markov, “EPIC: Ending Piracy of Integrated Circuits,” in 2008 Design, Automation and Test in Europe, 2008, pp. 1069–1074. [3] J. Rajendran, M. Sam, O. Sinanoglu, and R. Karri, “Security Analysis of Integrated Circuit Camouflaging,” ACM Conference on Computer Communications and Security, 2013. [4] Bao Liu, Wang, B., "Embedded reconfigurable logic for ASIC design obfuscation against supply chain attacks,"Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE), 2014 , vol., no., pp.1,6, 24-28 March 2014

FuncTeller: How Well Does eFPGA Hide Functionality?

Hardware intellectual property (IP) piracy is an emerging threat to the global supply chain. Correspondingly, various countermeasures aim to protect hardware IPs, such as logic locking, camouflaging, and split manufacturing. However, these countermeasures cannot always guarantee IP security. A malicious attacker can access the layout/netlist of the hardware IP protected by these countermeasures and further retrieve the design. To eliminate/bypass these vulnerabilities, a recent approach redacts the design's IP to an embedded field-programmable gate array (eFPGA), disabling the attacker's access to the layout/netlist. eFPGAs can be programmed with arbitrary functionality. Without the bitstream, the attacker cannot recover the functionality of the protected IP. Consequently, state-of-the-art attacks are inapplicable to pirate the redacted hardware IP. In this paper, we challenge the assumed security of eFPGA-based redaction. We present an attack to retrieve the hardware IP with only black-box access to a programmed eFPGA. We observe the effect of modern electronic design automation (EDA) tools on practical hardware circuits and leverage the observation to guide our attack. Thus, our proposed method FuncTeller selects minterms to query, recovering the circuit function within a reasonable time. We demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of FuncTeller on multiple circuits, including academic benchmark circuits, Stanford MIPS processor, IBEX processor, Common Evaluation Platform GPS, and Cybersecurity Awareness Worldwide competition circuits. Our results show that FuncTeller achieves an average accuracy greater than 85% over these tested circuits retrieving the design's functionality.Comment: To be published in the proceedings of the 32st USENIX Security Symposium, 202

Attacking Split Manufacturing from a Deep Learning Perspective

The notion of integrated circuit split manufacturing which delegates the front-end-of-line (FEOL) and back-end-of-line (BEOL) parts to different foundries, is to prevent overproduction, piracy of the intellectual property (IP), or targeted insertion of hardware Trojans by adversaries in the FEOL facility. In this work, we challenge the security promise of split manufacturing by formulating various layout-level placement and routing hints as vector- and image-based features. We construct a sophisticated deep neural network which can infer the missing BEOL connections with high accuracy. Compared with the publicly available network-flow attack [1], for the same set of ISCAS-85 benchmarks, we achieve 1.21X accuracy when splitting on M1 and 1.12X accuracy when splitting on M3 with less than 1% running time

Adaptive Integrated Circuit Design for Variation Resilience and Security

The past few decades witness the burgeoning development of integrated circuit in terms of process technology scaling. Along with the tremendous benefits coming from the scaling, challenges are also presented in various stages. During the design time, the complexity of developing a circuit with millions to billions of smaller size transistors is extended after the variations are taken into account. The difficulty of analyzing these nondeterministic properties makes the allocation scheme of redundant resource hardly work in a cost-efficient way. Besides fabrication variations, analog circuits are suffered from severe performance degradations owing to their physical attributes which are vulnerable to aging effects. As such, the post-silicon calibration approach gains increasing attentions to compensate the performance mismatch. For the user-end applications, additional system failures result from the pirated and counterfeited devices provided by the untrusted semiconductor supply chain. Again analog circuits show their weakness to this threat due to the shortage of piracy avoidance techniques. In this dissertation, we propose three adaptive integrated circuit designs to overcome these challenges respectively. The first one investigates the variability-aware gate implementation with the consideration of the overhead control of adaptivity assignment. This design improves the variation resilience typically for digital circuits while optimizing the power consumption and timing yield. The second design is implemented as a self-validation system for the calibration of diverse analog circuits. The system is completely integrated on chip to enhance the convenience without external assistance. In the last design, a classic analog component is further studied to establish the configurable locking mechanism for analog circuits. The use of Satisfiability Modulo Theories addresses the difficulty of searching the unique unlocking pattern of non-Boolean variables

Probability Based Logic Locking on Integrated Circuits

The demand of integrated circuits (IC)s are increasing and the industry has outsourced the fabrication process to untrusted environments. An adversary at these untrusted facilities can reverse engineer parts of the IC to reveal the original design. IC piracy and overproduction are serious issues that threaten the security and integrity of a system. These ICs can be copied illegally and altered to contain malicious hardware. The pirated ICs can be placed in consumer products which may harm the system or leak sensitive information. Hardware obfuscation is a technique used to protect the original design before it gets fabricated, tested, assembled, and packaged. Hardware obfuscation intends to hide or alter the original design of a circuit to prevent attackers from determining the true design. Logic locking is a type of hardware obfuscation technique where additional key gates are inserted into the circuit. Only the correct key can unlock the functionality of that circuit otherwise the system produces the wrong output. In an effort to hinder these threats on ICs, we have developed a probability-based logic locking technique to protect the design of a circuit. Our proposed technique called ProbLock can be applied to combinational and sequential circuits through a critical selection process. We used a filtering process to select the best location of key gates based on various constraints. The main constraint is based on gate probabilities in the circuit. Each step in the filtering process generates a subset of nodes for each constraint. We also integrated an anti-SAT technique into ProbLock to enhance the security against a specific boolean satisfiability (SAT) attack. We analyzed the correlation between each constraint and adjusted the strength of the constraints before inserting key gates. We adjusted an optimized ProbLock to have a small overhead but high security metric against SAT attacks. We have tested our algorithm on 40 benchmarks from the ISCAS ’85 and ISCAS ’89 suite. ProbLock is evaluated using a SAT attack on the benchmark and measuring how well the attack performs on the locked circuit. Finally, we compared ProbLock to other logic locking techniques and discussed future steps for this project

CYBERSECURITY FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL FINGERPRINTING TECHNIQUES FOR INTEGRATED CIRCUITRY

The system on a chip (SoC) paradigm for computing has become more prevalent in modern society. Because of this, reuse of different functional integrated circuits (ICs), with standardized inputs and outputs, make designing SoC systems easier. As a result, the theft of intellectual property for different ICs has become a highly profitable business. One method of theft-prevention is to add a signature, or fingerprint, to ICs so that they may be tracked after they are sold. The contribution of this dissertation is the creation and simulation of three new fingerprinting methods that can be implemented automatically during the design process. In addition, because manufacturing and design costs are significant, three of the fingerprinting methods presented, attempt to alleviate costs by determining the fingerprint in the post-silicon stage of the VLSI design cycle. Our first two approaches to fingerprint ICs, are to use Observability Don’t Cares (ODCs) and Satisfiability Don’t Cares (SDCs), which are almost always present in ICs, to hide our fingerprint. ODCs cause an IC to ignore certain internal signals, which we can utilize to create fingerprints that have a minimal performance overhead. Using a heuristic approach, we are also able to choose the overhead the gate will have by removing some fingerprint locations. The experiments show that this work is effective and can provide a large number of fingerprints for more substantial circuits, with a minimal overhead. SDCs are similar to ODCs except that they focus on input patterns, to gates, that cannot exist. For this work, we found a way to quickly locate most of the SDCs in a circuit and depending on the input patterns that we know will not occur, replace the gates to create a fingerprint with a minimal overhead. We also created two methods to implement this SDC fingerprinting method, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. Both the ODC and SDC fingerprinting methods can be implemented in the circuit design or physical design of the IC, and finalized in the post-silicon phase, thus reducing the cost of manufacturing several different circuits. The third method developed for this dissertation was based on our previous work on finite state machine (FSM) protection to generate a fingerprint. We show that we can edit ICs with incomplete FSMs by adding additional transitions from the set of don’t care transitions. Although the best candidates for this method are those with unused states and transitions, additional states can be added to the circuit to generate additional don’t care transitions and states, useful for generating more fingerprints. This method has the potential for an astronomical number of fingerprints, but the generated fingerprints need to be filtered for designs that have an acceptable design overhead in comparison to the original circuit. Our fourth and final method for IC fingerprinting utilizes scan-chains which help to monitor the internal state of a sequential circuit. By modifying the interconnects between flip flops in a scan chain we can create unique fingerprints that are easy to detect by the user. These modifications are done after the design for test and during the fabrication stage, which helps reduce redesign overhead. These changes can also be finalized in the post-silicon stage, similar to the work for the ODC and SDC fingerprinting, to minimize manufacturing costs. The hope with this dissertation is to demonstrate that these methods for generating fingerprints, for ICs, will improve upon the current state of the art. First, these methods will create a significant number of unique fingerprints. Second, they will create fingerprints that have an acceptable overhead and are easy to detect by the developer and are harder to detect or remove by the adversary. Finally, we show that three of the methods will reduce the cost of manufacturing by being able to be implemented in the later stages of their design cycle