235 research outputs found
THE PRICE OF NON-COOPERATION IN RESERVATION-BASED BANDWIDTH SHARING PROTOCOLS
ABSTRACTIn reservation-based bandwidth sharing protocols, the base station relies on the stations’ requests to allocate time slots to them. Like most other protocols, reservation-based protocols were designed with the assumption that all stationsrespect the rules of the protocols. However, as mobile devices are becoming more intelligent andprogrammable, they can selfishly optimize their operations to obtain a larger share of commonbandwidth. Here, we study reservation-based bandwidth sharing protocols considering the existence of selfish stations through game-theoretic perspectives. We show that this game admits a Nash equilibrium. Then, we prove the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium. Game-theoretical analysis shows that local optimization in the bandwidth sharing problem with conflicted interests does not lead to any global optimization.Keywords. Nash equilibrium, Repeated game, Reservation-based
Random Access Game in Fading Channels with Capture: Equilibria and Braess-like Paradoxes
The Nash equilibrium point of the transmission probabilities in a slotted
ALOHA system with selfish nodes is analyzed. The system consists of a finite
number of heterogeneous nodes, each trying to minimize its average transmission
probability (or power investment) selfishly while meeting its average
throughput demand over the shared wireless channel to a common base station
(BS). We use a game-theoretic approach to analyze the network under two
reception models: one is called power capture, the other is called signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SINR) capture. It is shown that, in some
situations, Braess-like paradoxes may occur. That is, the performance of the
system may become worse instead of better when channel state information (CSI)
is available at the selfish nodes. In particular, for homogeneous nodes, we
analytically present that Braess-like paradoxes occur in the power capture
model, and in the SINR capture model with the capture ratio larger than one and
the noise to signal ratio sufficiently small.Comment: 30 pages, 5 figure
Altruism in groups: an evolutionary games approach
We revisit in this paper the relation between evolution of species and the
mathematical tool of evolutionary games, which has been used to model and
predict it. We indicate known shortcoming of this model that restricts the
capacity of evolutionary games to model groups of individuals that share a
common gene or a common fitness function. In this paper we provide a new
concept to remedy this shortcoming in the standard evolutionary games in order
to cover this kind of behavior. Further, we explore the relationship between
this new concept and Nash equilibrium or ESS. We indicate through the study of
some example in the biology as Hawk and Dove game, Stag Hunt Game and Prisoner
Dilemma, that when taking into account a utility that is common to a group of
individuals, the equilibrium structure may change dramatically. We also study
the multiple access control in slotted Aloha based wireless networks. We
analyze the impact of the altruism behavior on the performance at the
equilibrium
A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks
Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral
improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The
potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network
problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this
paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless
networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively
discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on
Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201
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