99,223 research outputs found
Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics
The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final allocation of private goods and admission tickets for excludable public goods. Under an affiliation assumption on the underlying distribution, optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and admission fees have the same qualitative properties as in unidimensional models. These properties are obtained for utilitarian welfare maximization and for a Ramsey-Boiteux formulation with interim participation constraints.Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods, Public-Sector Pricing, Multidimensional Mechanism Design, Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing
Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision
The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final allocation of private goods and admission tickets for excludable public goods. Under an affiliation assumption on the underlying distribution, optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and admission fees have the same qualitative properties as in unidimensional models. These properties are obtained for utilitarian welfare maximization and for a Ramsey-Boiteux formulation with interim participation constraints.
Optimal Design of Robust Combinatorial Mechanisms for Substitutable Goods
In this paper we consider multidimensional mechanism design problem for
selling discrete substitutable items to a group of buyers. Previous work on
this problem mostly focus on stochastic description of valuations used by the
seller. However, in certain applications, no prior information regarding
buyers' preferences is known. To address this issue, we consider uncertain
valuations and formulate the problem in a robust optimization framework: the
objective is to minimize the maximum regret. For a special case of
revenue-maximizing pricing problem we present a solution method based on
mixed-integer linear programming formulation
Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players
We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post
individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian
setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may
be correlated, and the goal is to minimize the expected total payment made by
the mechanism. We formulate a notion of incentive compatibility (IC) that we
call {\em support-based IC} that is substantially more robust than Bayesian IC,
and develop black-box reductions from support-based-IC mechanism design to
algorithm design. For single-dimensional settings, this black-box reduction
applies even when we only have an LP-relative {\em approximation algorithm} for
the algorithmic problem. Thus, we obtain near-optimal mechanisms for various
covering settings including single-dimensional covering problems, multi-item
procurement auctions, and multidimensional facility location.Comment: Major changes compared to the previous version. Please consult this
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Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms
We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind many new, specific phenomena with allocative externalities: even in complete information settings, traditional auction formats need not be efficient, and they may give rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But, in the absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be achieved by Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing Bayes-Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object settings with informational externalities, unless the allocation problem is separable across objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities nor complementarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, implementation of any choice function via ex-post equilibrium is generically impossible with informational externalities and multidimensional types. A theory of information constraints with multidimensional signals is rather complex, but indispensable for our study
Optimal procurement mechanism with observable quality
In a procurement contract the Administration usually has some prior information about the quality of the bidding firms. The goal of this article is to characterize the optimal mechanism in such a situation, when firms have private information about their costs. The optimal mechanism selects low-quality firms more often than it would be efficient with perfect information. We also compare this mechanism with others frequently used by the Spanish Administration such as the first price sealed bid auction and the previous admission auction
Bounding the Optimal Revenue of Selling Multiple Goods
Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for
bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods,
in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a
uniform distribution and in the case where they follow independent (but not
necessarily identical) exponential distributions. We apply this in order to get
in both these settings specific performance guarantees, as functions of the
number of items , for the simple deterministic selling mechanisms studied by
Hart and Nisan [EC 2012], namely the one that sells the items separately and
the one that offers them all in a single bundle.
We also propose and study the performance of a natural randomized mechanism
for exponential valuations, called Proportional. As an interesting corollary,
for the special case where the exponential distributions are also identical, we
can derive that offering the goods in a single full bundle is the optimal
selling mechanism for any number of items. To our knowledge, this is the first
result of its kind: finding a revenue-maximizing auction in an additive setting
with arbitrarily many goods
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