Covering Partial Cubes with Zones

A partial cube is a graph having an isometric embedding in a hypercube. Partial cubes are characterized by a natural equivalence relation on the edges, whose classes are called zones. The number of zones determines the minimal dimension of a hypercube in which the graph can be embedded. We consider the problem of covering the vertices of a partial cube with the minimum number of zones. The problem admits several special cases, among which are the problem of covering the cells of a line arrangement with a minimum number of lines, and the problem of finding a minimum-size fibre in a bipartite poset. For several such special cases, we give upper and lower bounds on the minimum size of a covering by zones. We also consider the computational complexity of those problems, and establish some hardness results

Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice

In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical. How then can we design a mechanism - preferably decentralized, simple, scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural solution to this problem. In this iterative method, successive pairs of agents bargain over the decision space using the previous decision as a disagreement alternative. We describe the general method and analyze the quality of its outcome when the space of preferences define a median graph. We show that sequential deliberation finds a 1.208- approximation to the optimal social cost on such graphs, coming very close to this value with only a small constant number of agents sampled from the population. We also show lower bounds on simpler classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. We finally show that for general metric spaces, the second moment of of the distribution of social cost of the outcomes produced by sequential deliberation is also bounded

Ramified rectilinear polygons: coordinatization by dendrons

Simple rectilinear polygons (i.e. rectilinear polygons without holes or cutpoints) can be regarded as finite rectangular cell complexes coordinatized by two finite dendrons. The intrinsic $l_1$-metric is thus inherited from the product of the two finite dendrons via an isometric embedding. The rectangular cell complexes that share this same embedding property are called ramified rectilinear polygons. The links of vertices in these cell complexes may be arbitrary bipartite graphs, in contrast to simple rectilinear polygons where the links of points are either 4-cycles or paths of length at most 3. Ramified rectilinear polygons are particular instances of rectangular complexes obtained from cube-free median graphs, or equivalently simply connected rectangular complexes with triangle-free links. The underlying graphs of finite ramified rectilinear polygons can be recognized among graphs in linear time by a Lexicographic Breadth-First-Search. Whereas the symmetry of a simple rectilinear polygon is very restricted (with automorphism group being a subgroup of the dihedral group $D_4$), ramified rectilinear polygons are universal: every finite group is the automorphism group of some ramified rectilinear polygon.Comment: 27 pages, 6 figure