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Your Code Is My Code: Exploiting a Common Weakness in OAuth 2.0 Implementations
Many millions of users routinely use their Google, Facebook and Microsoft accounts to log in to websites supporting OAuth 2.0-based single sign on. The security of OAuth 2.0 is therefore of critical importance, and it has been widely examined both in theory and in practice. In this paper we disclose a new class of practical attacks on OAuth 2.0 implementations, which we call Partial Redirection URI Manipulation Attacks. An attack of this type can be used by an attacker to gain a victim user’s OAuth 2.0 code (a token representing a right to access user data) without the user’s knowledge; this code can then be used to impersonate the user to the relevant relying party website. We examined 27 leading OAuth 2.0 identity providers, and found that 19 of them are vulnerable to these attacks
Analysing the Security of Google's implementation of OpenID Connect
Many millions of users routinely use their Google accounts to log in to
relying party (RP) websites supporting the Google OpenID Connect service.
OpenID Connect, a newly standardised single-sign-on protocol, builds an
identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which has itself been widely
adopted to support identity management services. It adds identity management
functionality to the OAuth 2.0 system and allows an RP to obtain assurances
regarding the authenticity of an end user. A number of authors have analysed
the security of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, but whether OpenID Connect is secure in
practice remains an open question. We report on a large-scale practical study
of Google's implementation of OpenID Connect, involving forensic examination of
103 RP websites which support its use for sign-in. Our study reveals serious
vulnerabilities of a number of types, all of which allow an attacker to log in
to an RP website as a victim user. Further examination suggests that these
vulnerabilities are caused by a combination of Google's design of its OpenID
Connect service and RP developers making design decisions which sacrifice
security for simplicity of implementation. We also give practical
recommendations for both RPs and OPs to help improve the security of real world
OpenID Connect systems
SciTokens: Capability-Based Secure Access to Remote Scientific Data
The management of security credentials (e.g., passwords, secret keys) for
computational science workflows is a burden for scientists and information
security officers. Problems with credentials (e.g., expiration, privilege
mismatch) cause workflows to fail to fetch needed input data or store valuable
scientific results, distracting scientists from their research by requiring
them to diagnose the problems, re-run their computations, and wait longer for
their results. In this paper, we introduce SciTokens, open source software to
help scientists manage their security credentials more reliably and securely.
We describe the SciTokens system architecture, design, and implementation
addressing use cases from the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave
Observatory (LIGO) Scientific Collaboration and the Large Synoptic Survey
Telescope (LSST) projects. We also present our integration with widely-used
software that supports distributed scientific computing, including HTCondor,
CVMFS, and XrootD. SciTokens uses IETF-standard OAuth tokens for
capability-based secure access to remote scientific data. The access tokens
convey the specific authorizations needed by the workflows, rather than
general-purpose authentication impersonation credentials, to address the risks
of scientific workflows running on distributed infrastructure including NSF
resources (e.g., LIGO Data Grid, Open Science Grid, XSEDE) and public clouds
(e.g., Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure). By improving the
interoperability and security of scientific workflows, SciTokens 1) enables use
of distributed computing for scientific domains that require greater data
protection and 2) enables use of more widely distributed computing resources by
reducing the risk of credential abuse on remote systems.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, PEARC '18: Practice and Experience in Advanced
Research Computing, July 22--26, 2018, Pittsburgh, PA, US
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