Norm Negotiation in Online Multi-Player Games

In this paper, we introduce an agent communication protocol and speech acts for norm negotiation. The protocol creates individual or contractual obligations to fulfill goals of the agents based on the so-called social delegation cycle. First, agents communicate their individual goals and powers. Second, they propose social goals which can be accepted or rejected by other agents. Third, they propose obligations and sanctions to achieve the social goal, which can again be accepted or rejected. Finally, the agents accept the new norm by indicating which of their communicated individual goals the norm achieves. The semantics of the speech acts is based on a commitment to public mental attitudes. The norm negotiation model is illustrated by an example of norm negotiation in multi-player online gaming

Massively multiple online role playing games as normative multiagent systems

The latest advancements in computer games offer a domain of human and artificial agent behaviour well suited for analysis and development based on normative multi agent systems research. One of the most influential gaming trends today, Massively Multi Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG), poses new questions about the interaction between the players in the game. If we model the players and groups of players in these games as multiagent systems with the possibility to create norms and sanction norm violations we have to create a way to describe the different kind of norms that may appear in these situations. Certain situations in MMORPG are subject to discussions about how norms are created and propagated in a group, one such example involves the sleeper in the game Everquest, from Sony Online Entertainment (SOE). The Sleeper was at first designed to be unkillable, but after some events and some considerations from SOE the sleeper was finally killed. The most interesting aspect of the story about the sleeper is how we can interpret the norms being created in this example. We propose a framework to analyse the norms involved in the interaction between players and groups in MMORPG. We argue that our model adds complexity where we find earlier norm typologies lacking some descriptive power of this phenomenon, and we can even describe and understand the confusing event with the sleeper in Everquest

Ten Challenges for Normative Multiagent Systems

In this paper we discuss the shift from a legal to an interactionist view on normative multiagent systems, examples, and ten new challenges in this more dynamic setting

The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions

Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conflicts? While norms are widely regarded as a source for cooperation, this article proposes a novel theory in which the emergence of norms can be understood as a bargaining process in which normative conflicts explain the finally emerging norm. The theory is tested with a dynamical experiment on conflicts over the consideration of equality, effort or efficiency for the distribution of joint earnings. Normative conflict is measured by the number of rejected offers in a recursive bargaining game. The emerging normative system is analyzed by feedback cycles between micro- and macro-level. It is demonstrated that more normative cues cause more normative conflict. Further, under the structural conditions of either simple or complex situations, the convergence towards a simple and widely shared norm is likely. In contrast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely and several equally reasonable norms co-exist. The findings are discussed with respect to the integration of sociological conflict theory with the bargaining concept in economic theory.social norms, normative conflict, bargaining, cooperation, experiment

Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of America: From the Formal to the Informal to the ‘Semi-formal’

The story of ADR in the US is one of ‘co-optation’ of what was to be a serious challenge to formalistic and legalistic approaches to legal and social problem solving and is now highly institutionalized by its more formal use in courts. At the same time, use of private forms of dispute resolution in mediation, arbitration and newly hybridised forms of dispute resolution among disputants who can choose (and afford) to leave the formal justice system (in both large commercial matters and private family matters) has resulted in claims of increased privatization of justice, with consequences for access to justice in different areas of legal dispute resolution. These consequences include difficulty of access to some forms of private dispute resolution for those who cannot afford them and claims that, with mass exits from the formal system by those who can afford to ‘litigate’ elsewhere, there is less interest in judicial service and reform. In addition, in recent years consumers and employees have been subjected to contractual commitments to mandatory arbitration, sustained by the US Supreme Court, which has all but eliminated choice about where to resolve certain kinds of disputes. All of these claims are highly contested by practitioners, judges and scholars of the American legal system