203 research outputs found

    On the Computability of Solomonoff Induction and Knowledge-Seeking

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    Solomonoff induction is held as a gold standard for learning, but it is known to be incomputable. We quantify its incomputability by placing various flavors of Solomonoff's prior M in the arithmetical hierarchy. We also derive computability bounds for knowledge-seeking agents, and give a limit-computable weakly asymptotically optimal reinforcement learning agent.Comment: ALT 201

    On the computability of Solomonoff induction and AIXI

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    How could we solve the machine learning and the artificial intelligence problem if we had infinite computation? Solomonoff induction and the reinforcement learning agent AIXI are proposed answers to this question. Both are known to be incomputable. We quantify this using the arithmetical hierarchy, and prove upper and in most cases corresponding lower bounds for incomputability. Moreover, we show that AIXI is not limit computable, thus it cannot be approximated using finite computation. However there are limit computable ε-optimal approximations to AIXI. We also derive computability bounds for knowledge-seeking agents, and give a limit computable weakly asymptotically optimal reinforcement learning agent.This work was supported by ARC grant DP150104590

    Algorithmic Randomness as Foundation of Inductive Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence

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    This article is a brief personal account of the past, present, and future of algorithmic randomness, emphasizing its role in inductive inference and artificial intelligence. It is written for a general audience interested in science and philosophy. Intuitively, randomness is a lack of order or predictability. If randomness is the opposite of determinism, then algorithmic randomness is the opposite of computability. Besides many other things, these concepts have been used to quantify Ockham's razor, solve the induction problem, and define intelligence.Comment: 9 LaTeX page

    Principles of Solomonoff Induction and AIXI

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    We identify principles characterizing Solomonoff Induction by demands on an agent's external behaviour. Key concepts are rationality, computability, indifference and time consistency. Furthermore, we discuss extensions to the full AI case to derive AIXI.Comment: 14 LaTeX page

    Death and Suicide in Universal Artificial Intelligence

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    Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general paradigm for studying intelligent behaviour, with applications ranging from artificial intelligence to psychology and economics. AIXI is a universal solution to the RL problem; it can learn any computable environment. A technical subtlety of AIXI is that it is defined using a mixture over semimeasures that need not sum to 1, rather than over proper probability measures. In this work we argue that the shortfall of a semimeasure can naturally be interpreted as the agent's estimate of the probability of its death. We formally define death for generally intelligent agents like AIXI, and prove a number of related theorems about their behaviour. Notable discoveries include that agent behaviour can change radically under positive linear transformations of the reward signal (from suicidal to dogmatically self-preserving), and that the agent's posterior belief that it will survive increases over time.Comment: Conference: Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) 2016 13 pages, 2 figure

    Bad Universal Priors and Notions of Optimality

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    A big open question of algorithmic information theory is the choice of the universal Turing machine (UTM). For Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff induction we have invariance theorems: the choice of the UTM changes bounds only by a constant. For the universally intelligent agent AIXI (Hutter, 2005) no invariance theorem is known. Our results are entirely negative: we discuss cases in which unlucky or adversarial choices of the UTM cause AIXI to misbehave drastically. We show that Legg-Hutter intelligence and thus balanced Pareto optimality is entirely subjective, and that every policy is Pareto optimal in the class of all computable environments. This undermines all existing optimality properties for AIXI. While it may still serve as a gold standard for AI, our results imply that AIXI is a relative theory, dependent on the choice of the UTM.Comment: COLT 201
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