1,790 research outputs found
Deterministic Distributed Edge-Coloring via Hypergraph Maximal Matching
We present a deterministic distributed algorithm that computes a
-edge-coloring, or even list-edge-coloring, in any -node graph
with maximum degree , in rounds. This answers
one of the long-standing open questions of \emph{distributed graph algorithms}
from the late 1980s, which asked for a polylogarithmic-time algorithm. See,
e.g., Open Problem 4 in the Distributed Graph Coloring book of Barenboim and
Elkin. The previous best round complexities were by
Panconesi and Srinivasan [STOC'92] and
by Fraigniaud, Heinrich, and Kosowski [FOCS'16]. A corollary of our
deterministic list-edge-coloring also improves the randomized complexity of
-edge-coloring to poly rounds.
The key technical ingredient is a deterministic distributed algorithm for
\emph{hypergraph maximal matching}, which we believe will be of interest beyond
this result. In any hypergraph of rank --- where each hyperedge has at most
vertices --- with nodes and maximum degree , this algorithm
computes a maximal matching in rounds.
This hypergraph matching algorithm and its extensions lead to a number of
other results. In particular, a polylogarithmic-time deterministic distributed
maximal independent set algorithm for graphs with bounded neighborhood
independence, hence answering Open Problem 5 of Barenboim and Elkin's book, a
-round deterministic
algorithm for -approximation of maximum matching, and a
quasi-polylogarithmic-time deterministic distributed algorithm for orienting
-arboricity graphs with out-degree at most ,
for any constant , hence partially answering Open Problem 10 of
Barenboim and Elkin's book
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial
information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the
algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is
motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents cannot express the
numerical values of their utility for different outcomes, but are still able to
rank the outcomes in their order of preference. Specifically, we study problems
where the ground truth exists in the form of a weighted graph of agent
utilities, but the algorithm can only elicit the agents' private information in
the form of a preference ordering for each agent induced by the underlying
weights. Against this backdrop, we design truthful algorithms to approximate
the true optimum solution with respect to the hidden weights. Our techniques
yield universally truthful algorithms for a number of graph problems: a
1.76-approximation algorithm for Max-Weight Matching, 2-approximation algorithm
for Max k-matching, a 6-approximation algorithm for Densest k-subgraph, and a
2-approximation algorithm for Max Traveling Salesman as long as the hidden
weights constitute a metric. We also provide improved approximation algorithms
for such problems when the agents are not able to lie about their preferences.
Our results are the first non-trivial truthful approximation algorithms for
these problems, and indicate that in many situations, we can design robust
algorithms even when the agents may lie and only provide ordinal information
instead of precise utilities.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of WINE 201
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of
budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of
resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the
same time maximize a given valuation function. This framework captures the
budgeted version of several well known optimization problems, and when the
resources are owned by strategic agents the goal is to design truthful and
budget feasible mechanisms, i.e. elicit the true cost of the resources and
ensure the payments of the mechanism do not exceed the budget. Budget
feasibility introduces more challenges in mechanism design, and we study
instantiations of this problem for certain classes of submodular and XOS
valuation functions. We first obtain mechanisms with an improved approximation
ratio for weighted coverage valuations, a special class of submodular functions
that has already attracted attention in previous works. We then provide a
general scheme for designing randomized and deterministic polynomial time
mechanisms for a class of XOS problems. This class contains problems whose
feasible set forms an independence system (a more general structure than
matroids), and some representative problems include, among others, finding
maximum weighted matchings, maximum weighted matroid members, and maximum
weighted 3D-matchings. For most of these problems, only randomized mechanisms
with very high approximation ratios were known prior to our results
Streaming Algorithms for Submodular Function Maximization
We consider the problem of maximizing a nonnegative submodular set function
subject to a -matchoid
constraint in the single-pass streaming setting. Previous work in this context
has considered streaming algorithms for modular functions and monotone
submodular functions. The main result is for submodular functions that are {\em
non-monotone}. We describe deterministic and randomized algorithms that obtain
a -approximation using -space, where is
an upper bound on the cardinality of the desired set. The model assumes value
oracle access to and membership oracles for the matroids defining the
-matchoid constraint.Comment: 29 pages, 7 figures, extended abstract to appear in ICALP 201
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