The Necessity of Mathematics

Some have argued for a division of epistemic labor in which mathematicians supply truths and philosophers supply their necessity. We argue that this is wrong: mathematics is committed to its own necessity. Counterfactuals play a starring role

How unprovable is Rabin's decidability theorem?

We study the strength of set-theoretic axioms needed to prove Rabin's theorem on the decidability of the MSO theory of the infinite binary tree. We first show that the complementation theorem for tree automata, which forms the technical core of typical proofs of Rabin's theorem, is equivalent over the moderately strong second-order arithmetic theory $\mathsf{ACA}_0$ to a determinacy principle implied by the positional determinacy of all parity games and implying the determinacy of all Gale-Stewart games given by boolean combinations of ${\bf \Sigma^0_2}$ sets. It follows that complementation for tree automata is provable from $\Pi^1_3$- but not $\Delta^1_3$-comprehension. We then use results due to MedSalem-Tanaka, M\"ollerfeld and Heinatsch-M\"ollerfeld to prove that over $\Pi^1_2$-comprehension, the complementation theorem for tree automata, decidability of the MSO theory of the infinite binary tree, positional determinacy of parity games and determinacy of $\mathrm{Bool}({\bf \Sigma^0_2})$ Gale-Stewart games are all equivalent. Moreover, these statements are equivalent to the $\Pi^1_3$-reflection principle for $\Pi^1_2$-comprehension. It follows in particular that Rabin's decidability theorem is not provable in $\Delta^1_3$-comprehension.Comment: 21 page

Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later

Kleene Algebra with Hypotheses

We study the Horn theories of Kleene algebras and star continuous Kleene algebras, from the complexity point of view. While their equational theories coincide and are PSpace-complete, their Horn theories differ and are undecidable. We characterise the Horn theory of star continuous Kleene algebras in terms of downward closed languages and we show that when restricting the shape of allowed hypotheses, the problems lie in various levels of the arithmetical or analytical hierarchy. We also answer a question posed by Cohen about hypotheses of the form 1=S where S is a sum of letters: we show that it is decidable

Build your own clarithmetic I: Setup and completeness

Clarithmetics are number theories based on computability logic (see http://www.csc.villanova.edu/~japaridz/CL/ ). Formulas of these theories represent interactive computational problems, and their "truth" is understood as existence of an algorithmic solution. Various complexity constraints on such solutions induce various versions of clarithmetic. The present paper introduces a parameterized/schematic version CLA11(P1,P2,P3,P4). By tuning the three parameters P1,P2,P3 in an essentially mechanical manner, one automatically obtains sound and complete theories with respect to a wide range of target tricomplexity classes, i.e. combinations of time (set by P3), space (set by P2) and so called amplitude (set by P1) complexities. Sound in the sense that every theorem T of the system represents an interactive number-theoretic computational problem with a solution from the given tricomplexity class and, furthermore, such a solution can be automatically extracted from a proof of T. And complete in the sense that every interactive number-theoretic problem with a solution from the given tricomplexity class is represented by some theorem of the system. Furthermore, through tuning the 4th parameter P4, at the cost of sacrificing recursive axiomatizability but not simplicity or elegance, the above extensional completeness can be strengthened to intensional completeness, according to which every formula representing a problem with a solution from the given tricomplexity class is a theorem of the system. This article is published in two parts. The present Part I introduces the system and proves its completeness, while Part II is devoted to proving soundness

Mathematical proofs and scientific discovery

The idea that science can be automated is so deeply related to the view that the method of mathematics is the axiomatic method, that confuting the claim that mathematical knowledge can be extended by means of the axiomatic method is almost equivalent to confuting the claim that science can be automated. I argue that the axiomatic view is inadequate as a view of the method of mathematics and that the analytic view is to be preferred. But, if the method of mathematics and natural sciences is the analytic method, then the advancement of knowledge cannot be mechanized, since non-deductive reasoning plays a crucial role in the analytic method, and non-deductive reasoning cannot be fully mechanized