Complexity Jumps In Multiagent Justification Logic Under Interacting Justifications

The Logic of Proofs, LP, and its successor, Justification Logic, is a refinement of the modal logic approach to epistemology in which proofs/justifications are taken into account. In 2000 Kuznets showed that satisfiability for LP is in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, a result which has been successfully repeated for all other one-agent justification logics whose complexity is known. We introduce a family of multi-agent justification logics with interactions between the agents' justifications, by extending and generalizing the two-agent versions of the Logic of Proofs introduced by Yavorskaya in 2008. Known concepts and tools from the single-agent justification setting are adjusted for this multiple agent case. We present tableau rules and some preliminary complexity results. In several cases the satisfiability problem for these logics remains in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, while for others it is PSPACE or EXP-hard. Furthermore, this problem becomes PSPACE-hard even for certain two-agent logics, while there are EXP-hard logics of three agents

NEXP-completeness and Universal Hardness Results for Justification Logic

We provide a lower complexity bound for the satisfiability problem of a multi-agent justification logic, establishing that the general NEXP upper bound from our previous work is tight. We then use a simple modification of the corresponding reduction to prove that satisfiability for all multi-agent justification logics from there is hard for the Sigma 2 p class of the second level of the polynomial hierarchy - given certain reasonable conditions. Our methods improve on these required conditions for the same lower bound for the single-agent justification logics, proven by Buss and Kuznets in 2009, thus answering one of their open questions.Comment: Shorter version has been accepted for publication by CSR 201

Impossible and Conflicting Obligations in Justification Logic

Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justification logics, which feature explicit reasons for obligations, the situation is different. Their strength depends on a constant specification and on the available set of operations for combining different reasons. We present different consistency principles in justification logic and compare their logical strength. We propose a novel semantics for which justification logics with the explicit version of axiom D, jd, are complete for arbitrary constant specifications. We then discuss the philosophical implications with regard to some deontic paradoxes