In defence of global egalitarianism

This essay argues that David Miller's criticisms of global egalitarianism do not undermine the view where it is stated in one of its stronger, luck egalitarian forms. The claim that global egalitarianism cannot specify a metric of justice which is broad enough to exclude spurious claims for redistribution, but precise enough to appropriately value different kinds of advantage, implicitly assumes that cultural understandings are the only legitimate way of identifying what counts as advantage. But that is an assumption always or almost always rejected by global egalitarianism. The claim that global egalitarianism demands either too little redistribution, leaving the unborn and dissenters burdened with their societies' imprudent choices, or too much redistribution, creating perverse incentives by punishing prudent decisions, only presents a problem for global luck egalitarianism on the assumption that nations can legitimately inherit assets from earlier generations – again, an assumption very much at odds with global egalitarian assumptions

Can Beliefs Wrong?

We care what people think of us. The thesis that beliefs wrong, although compelling, can sound ridiculous. The norms that properly govern belief are plausibly epistemic norms such as truth, accuracy, and evidence. Moral and prudential norms seem to play no role in settling the question of whether to believe p, and they are irrelevant to answering the question of what you should believe. This leaves us with the question: can we wrong one another by virtue of what we believe about each other? Can beliefs wrong? In this introduction, I present a brief summary of the articles that make up this special issue. The aim is to direct readers to open avenues for future research by highlighting questions and challenges that are far from being settled. These papers shouldn’t be taken as the last word on the subject. Rather, they mark the beginning of a serious exploration into a set of questions that concern the morality of belief, i.e., doxastic morality

What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other

This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other

Love, Reasons, and Desire

This essay defends subjectivism about reasons of love. These are the normative reasons we have to treat those we love especially well, such as the reasons we have to treat our close friends or life partners better than strangers. Subjectivism about reasons of love is the view that every reason of love a person has is correctly explained by her desires. I formulate a version of subjectivism about reasons of love and defend it against three objections that have been made to this kind of view. Firstly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our focus when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism about those reasons. Secondly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our motivations when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism about those reasons. Thirdly, it has been argued that subjectivism about reasons of love has deeply counterintuitive implications about what our reasons of love are. I argue that none of these objections succeeds

Knowledge Is (Still) the Norm of Assertion

In this paper, I defend the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion. I first examine three prominent “counterexamples”: false assertion, selfless assertion, and assertion based on mere justified true belief. I argue that they all fail to square well with our ordinary intuitions. However, the contemporary debate over the norm of assertion depends heavily on the method of counterexamples, whose crux is to prompt our intuitions regarding the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of a certain kind of assertions. This method has its limits as sometimes the debate simply boils down to a clash of intuitions. I think we can do better. In the second part of the paper, I construct a positive argument for the knowledge norm, showing that the knowledge norm can be derived from the general account of the conversational role of assertion. I argue that in order for assertion to play the role it plays in conversation, the knowledge norm must hold

Mixin Composition Synthesis based on Intersection Types

We present a method for synthesizing compositions of mixins using type inhabitation in intersection types. First, recursively defined classes and mixins, which are functions over classes, are expressed as terms in a lambda calculus with records. Intersection types with records and record-merge are used to assign meaningful types to these terms without resorting to recursive types. Second, typed terms are translated to a repository of typed combinators. We show a relation between record types with record-merge and intersection types with constructors. This relation is used to prove soundness and partial completeness of the translation with respect to mixin composition synthesis. Furthermore, we demonstrate how a translated repository and goal type can be used as input to an existing framework for composition synthesis in bounded combinatory logic via type inhabitation. The computed result is a class typed by the goal type and generated by a mixin composition applied to an existing class

Strong Completeness Results for Paraconsistent Logic Programming

In [6], we introduced a means of allowing logic programs to contain negations in both the head and the body of a clause. Such programs were called generally Horn programs (GHPs, for short). The model-theoretic semantics of GHPs were defined in terms of four-valued Belnap lattices [5]. For a class of programs called well-behaved programs, an SLD-resolution like proof procedure was introduced. This procedure was proven (under certain restrictions) to be sound (for existential queries) and complete (for ground queries). In this paper, we remove the restriction that programs be well-behaved and extend our soundness and completeness results to apply to arbitrary existential queries and to arbitrary GHPs. This is the strongest possible completeness result for GHPs. The results reported here apply to the design of very large knowledge bases and in processing queries to knowledge bases that possibly contain erroneous information

A hybrid approach for modeling uncertainty in terminological logics

This paper proposes a probabilistic extension of terminological logics. The extension maintains the original performance of drawing inferences in a hierarchy of terminological definitions. It enlarges the range of applicability to real world domains determined not only by definitional but also by uncertain knowledge. First, we introduce the propositionally complete terminological language ALC. On the basis of the language construct "probabilistic implication" it is shown how statistical information on concept dependencies can be represented. To guarantee (terminological and probabilistic) consistency, several requirements have to be met. Moreover, these requirements allow one to infer implicitly existent probabilistic relationships and their quantitative computation. By explicitly introducing restrictions for the ranges derived by instantiating the consistency requirements, exceptions can also be handled. In the categorical cases this corresponds to the overriding of properties in non monotonic inheritance networks. Consequently, our model applies to domains where both term descriptions and non-categorical relations between term extensions have to be represented