363 research outputs found
A Shannon Approach to Secure Multi-party Computations
In secure multi-party computations (SMC), parties wish to compute a function
on their private data without revealing more information about their data than
what the function reveals. In this paper, we investigate two Shannon-type
questions on this problem. We first consider the traditional one-shot model for
SMC which does not assume a probabilistic prior on the data. In this model,
private communication and randomness are the key enablers to secure computing,
and we investigate a notion of randomness cost and capacity. We then move to a
probabilistic model for the data, and propose a Shannon model for discrete
memoryless SMC. In this model, correlations among data are the key enablers for
secure computing, and we investigate a notion of dependency which permits the
secure computation of a function. While the models and questions are general,
this paper focuses on summation functions, and relies on polar code
constructions
Why Quantum Bit Commitment And Ideal Quantum Coin Tossing Are Impossible
There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols
for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all
proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the
sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type of attack and delaying her measurements. One
might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment protocols exist at all. We answer
this question by showing that the same type of attack by Alice will, in
principle, break any bit commitment scheme. The cheating strategy generally
requires a quantum computer. We emphasize the generality of this ``no-go
theorem'': Unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes based on quantum
mechanics---fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements---are all
ruled out by this result. Since bit commitment is a useful primitive for
building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our
results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the
so-called ``post-cold-war'' applications. We also show that ideal quantum coin
tossing is impossible because of the EPR attack. This no-go theorem for ideal
quantum coin tossing may help to shed some lights on the possibility of
non-ideal protocols.Comment: We emphasize the generality of this "no-go theorem". All bit
commitment schemes---fully quantum, classical and quantum but with
measurements---are shown to be necessarily insecure. Accepted for publication
in a special issue of Physica D. About 18 pages in elsart.sty. This is an
extended version of an earlier manuscript (quant-ph/9605026) which has
appeared in the proceedings of PHYSCOMP'9
Quantum cryptography: key distribution and beyond
Uniquely among the sciences, quantum cryptography has driven both
foundational research as well as practical real-life applications. We review
the progress of quantum cryptography in the last decade, covering quantum key
distribution and other applications.Comment: It's a review on quantum cryptography and it is not restricted to QK
Field test of a practical secure communication network with decoy-state quantum cryptography
We present a secure network communication system that operated with
decoy-state quantum cryptography in a real-world application scenario. The full
key exchange and application protocols were performed in real time among three
nodes, in which two adjacent nodes were connected by approximate 20 km of
commercial telecom optical fiber. The generated quantum keys were immediately
employed and demonstrated for communication applications, including unbreakable
real-time voice telephone between any two of the three communication nodes, or
a broadcast from one node to the other two nodes by using one-time pad
encryption.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, typos correcte
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