Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations

We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041

Pavelka-style completeness in expansions of \L ukasiewicz logic

An algebraic setting for the validity of Pavelka style completeness for some natural expansions of \L ukasiewicz logic by new connectives and rational constants is given. This algebraic approach is based on the fact that the standard MV-algebra on the real segment $[0, 1]$ is an injective MV-algebra. In particular the logics associated with MV-algebras with product and with divisible MV-algebras are considered