Why De Minimis?

De minimis cutoffs are a familiar feature of risk regulation. This includes the quantitative individual risk thresholds for fatality risks employed in many contexts by EPA, FDA, and other agencies, such as the 1-in-1 million lifetime cancer risk cutoff; extreme event cutoffs for addressing natural hazards, such as the 100 - year - flood or 475 - year - earthquake; de minimis failure probabilities for built structures; the exclusion of low - probability causal models; and other policymaking criteria. All these tests have a common structure, as I show in the Article. A de minimis test, broadly defined, tells the decisionmaker to determine whether the probability of some outcome is above a low threshold and makes this determination relevant, in some way, to her choice. De minimis cutoffs are deeply problematic, and have been generally misunderstood by scholars. First, they are warranted - if at all - by virtue of policymakers\u27 bounded rationality. If policymakers were fully rational, de minimis cutoffs would have no justification. (This is true, I suggest, across a wide range of normative theories, and for the full gamut of de minimis tests). Second, although it seems plausible that some de minimis tests are justified once bounded rationality is brought into the picture, it is not clear which those are, or even how we should go about identifying them

Environmental Enrichment for Primates in Laboratories

Environmental enrichment is a critical component of Refinement, one of the 3Rs underlying humane experimentation on animals. In this paper I discuss why primates housed in laboratories, which often have constraints of space and study protocols, are a special case for enrichment. I outline a framework for categorising the different types of enrichment, using the marmoset as a case study, and summarise the methods used to determine what animals want/prefer. I briefly review the arguments that enrichment does not negatively affect experimental outcomes. Finally I focus on complexity and novelty, choice and control, the underlying features of enrichment that makes it successful, and how combined with a thorough understanding of natural history we can put effective enrichment into practice in laboratories. Throughout the paper I emphasise the need to evaluate enrichment to ensure it is having the desired effect

Why De Minimis?

De minimis cutoffs are a familiar feature of risk regulation. This includes the quantitative "individual risk" thresholds for fatality risks employed in many contexts by EPA, FDA, and other agencies, such as the 1-in-1 million lifetime cancer risk cutoff; extreme event cutoffs for addressing natural hazards, such as the 100-year-flood or 475-year-earthquake; de minimis failure probabilities for built structures; the exclusion of low-probability causal models; and other policymaking criteria. All these tests have a common structure, as I show in the Article. A de minimis test, broadly defined, tells the decisionmaker to determine whether the probability of some outcome is above a low threshold and makes this determination relevant, in some way, to her choice. De minimis cutoffs are deeply problematic, and have been generally misunderstood by scholars. First, they are warranted -- if at all -- by virtue of policymakers' bounded rationality. If policymakers were fully rational, de minimis cutoffs would have no justification. Second, although it seems plausible that some de minimis tests are justified once bounded rationality is brought into the picture, it is not clear which those are, or even how we should go about identifying them.Health and Safety, Regulatory Reform

Resistance to bribery when aggregating soft constraints

Abstract We consider a multi-agent scenario, where the preferences of several agents are modelled via soft constraint problems and need to be aggregated to compute a single "socially optimal" solution. We study the resistance of various ways to compute such a solution to influence the result, such as those based on the notion of bribery. In doing this, we link the cost of bribing an agent to the effort needed by the agent to make a certain solution optimal, by only changing preferences associated to parts of the solution. This leads to the definition of four notions of distance from optimality of a solution in a soft constraint problem. The notions differ on the amount of information considered when evaluating the effort

Community-based risk management arrangements : an overview and implications for social fund programs

Risk and its consequences pose a formidable threat to poverty reduction efforts. This study reviews a plethora of community-based risk management arrangements across the developing world. These types of arrangements are garnering greater interest in light of the growing recognition of the relative prominence of household or individual-specific idiosyncratic risk as well as the increasing shift towards community-based development funding. The study discusses potential advantages (such as targeting, cost, and informational) and disadvantages (such as exclusion and inability to manage correlated risk) of these arrangements, and their implications for the design of innovative social fund programs.Rural Poverty Reduction,Labor Policies,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Currencies and Exchange Rates,Debt Markets

Labour by Design: Contributions of David Card, Joshua Angrist, and Guido Imbens

The 2021 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to David Card "for his empirical contributions to labour economics" and to Joshua Angrist and Guido Imbens "for their methodological contributions to the analysis of causal relationships." We survey these contributions of the three laureates, and discuss how their empirical and methodological insights transformed the modern practice of applied microeconomics. By emphasizing research design and formalizing the causal content of different econometric procedures, the laureates shed new light on key questions in labour economics and advanced a robust toolkit for empirical analyses across many fields