An Algorithmic Argument for Nonadaptive Query Complexity Lower Bounds on Advised Quantum Computation

This paper employs a powerful argument, called an algorithmic argument, to prove lower bounds of the quantum query complexity of a multiple-block ordered search problem in which, given a block number i, we are to find a location of a target keyword in an ordered list of the i-th block. Apart from much studied polynomial and adversary methods for quantum query complexity lower bounds, our argument shows that the multiple-block ordered search needs a large number of nonadaptive oracle queries on a black-box model of quantum computation that is also supplemented with advice. Our argument is also applied to the notions of computational complexity theory: quantum truth-table reducibility and quantum truth-table autoreducibility.Comment: 16 pages. An extended abstract will appear in the Proceedings of the 29th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Prague, August 22-27, 200

Adversary lower bounds for nonadaptive quantum algorithms

International audienceWe present general methods for proving lower bounds on the query complexity of nonadaptive quantum algorithms. Our results are based on the adversary method of Ambainis

Quantum Certificate Complexity

Given a Boolean function f, we study two natural generalizations of the certificate complexity C(f): the randomized certificate complexity RC(f) and the quantum certificate complexity QC(f). Using Ambainis' adversary method, we exactly characterize QC(f) as the square root of RC(f). We then use this result to prove the new relation R0(f) = O(Q2(f)^2 Q0(f) log n) for total f, where R0, Q2, and Q0 are zero-error randomized, bounded-error quantum, and zero-error quantum query complexities respectively. Finally we give asymptotic gaps between the measures, including a total f for which C(f) is superquadratic in QC(f), and a symmetric partial f for which QC(f) = O(1) yet Q2(f) = Omega(n/log n).Comment: 9 page

Optimal query complexity for estimating the trace of a matrix

Given an implicit $n\times n$ matrix $A$ with oracle access $x^TA x$ for any $x\in \mathbb{R}^n$, we study the query complexity of randomized algorithms for estimating the trace of the matrix. This problem has many applications in quantum physics, machine learning, and pattern matching. Two metrics are commonly used for evaluating the estimators: i) variance; ii) a high probability multiplicative-approximation guarantee. Almost all the known estimators are of the form $\frac{1}{k}\sum_{i=1}^k x_i^T A x_i$ for $x_i\in \mathbb{R}^n$ being i.i.d. for some special distribution. Our main results are summarized as follows. We give an exact characterization of the minimum variance unbiased estimator in the broad class of linear nonadaptive estimators (which subsumes all the existing known estimators). We also consider the query complexity lower bounds for any (possibly nonlinear and adaptive) estimators: (1) We show that any estimator requires $\Omega(1/\epsilon)$ queries to have a guarantee of variance at most $\epsilon$. (2) We show that any estimator requires $\Omega(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}\log \frac{1}{\delta})$ queries to achieve a $(1\pm\epsilon)$-multiplicative approximation guarantee with probability at least $1 - \delta$. Both above lower bounds are asymptotically tight. As a corollary, we also resolve a conjecture in the seminal work of Avron and Toledo (Journal of the ACM 2011) regarding the sample complexity of the Gaussian Estimator.Comment: full version of the paper in ICALP 201

Quantum Query Lower Bounds for Key Recovery Attacks on the Even-Mansour Cipher

The Even-Mansour (EM) cipher is one of the famous constructions for a block cipher. Kuwakado and Morii demonstrated that a quantum adversary can recover its $n$-bit secret keys only with $O(n)$ nonadaptive quantum queries. While the security of the EM cipher and its variants is well-understood for classical adversaries, very little is currently known of their quantum security. Towards a better understanding of the quantum security, or the limits of quantum adversaries for the EM cipher, we study the quantum query complexity for the key recovery of the EM cipher and prove every quantum algorithm requires $\Omega(n)$ quantum queries for the key recovery even if it is allowed to make adaptive queries. Therefore, the quantum attack of Kuwakado and Morii has the optimal query complexity up to a constant factor, and we cannot asymptotically improve it even with adaptive quantum queries