Consensus Strategies for Signed Profiles on Graphs

The median problem is a classical problem in Location Theory: one searches for a location that minimizes the average distance to the sites of the clients. This is for desired facilities as a distribution center for a set of warehouses. More recently, for obnoxious facilities, the antimedian was studied. Here one maximizes the average distance to the clients. In this paper the mixed case is studied. Clients are represented by a profile, which is a sequence of vertices with repetitions allowed. In a signed profile each element is provided with a sign from {+,-}. Thus one can take into account whether the client prefers the facility (with a + sign) or rejects it (with a - sign). The graphs for which all median sets, or all antimedian sets, are connected are characterized. Various consensus strategies for signed profiles are studied, amongst which Majority, Plurality and Scarcity. Hypercubes are the only graphs on which Majority produces the median set for all signed profiles. Finally, the antimedian sets are found by the Scarcity Strategy on e.g. Hamming graphs, Johnson graphs and halfcubes.median;consensus function;median graph;majority rule;plurality strategy;Graph theory;Hamming graph;Johnson graph;halfcube;scarcity strategy;Discrete location and assignment;Distance in graphs

Axiomatic Characterization of the Antimedian Function on Paths and Hypercubes

An antimedian of a profile $\\pi = (x_1, x_2, \\ldots , x_k)$ of vertices of a graph $G$ is a vertex maximizing the sum of the distances to the elements of the profile. The antimedian function is defined on the set of all profiles on $G$ and has as output the set of antimedians of a profile. It is a typical location function for finding a location for an obnoxious facility. The `converse' of the antimedian function is the median function, where the distance sum is minimized. The median function is well studied. For instance it has been characterized axiomatically by three simple axioms on median graphs. The median function behaves nicely on many classes of graphs. In contrast the antimedian function does not have a nice behavior on most classes. So a nice axiomatic characterization may not be expected. In this paper such a characterization is obtained for the two classes of graphs on which the antimedian is well-behaved: paths and hypercubes

Axiomatic Characterization of the Median and Antimedian Functions on Cocktail-Party Graphs and Complete Graphs

__Abstract__ A median (antimedian) of a profile of vertices on a graph $G$ is a vertex that minimizes (maximizes) the remoteness value, that is, the sum of the distances to the elements in the profile. The median (or antimedian) function has as output the set of medians (antimedians) of a profile. It is one of the basic models for the location of a desirable (or obnoxious) facility in a network. The median function is well studied. For instance it has been characterized axiomatically by three simple axioms on median graphs. The median function behaves nicely on many classes of graphs. In contrast the antimedian function does not have a nice behavior on most classes. So a nice axiomatic characterization may not be expected. In this paper an axiomatic characterization is obtained for the median and antimedian functions on complete graphs minus a perfect matching (also known as cocktail-party graphs). In addition a characterization of the antimedian function on complete graphs is presented

Axiomatic Characterization of the Median and Antimedian Function on a Complete Graph minus a Matching

__Abstract__ A median (antimedian) of a profile of vertices on a graph G is a vertex that minimizes (maximizes) the sum of the distances to the elements in the profile. The median (antimedian) function has as output the set of medians (antimedians) of a profile. It is one of the basic models for the location of a desirable (obnoxious) facility in a network. The median function is well studied. For instance it has been characterized axiomatically by three simple axioms on median graphs. The median function behaves nicely on many classes of graphs. In contrast the antimedian function does not have a nice behavior on most classes. So a nice axiomatic characterization may not be expected. In this paper an axiomatic characterization is obtained for the median and antimedian function on complete graphs minus a matching

Consensus strategies for signed profiles on graphs

The median problem is a classical problem in Location Theory: one searches for a location that minimizes the average distance to the sites of the clients. This is for desired facilities as a distribution center for a set of warehouses. More recently, for obnoxious facilities, the antimedian was studied. Here one maximizes the average distance to the clients. In this paper the mixed case is studied. Clients are represented by a profile, which is a sequence of vertices with repetitions allowed. In a signed profile each element is provided with a sign from (+,-). Thus one can take into account whether the client prefers the facility (with a + sign) or rejects it (with a - sign). The graphs for which all median sets, or all antimedian sets, are connected are characterized. Various consensus strategies for signed profiles are studied, amongst which Majority, Plurality and Scarcity. Hypercubes are the only graphs on which Majority produces the median set for all signed profiles. Finally, the antimedian sets are found by the Scarcity Strategy on e.g. Hamming graphs, Johnson graphs and halfcubes

Consensus Strategies for Signed Profiles on Graphs

The median problem is a classical problem in Location Theory: one searches for a location that minimizes the average distance to the sites of the clients. This is for desired facilities as a distribution center for a set of warehouses. More recently, for obnoxious facilities, the antimedian was studied. Here one maximizes the average distance to the clients. In this paper the mixed case is studied. Clients are represented by a profile, which is a sequence of vertices with repetitions allowed. In a signed profile each element is provided with a sign from {+,-}. Thus one can take into account whether the client prefers the facility (with a + sign) or rejects it (with a - sign). The graphs for which all median sets, or all antimedian sets, are connected are characterized. Various consensus strategies for signed profiles are studied, amongst which Majority, Plurality and Scarcity. Hypercubes are the only graphs on which Majority produces the median set for all signed profiles. Finally, the antimedian sets are found by the Scarcity Strategy on e.g. Hamming graphs, Johnson graphs and halfcubes

A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design without Money for Facility Games

In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In a classical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as possible, and the cost of an agent can be defined as the distance between her location and the closest facility. In an obnoxious facility game, each agent wants to be far away from all facilities, and her utility is the distance from her location to the facility set. The objective of each agent is to minimize her cost or maximize her utility. An agent may lie if, by doing so, more benefit can be obtained. We are interested in social choice mechanisms that do not utilize payments. The game designer aims at a mechanism that is strategy-proof, in the sense that any agent cannot benefit by misreporting her address, or, even better, group strategy-proof, in the sense that any coalition of agents cannot all benefit by lying. Meanwhile, it is desirable to have the mechanism to be approximately optimal with respect to a chosen objective function. Several models for such approximation mechanism design without money for facility games have been proposed. In this paper we briefly review these models and related results for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and meanwhile we present a general framework for approximation mechanism design without money for facility games

New models for the location of controversial facilities: A bilevel programming approach

Motivated by recent real-life applications in Location Theory in which the location decisions generate controversy, we propose a novel bilevel location model in which, on the one hand, there is a leader that chooses among a number of fixed potential locations which ones to establish. Next, on the second hand, there is one or several followers that, once the leader location facilities have been set, chooses his location points in a continuous framework. The leader’s goal is to maximize some proxy to the weighted distance to the follower’s location points, while the follower(s) aim is to locate his location points as close as possible to the leader ones. We develop the bilevel location model for one follower and for any polyhedral distance, and we extend it for several followers and any ℓp-norm, p ∈ Q, p ≥ 1. We prove the NP-hardness of the problem and propose different mixed integer linear programming formulations. Moreover, we develop alternative Benders decomposition algorithms for the problem. Finally, we report some computational results comparing the formulations and the Benders decompositions on a set of instances.Fonds de la Recherche Scientique - FNRSMinisterio de Economía y CompetitividadFondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regiona