Beyond economic efficiency in biodiversity conservation

This paper aims at explaining the importance of the democracy stance as compared to the efficiency stance in order to deal with complexity in biodiversity conservation. While the efficiency stance refers to the realm of relatively simple systems, individual rationality, and instrumental values, the complexity stance transcends these boundaries into the realm of complex systems, social rationality and intrinsic values. We argue that the task of biodiversity conservation is impossible to achieve in economically efficient ways, because (a) it is impossible to come to a (fully informed) complete account of all values, not only because it is costly but also because (b) moral values are involved which (by their nature) exclude themselves from being accounted for, and (c) biodiversity conservation can be regarded as an end in itself instead of only a means towards an end. The point we raise is, that in order to cope with biodiversity conservation we need to apply valuation methods which are from the complexity stance, take better account of intrinsic values and feelings, as well as consider social rationality. Economic valuation methods are themselves 'value articulating institutions' and as biodiversity conservation confronts us with the complexity of social-ecological systems, the choice of the 'value articulating institutions' needs to consider their ability to capture instrumental and intrinsic values of biodiversity. We demonstrate a method, based on cybernetics, which is able to take into account the issues raised

Normativity of law and interpretive approaches : (a discussion on the relation between law and reason)

The debates about the interrelations between reason and law have undergone a change after the eighteenth century. References to the recta ratio of jusnaturalistic tradition have not disappeared, but other comprehensions of legal reason have developed. The European debate over legal positivist science has contributed to this in a manifestation of the rationality of law. This transformation may be considered the basis for the development of true “legal technologies” throughout the twentieth century. On the other hand, in the context of theories of positive law which have taken the relation between ethics and legal reason as a problem, the formation of discourses on coercion (Austin and Holmes), on validity (Kelsen and Hart) and on justification (Alexy and Dworkin) has also contributed to the emergence of new models of legal rationality. In this paper, it is highlighted that the construction of these models is linked to the “points of view” which theories have proposed as legitimate for the interpretation of legal phenomenon. And it is suggested that the discussion over points of view (defined as “focuses”, term which is close to the notion of “attitude”, “stance” or “place of speech”) may aid in the debate on the normativity of law

Aesthetic Rationality

We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. Aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but on whether an object is to be appreciated. Aesthetic judgment is simply appreciation. Correlatively, reasons supporting theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments operate in fundamentally different ways. The irreducibility of the aesthetic domain is due to the fact that aesthetic judgment is a sensory-affective disclosure of, and responsiveness to, merit: it is a feeling that presents an object, and is responsive to it, as worthy of being liked. Aesthetic judgment is thus shown to be, on the hand, first personal and non-transferable; and, on the other hand, a presentation of reality. We thereby capture what is right in both subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of aesthetic judgment

Rationality as the Rule of Reason

The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show how this view can account for structural rationality on the assumption that intentions and beliefs as such involve competent perceptions of downstream reasons, and explore various implications of the account

The legitimacy of the European Union through legal rationality: Free movement of third country nationals

Third country nationals (TCNs) play an important part in the economy of the European Union, reflected in the rights granted to them under European Union Law. Political expediency is however shaped by world, regional and domestic influences that in turn determine policy towards third country nationals and their legal rights to freedom of movement.This book examines the concept of political legitimacy within the European Union through the principles of legal rationality, focusing in particular on the European Union’s policy towards third country nationals. Richard Ball argues that for legal doctrine to be rational it must display the requirements of formal, instrumental and substantive rationality, each mutually exclusive and essential.In taking this position of legal rationality, the book focuses on free movement rights of TCNs within EU treaties and implementing legislation, the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, and Association Agreements. Ball concludes that the stance of European Union Law towards third country nationals lacks legitimacy, and suggests possible new directions that EU policy should take in the future

Animal Rights -‘One-of-Us-ness’: From the Greek Philosophy towards a Modern Stance

Animals, the beautiful creatures of God in the Stoic and especially in Porphyry’s sense, need to be treated as rational. We know that the Stoics ask for justice to all rational beings, but I think there is no significant proclamation from their side that openly talks in favour of animal’s justice. They claim the rationality of animals but do not confer any right to human beings. The later Neo-Platonist philosopher Porphyry magnificently deciphers this idea in his writing On Abstinence from Animal Food. Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus thinks that both animals and humans are made up of same tissues and like a human, animals also have the same way of perception, reasoning and appetites. My next effort would be to decipher how Porphyry illustrates Theophrastus’ perspective not in the way (the technical theory of justice) the Stoics argued. Porphyry’s stance seems more humanistic that looks for the pertinent reasons for treating animal rights from the contention of justice that Aristotle in his early writings defied since the animals can deal with reasons. The paper highlights on how much we could justificatorily demand the empathetic concern for animals from the outlook of the mentioned Greek thinkers and the modern animal rights thinkers as quasi-right of animals, even if my own position undertakes the empathetic ground for animals as an undeserving humanitarian way

Moral Values, Perceived Access to Care and Preferences for Healthcare Resource Allocation

Background: The National Health Service (NHS) is under financial pressure, and the allocation of healthcare resources relies on complex decision-making processes. Rationality is key in rationing procedures, yet its definition is subjective. Additionally, ethical frameworks associated with rationing processes may be ill-equipped to address health-related social injustices. Literature suggests emotions, intuition, rationality, moral values, and narratives of deservedness may infiltrate preferences about healthcare resources allocation (PHRA). Aims: This research explored how factors drawn from the literature (demographic characteristics, moral judgement, health locus of control, political views, and perceived access to health resources) are associated with PHRA. Methods: A pragmatic stance with a cross-sectional quantitative approach was adopted. PHRA was defined by author-designed health vignettes with four ethical response options. These were presented to 549 adults in an online survey alongside standardised questionnaires. Results: Chi-Square analyses suggested that demographic characteristics (e.g. ethnicity and job types) were associated with PHRA in some vignettes but not others. Kruskal Wallis and post hoc tests found differences in PHRA based on political views, moral values, and internal health locus of control. Deprioritising certain groups or allocation based on previous taxation contribution was associated with high internal health locus of control, right-wing views, and moral concerns associated with this stance. Left-wing participants with a lower internal locus of control and moral concerns about care were represented more often in the group that favoured the vulnerability-based options. Specific results differed significantly for each vignette. Conclusion: The situation-specific nature of the results suggests that participants were not relying on single ethical frameworks when allocating resources and that PHRA may be associated with intuitive processes. Thereafter, the ‘Intuition & Bias Accountability Framework’ is proposed so that healthcare services are held accountable for bias, and practical rationality is acknowledged as a positive tool for social justice

What should a robot learn from an infant? Mechanisms of action interpretation and observational learning in infancy

The paper provides a summary of our recent research on preverbal infants (using violation-of-expectation and observational learning paradigms) demonstrating that one-year-olds interpret and draw systematic inferences about other’s goal-directed actions, and can rely on such inferences when imitating other’s actions or emulating their goals. To account for these findings it is proposed that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic action interpretational system, the ’teleological stance’ that represents actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state, and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available in the actor’s situation. The relevance of these research findings and the proposed theoretical model for how to realize the goal of epigenetic robotics of building a ’socially relevant’ humanoid robot is discussed

Dennett's compatibilism considered

My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility